Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agreement
process, but are likely to re-emerge as the elections
come closer.
Assessment
Process
The exclusive nature of the talks was necessary to
allow the two main opponents to build confidence,
the weak spot of all previous agreements.
Previous mediation efforts had been prone to
casting blame on all sorts of non-controllable actors,
such as the pro-government MPs, which repeatedly
blocked agreed amendments in parliament,
the international community for its neocolonial
stance, or the Government of Reconciliation
with its weak and marginalized prime minister.
The resulting lack of trust could only be
overcome if the principal actors were directly accountable
for the implementation of the agreement.
Blaise Compaoré invested a remarkable amount
of energy in the resolution of the conflict and repeatedly
pressured the parties when the implementation
process became deadlocked. 90 There
are two main reasons for his engagement: First,
Burkina Faso’s economy relies to a large extent on
the ability to export its goods into and through
neighboring countries; secondly, Compaoré was
suspected of having fuelled other West African
conflicts and was interested in improving his
reputation through his mediation efforts in Togo
and Côte d’Ivoire. 91 Even though being biased
towards one conflict party, his mediation was
perceived as even-handed.
Finally, low-power mediation was a crucial component
of empowerment of the leading actors. It
allowed for shifts in perception and attitude and
put the actors in a situation where they were
forced to make their own decisions for their own
process.
Agreement
The assessment of the agreement is ambivalent.
The text was short and focused on the problems
the parties needed to deal with most urgently. It
was more likely to be implemented, as its provi-
90 International Crisis Group (2008): op. cit., p. 3.
91 International Crisis Group (2007): op.cit., p. 6.
sions were not part of an external plan to solve
the crisis, but the result of the parties’ own deliberations.
At the same time, the implementation
schedule was not detailed enough and provided
for misunderstandings regarding the roles and responsibilities.
Additionally, the timelines were
unrealistic. Most of these shortcomings, for instance
the delay in the election process, could be
managed by the CPC, though.
Context
The successful transitions of Sierra Leone and Liberia,
together with the change in attitude of
Blaise Compaoré, were necessary conditions to
the solution of the Ivorian crisis. At the same
time, the constant international and rising internal
pressure might have pushed Gbagbo to put
forward his own proposal for negotiations. For
instance, one factor pushing Gbagbo into talks
might have been the shrinking influence of
Gbagbo’s close ally, the Alliance des jeunes patriotes
pour le sursaut national, in Abidjan. Thus,
while low-power mediation was necessary as a
process feature, international pressure was needed
as a long-term characteristic of the context.
Outlook
The key challenges for the mediation during the
implementation phase mostly pertain to the technical
implementation of the OA as well as to the
internal dynamics of the conflict parties.
• Generally speaking, the presidential elections as
well as the period of around six months between
the presidential and legislative elections
will be the most volatile in terms of security.
The mediation will have to take into account
the prospect of changing alliances and increased
tensions.
• The former presidential party’s leader Bédié
was one of the ideologues behind the ‘Ivoirité’
concept directed against his fellow oppositionist
Ouattara. These ruptures will certainly reemerge
on the eve of the elections and may
therefore change the dynamics within the CPC.
• Electoral register: Up to now, about half a million
people have been issued auxiliary birth certificates
with the remark “claiming to be
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