Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

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Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes rebel groups were not signatories of the Arusha Accord, signed in 2000. Mediation Style and Third-Party Coordination The regional African states’ most significant initiative – economic sanctions against the Burundi government and mediation under the auspices of Nyerere – suffered, at least initially, from lack of sufficient Western support. The regional states clearly pushed the Burundian conflict parties in the direction of political negotiation. European and US reservations were based on their belief that it was necessary to work through moderate political leaders and that a relaxation of sanctions would strengthen moderate forces for peace. But the Burundi government’s military-oriented policies indicated that relative extremists were largely in control. This suggested the need for more rather than less outside pressure, carefully orchestrated to bring the radical rebel groups into power-sharing negotiations that could protect their essential interests. 21 A plethora of non-state mediation organizations were active in Burundi, including the Carter Center 22 , the Community of Sant’Egidio 23 , The Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) 24 , and Synergies Africa 25 . Some of these efforts helped to keep the peace process moving while the official Arusha talks were stalled, e.g. efforts of Sant’Egidio in 1997 or by the Swiss Federalism Institute and Synergies Africa in March 1998. 21 Weissman (1998): op. cit. 22 The Carter Center sponsored talks in 1995 and 1996, cochaired by Julius Nyerere and Jimmy Carter. Hara (1999): op.cit., p. 146. 23 Sant’Egidio had contacts with the parties since 1995, and held secret talks in Rome leading to an outline agreement in 1997 (Ibid., p. 147). Don Mateo Zuppi, a member of St. Egidio, had the office of the president of the commission for the "ceasefire and disarmament" in the official Arusha talks under Nyerere and Mandela. Sant Egidio website: (http://www.santegidio.org/en/pace/pace6.htm) 24 HD was involved in 1999 in efforts to establish communication channels with the armed groups. In Feb 2000 HD hosted a seminar in Geneva to start a dialogue on humanitarian issues. It ended these efforts in August 2000, however, so as not to distract from the then-ongoing political negotiations in Arusha. HD website: (http://www.hdcentre.org/projects/burundi/activities?hd-centre-ends-its-involvement-burundi) 25 Synergies Africa helped set up a conference in 1997 and seminar in 1998. Hara (1999): op. cit., p. 147-150. 24 However, parallel efforts by non state mediators also posed the danger of giving certain splinter groups some form of legitimacy while not being at the table, or giving the parties an excuse to exit the Arusha process. 26 This was also why HD stopped its efforts to establish a dialogue on humanitarian issues in August 2000. 27 Thus the Burundi case shows the potential of various third parties, but also that too many actors can threaten a process if they are not well coordinated. Arusha Process The Arusha process was structured into five committees dealing with the following topics: 1) nature of the conflict, 2) democracy, good governance, and constitutional arrangements28 , 3) peace and security, 4) reconstruction and development, 5) guarantees to support implementation of the accord. Besides the chief mediators Nyerere and later Mandela, there were some two dozen people in the facilitation team between the Tanzanian Facilitation and the International ones. The mediators of the second committee structured the agenda by getting the parties to talk about the 1992 constitution, which had been very widely accepted in a referendum. The parties were set the task of making three columns: 1) acceptable points that they agreed with, 2) problematic points that could, however, be dealt with once the main hurdles had been overcome, 3) unacceptable points, which were absolutely “no-go” areas. The agenda was set following the second and third points. In this process, the mediators were looking for institutional settings and constitutional principles that would help bring Burundi out of its actual crisis and start solving the political crisis through power sharing mechanisms. A working draft document presented by the mediators, based on the 1992 constitution and the talks that had taken place so far, was rejected by all the parties. This is in fact better than if it is accepted by some parities, but rejected by others, as the mediator is then viewed as being biased. The 26 Hara (1999): op.cit., p. 150. 27 (http://www.hdcentre.org/projects/burundi/activities?hd-centreends-its-involvement-burundi) 28 Chaired by Nicolas Haysom and Julian T Hottinger.
Burundi, Arusha Peace Process idea of a draft text is that it is a document to work on, to adapt and “massage”. The principle set by the mediators for this work was that the parties could only change the content of the draft if there was total consensus amongst the parties. All parties had to agree to the change, but they could and did bargain: “If you change this I will let you change that”. This took about one year of work, in which the parties were supported by the mediators. It is likely that after the death of Julius Nyerere on the 14 th of October 1999, the process would have broken down if Nelson Mandela had not come in December 1999. He first let the committees work, and then increased pressure to get an agreement on the open issues, working with the heads of delegations. He used a lot of moral pressure, but with his background, was able to do so authentically and effectively. On a visit to Burundi in his capacity as chief facilitator of the peace process, for example, he visited a prison on the first day and said “If we are looking for peace here in Burundi, all the political prisoners have to be released.” 29 On the second day, he visited a Hutu refugee camp that he had earlier termed a ‘concentration camp’. 30 Finally, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was signed on 28 August 2000. Key Issues in the Arusha Accords 31 • Clarification of the origin and nature of the conflict so as to lead towards reconciliation • Agreement on an institutional framework for the transitional period, aiming at democratic renewal and fair power-sharing. The key principle here was the decision to include all parties to the conflict, without exception; to continue with the momentum of negotiations and dialog; and to re-establish the rights of the persons elected as well as of the parties that participated in the 1993 elections. 29 BBC News: “Mandela visits Burundi prisoners” (12 June 2000), (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/788230.stm). 30 BBC News: “Mandela visits “concentration camps” (13 June 2000), (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/788855.stm). 31 International Crisis Group: “Neither War Nor Peace”, Africa Report No. 25. (1 December 2000), (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400267_ 01122000.pdf). • Reform of the army and security guarantees for all citizens. • Outline of the country’s economic and social revival, and stabilization based on a return of refugees. • International guarantees ensuring that the Arusha resolutions would be implemented. Implementation The Hutu and Tutsi parties signed the Arusha accords in 2000 and formed a transitional government from 2002 to 2005. On 23 July 2001, Mandela’s choice of Pierre Buyoya and Domitien Ndayizeye as, respectively, president and vice president of Burundi for the first phase of transition was endorsed by the summit of regional heads of state. 32 This was a milestone in the implementation of the Arusha accord. Eight years down the road, the Arusha accord has to a large extent been implemented, even if at a slower timetable than anticipated. Today, power is shared in the government of Burundi, with 60 per cent Hutu and 40 per cent Tutsi representation in government institutions. The president is a Hutu, the vice president is a Tutsi, and the second vice president is a Hutu. The army is made up to equal parts of Hutu and Tutsi. Not all the armed rebel groups (all Hutu) were associated with this peace agreement, however. Buyoya’s transitional government negotiated a ceasefire agreement with the National Council for the CNDD-FDD in 2003. The CNDD-FDD then dominated the elections in 2005, forming the first democratically elected government of Burundi after the Arusha accords were signed. This government then negotiated the return to Burundi of other movements (e.g. CNDD; FNL Mugaramabona). It also tried to negotiate and deal militarily with the last active rebel group, Palipehutu-FNL. Ceasefire agreements were signed (e.g., in 2007), but were generally poorly implemented. 32 International Crisis Group: “Burundi: One Hundred Days to put the Peace Process Back on Track”, Africa Report no. 33 (14 August 2001), (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1656&l=1). 25
Page 1 and 2: Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation
Page 3: Table of Content Foreword..........
Page 7 and 8: “If you want to make peace with y
Page 9 and 10: Mediation in African Peace Processe
Page 21 and 22: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process Burun
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Page 27 and 28: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process insti
Page 29 and 30: Central African Republic, Inclusive
Page 35 and 36: Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agree
Page 41 and 42: D. R. Congo/Kivu, Conference on Pea
Page 47 and 48: Kenya, The National Accord and Reco
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Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Pe
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Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Pe
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Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations an
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Western Sahara, The Baker Plans Wes
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Western Sahara, The Baker Plans poi
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Western Sahara, The Baker Plans as
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Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation
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Acronyms MSU UN Mediation Support U
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