Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes
many observers linked the increasing number of
attacks against government positions in both Mali
and Niger to the presence of the ‘goodwill mission’.
156
Due to the heavy casualties suffered by the weak
military during the first months of 2008 and extensive
desertion from the armed forces to the rebels,
the Tuareg rebels expanded their control
from northern Mali to central parts of the country.
Few army officers still supported the president’s
attempts to find a solution to the conflict
through dialog and negotiations with the rebels.
In order to lessen the risk of a military coup, the
president replaced several of his highest-ranking
army officers and promised that the military
would strike back at the rebels, regardless of human
costs. 157 Algeria resumed its mediation efforts
in late July, aiming at re-asserting the provisions
of the 2006 deal. After four days of talks in
Algiers, an agreement on cessation of hostilities
was signed on 21 July between Malian government
envoys and the Malian Tuareg rebels.
In Niger, the conflict is spiraling out of control.
Although it expressed its cooperation with the
tribal delegation in late May, the Niger government
has now ruled out any peace talks with the
MNJ despite pressure from international organizations
and human rights groups. It cites Mali as
an example showing that dialog with the rebels is
useless, regardless of Algerian or Libyan mediation
efforts. Niger will instead focus on providing
security for growing foreign investments. 158
Perceptions by the Conflict Parties
While the Malian government very likely perceived
Libya’s engagement as a threat – Libya’s
regional influence is irrefutable, and to openly
oppose Libya in its ‘quest for peace’ could easily
cause negative repercussions – the rebels viewed
the involvement as an opportunity to gain political
and financial support. None of the parties respected
the ceasefire that was imposed upon them
by Libya, mainly due to mistrust. Libya’s mediation
effort was focused on getting quick results
rather than building up the necessary trust be-
156 Robert (2008): op. cit.
157 Ibid.
158 Reuters: “Niger rules out rebel talks, will protect investors” (9
June 2008), (http://africa.reuters.com).
58
tween the parties to create willingness for a serious
dialog. The Malian government never ordered
a ceasefire or a partial withdrawal of its
army, as it believed that the rebels had signed the
ceasefire merely to win time to reorganize and return
in force. Similarly, the rebel group never released
its hostages and intensified rather than
ceased its attacks on government troops. A source
within the Malian rebel group said that the Tuaregs
had determined that the government had
only signed the ceasefire to gain time to reinforce
the military. 159
Officially, the governments of Mali and Niger
welcomed Libya’s second-stage engagement, and
saluted Gaddafi for his ‘historic initiative to establish
security and stability’. 160 Judging from
later developments, however, this seemed to be
true only in rhetorical and diplomatic terms, at
least from Niger’s side. The rebels got what they
wanted, namely Libya’s influential support to
form a Tuareg state, a cause that many see as a
cover for far less altruistic goals.
Assessment
The governments of Mali and Niger have had
two different approaches: One has sought dialog
and negotiated settlements with those who are
not satisfied; the other has dismissed the notion
of any form of dialog and pursued a purely military
solution to the conflict. Until very recently,
Mali has had more success than Niger in containing
the threat from Tuareg insurgents, mainly
due to its willingness to enter into dialog.
Process
From a methodological point of view, Gaddafi’s
moral authority and innovative approach to regional
conflict resolution had several advantages.
The influence of Libya and its president in the
region goes unchallenged, and the symbolic value
of an ‘Arab brotherhood’, with tribal elders and
prominent Arabs finding an Arab solution to a
regional problem over land and assets without
outside interference, should not be underesti-
159 Reuters: “Mali not following truce with rebels” (8 April 2008),
(http://africa.reuters.com).
160 Libya Online: “Reconciliation delegation formed by the People’s
Social League of Tribes from Grand Sahara visits Niger” (3
June 2008), (http://www.libyaonline.com).