Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes
Northern Uganda, Juba Negotiations
By David Lanz, Mediation Support Project, swisspeace
In a Nutshell
The Juba talks between the government of
Uganda (GoU) and the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) officially started on 18 July 2006 under
the mediation of Vice-President of the Government
of Southern Sudan (GoSS) Riek Machar.
On 26 August 2006, the parties signed a document
on the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH),
which provided for the regrouping of LRA fighters
in two designated assembly points in Southern
Sudan. The CoH instituted a Cessation of Hostilities
Monitoring Team (CHTM) led by the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army. The negotiations
continued, but difficulties emerged in late
2006, as the parties violated the CoH and the
LRA voiced dissatisfaction about the process. The
talks were thus interrupted, and new mediators
were brought in, in particular the Special Envoy
of the UN Secretary-General for the areas affected
by the LRA, Joaquim Chissano, who was appointed
in December 2006.
The talks were taken up on 2 May 2007, the parties
signed the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions
to tackle the root causes of the conflict in
Northern Uganda. Roughly two months later on
29 June 2007, the parties signed the Agreement
on Reconciliation and Accountability, which provided
a framework for dealing with the past in
Northern Uganda and for addressing the International
Criminal Court (ICC) indictments of four
senior LRA leaders. In fall of 2007, the context of
the talks changed due to the assassination of
Kony’s deputy Vincent Otti. Negotiations were
taken up in January 2008 and concluded within a
month: On 29 February 2008, an annex to the
Agreement on Reconciliation and Accountability
was signed, followed by the agreements on DDR
and Implementation on 2 March 2008.
The final peace accord was supposed to be signed
in mid-April 2008 by Ugandan President Yoweri
Kaguta Museveni and LRA leader Joseph Kony,
but the latter failed to turn up to the signing
ceremony.
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Key Messages
Self-interested mediator: The GoSS became involved
as a mediator because it had a manifest
self-interest in neutralizing the security threat that
the LRA posed on its territory and in satisfying
Acholi groups within South Sudan. Selfinterested
mediators can be effective because of
their leverage over the parties and commitment to
the process.
“Losing” the ANSA leadership: The leaders of an
armed non-state actor (ANSA) cannot always be
present at the talks, which poses the risk that the
talks advance without their consent, giving them
the feeling of being out-maneuvered by their
agents. This can produce a backlash and lead to
the withdrawal of an ANSA from a peace process
at the last minute.
Perils of forum-shopping: The parties are likely to
blame the mediators when they feel unsatisfied
with the process. They may then try to find a new
mediator. This “forum-shopping” can seriously
undermine a process. International backers of
peace negotiations should prevent this by honoring
their commitment to the initial mediator.
Impact of the ICC: Despite its legal mandate, the
ICC had an important political impact on the
Juba talks. The indictments against senior LRA
leaders put pressure on the group and contributed
to bringing it to the negotiating table. The ICC
also influenced the structure of the negotiations,
making issues of transitional justice its central focus.
Finally, the indictments made it difficult to
satisfy the security concerns of the LRA, which
complicated the conclusion of the Juba talks.
Peace dividends even without agreement: The Juba
talks did not officially succeed, as the LRA did
not sign the final peace agreement. They nonetheless
had a positive impact in terms of stabilizing
the security situation in Northern Uganda. As
a result, close to one million IDPs were able to return
home.