Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes
smuggling routes in the Sahara and Sahel
zones. 146
Previous and Parallel Negotiations
/ Entry Points
Previous Negotiations
Peace deals in both Mali and Niger brought an
end to major fighting more than a decade ago,
but low-level fighting has continued. Some of the
main talks and agreements are: 1) the National
Pact in 1992 between the Mali government and a
coalition of Tuareg rebels; 2) the Ouagadougou
Agreement in 1998 between the Niger government
and the MNJ, initiated and brokered by
Burkina Faso’s president Blaise Compaoré; 3) the
Algiers Agreement in 2006 between the Malian
government and the DAC, mediated by Algeria;
4) various unofficial attempts in 2007 to negotiate
with Bahanga, led by Tuareg elders; and 5)
the process involving the former Tuareg rebel
leader Iyad Ag Ghaly, accompanied by Algerian
delegates, in which they met officially with Bahanga
in Algiers in late 2007 to revive the peace
process between the Mali government and the rebels.
Furthermore, the parties professed their interest
to enter into dialog in the talks initiated by
Algeria in early 2008. This process was interrupted
during the four-month (March-June) Libyan
engagement, but was taken up again in late
July.
Entry Points
The Mali rebels are based in the far-north region
of Mali, near the Algerian border. Several incidents
of attacks by the armed militia in the Mali
Sahel region have been registered close to the Nigerien
border with Libya. 147 The risk of escalation
further set in motion a process of political consultation
and created pressure to initiate dialog with
the rebels. In 2008, a mission was formed on a
Libyan initiative, operating under the name of
‘Delegation of Tribal Chiefs of the Great Sahara’
(the Delegation), in order to make contact with
all conflict parties. It consisted of sheiks and sul-
146 Reuters: “Climate, arms, drugs make lethal mix in Sahel” (5
June 2008), (http://africa.reuters.com).
147 IRIN News: “Western diplomats warn about ‘deterioration’ in
north” (11 September 2007), (http://www.irinnews.org).
56
tans from 14 Muslim countries who enjoyed
prominent social status in their countries and in
the Sahara in general. 148 Libya’s leader Muammar
Gaddafi arranged for talks to be held between the
interested parties in Tripoli, Libya, in early April.
At the same time, Gaddafi is also alleged to have
provided weapons and vehicles to the rebellion in
Niger, with the assumed objective of reversing the
government’s decision to undertake oil exploration
in the border region of Libya and Niger. 149
Negotiation
Participation and Inclusiveness
During the first stage of the Libya-initiated peace
process, only the Malian president was willing to
enter into negotiations. Niger refused to come to
the negotiating table despite repeated requests by
the MNJ to do so. Therefore, the Libyan ceasefire
agreement included only the Malian parties to the
conflict. It was not until all parties were approached
separately in a second phase that all
states and groups were simultaneously involved in
the continuing process. From the armed nonstate
actors, the Malian side was represented by
both Bahanga’s faction as well as those Tuaregs
standing by the 2006 Algiers agreement.
Mediation Team and Third-Party
Coordination
Two entities were in charge of organizing and coordinating
the talks: the Gaddafi International
Charity and Development Foundation (GICDF),
a charitable organization chaired by the Libyan
leader’s son, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi; and the Popular
and Social League of the Great Sahara Tribes
(the League), which was launched in 2006 under
the aegis of Gaddafi as a movement comprising
traditional and religious leaders from 21 African
and Asian countries. The League provided a platform
for the organization of the talks and mandated
the Delegation. The GICDF was in charge
of facilitating the talks during the first phase.
148 The mission delegation consisted of representatives from Djibouti,
Egypt, Eritrea, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Chad, and Tanzania.
149 Zounmenou, David: “Niger: Making Sense of the New Tuareg
Rebellion”, The Institute for Security Studies (27 July 2007),
(http://www.issafrica.org).