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Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

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<strong>Mediation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>African</strong> <strong>Peace</strong> Processes: Carefully Compar<strong>in</strong>g Apples and Oranges<br />

but actually mediated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> border<strong>in</strong>g country,<br />

as any conflict spill-over (migration, organized<br />

crime, armed groups) also leads to <strong>in</strong>security at<br />

home.<br />

Context with mixed impacts: The Sudan North-<br />

South process is an example <strong>of</strong> transition through<br />

various phases where <strong>the</strong> context was supportive,<br />

neutral, or even impeded progress. The IGAD<br />

countries Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda<br />

were much more coord<strong>in</strong>ated and thus supportive<br />

at <strong>the</strong> onset <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sudan North-South negotiations<br />

than towards <strong>the</strong> end, when <strong>the</strong>y became<br />

preoccupied with <strong>the</strong> Ethiopia-Eritrea clashes or<br />

tensions <strong>in</strong> Somalia. The attacks on 11 September<br />

2001 seem to have helped kick <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> Sudan negotiations,<br />

as Sudan feared it would be attacked<br />

similarly to Afghanistan if <strong>the</strong> country did not<br />

show some goodwill, but later on, <strong>the</strong> CIA also<br />

benefited from <strong>in</strong>telligence provided by <strong>the</strong> Government<br />

<strong>of</strong> Sudan (GoS) on Islamic groups, mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />

it easier for <strong>the</strong> GoS to slow down <strong>the</strong> process<br />

and have <strong>the</strong>ir say. The process enjoyed f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

and political support from <strong>the</strong> US, <strong>the</strong> UK, and<br />

Norway (Troika), as well as <strong>the</strong> EU and <strong>the</strong> UN.<br />

The chief mediator, Lt. Gen. Sumbeiywo, managed<br />

to protect <strong>the</strong> process from too much external<br />

<strong>in</strong>tervention – it is reported that he even<br />

threatened to shoot <strong>the</strong> US envoy when <strong>the</strong> latter<br />

became too <strong>in</strong>trusive. 8 The Ugandan-LRA negotiations<br />

began shortly after North and South Sudan<br />

signed <strong>the</strong>ir peace agreement. The LRA had<br />

acted as a proxy rebel group for <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />

GoS, help<strong>in</strong>g it to fight aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> SPLM <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

South. Once <strong>the</strong> Sudanese had struck a deal with<br />

each o<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> LRA lost its support, putt<strong>in</strong>g it<br />

under pressure that helped to open up negotiations<br />

with <strong>the</strong> Ugandan government.<br />

Imped<strong>in</strong>g context: In <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g processes, <strong>the</strong><br />

context seemed detrimental: Darfur, Somalia,<br />

Western Sahara, North-Mali/North-Niger – Tuareg<br />

and Congo/Kivu. In Darfur, <strong>the</strong> regional<br />

states <strong>of</strong> Libya, Chad, and Eritrea were fund<strong>in</strong>g<br />

one or <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conflict parties. In <strong>the</strong> US,<br />

a strong domestic lobby was call<strong>in</strong>g for swift action,<br />

and Ch<strong>in</strong>a had <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />

8 Mart<strong>in</strong>, Harriet: “K<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>Peace</strong>, Pawns <strong>of</strong> War: The Untold<br />

Story <strong>of</strong> <strong>Peace</strong>-Mak<strong>in</strong>g”, London, New York: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum International<br />

Publish<strong>in</strong>g Group (2006), p.137.<br />

<strong>the</strong> stability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sudanese regime due to its oil<br />

<strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> parties<br />

still felt <strong>the</strong>y could ga<strong>in</strong> more on <strong>the</strong> battlefield<br />

than at <strong>the</strong> negotiation table. In Western Sahara,<br />

<strong>the</strong> governments <strong>of</strong> Algeria and <strong>of</strong> Mauritania,<br />

<strong>the</strong> former colonial power France, and <strong>the</strong> US<br />

each had visions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own for <strong>the</strong> outcome,<br />

which did not necessarily agree with <strong>the</strong> UN’s vision<br />

at <strong>the</strong> time James Baker was work<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong><br />

conflict. In <strong>the</strong> North-Mali/North-Niger – Tuareg<br />

negotiations, Libya had a strong regional<br />

agenda that motivated it to mediate, but it may<br />

also have been <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> streng<strong>the</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g ties<br />

with certa<strong>in</strong> parties, even if no agreement was<br />

struck. The US counter-terrorism policy<br />

throughout <strong>the</strong> Sahel zone has also caused most<br />

non-governmental actors to be branded terrorists,<br />

mak<strong>in</strong>g it easier for governments to pursue <strong>the</strong>m<br />

militarily ra<strong>the</strong>r than to talk with <strong>the</strong>m, e.g., <strong>in</strong><br />

Niger. In <strong>the</strong> Congo/Kivu negotiations, Rwanda<br />

and Uganda were miss<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong> negotiations, but<br />

would have been key actors. In Somalia, Ethiopia<br />

– backed by <strong>the</strong> US’s counter-terrorism approach<br />

– was pursu<strong>in</strong>g a military solution aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> Islamic<br />

courts, thus leav<strong>in</strong>g extremely little room<br />

for any mediation process.<br />

In summary, context matters! If <strong>the</strong> context is<br />

strongly detrimental to <strong>the</strong> process, it is very hard<br />

to reach a susta<strong>in</strong>able outcome. However, most<br />

processes go through phases where <strong>the</strong> context is<br />

variously supportive, neutral, or imped<strong>in</strong>g. Dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />

difficult phases, <strong>the</strong> process may slow down,<br />

only to pick up aga<strong>in</strong> when <strong>the</strong> context changes.<br />

The key challenge for a mediator is to analyze <strong>the</strong><br />

context and see how best to design <strong>the</strong> process to<br />

fit it. At times, it may be better to lie low and<br />

wait for a more favorable context. Probably, it is<br />

useful to stay <strong>in</strong>volved and engaged dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se<br />

difficult phases, but not to fund major meet<strong>in</strong>gs,<br />

as long as <strong>the</strong>y have little chance <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g productive.<br />

Donors who want to be effective need patience<br />

and perseverance.<br />

Process<br />

The process factors analyzed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 11 case studies<br />

comprised participation, mediation style,<br />

third-party coord<strong>in</strong>ation, and mediation setup.<br />

13

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