Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Background of the Conflict
In the second civil war between the North and
South (1983–2005), more than 4 million people
were displaced, 600,000 refugees left the country,
and more than 2 million people lost their lives,
either directly through the fighting, or indirectly
from other consequences of the war, such as famine
and disease. A key root to the conflicts in the
Sudan was the segregation of the South from the
North already before independence in 1956. Tensions
between the center and the periphery were a
consequence of disparate socio-economic and political
development between the North and Central
Sudan on the one hand, and South Sudan
and other regions (e.g., Beja in the East and Darfur
in the West) on the other hand. The SPLM/A
in the South and the GoS, dominated by
NIF/NCP 198 in the North were the main parties
involved in the negotiations. The main issues
evolved around the relationship between religion
and state, wealth and power-sharing, the three
contested areas (Blue Nile Hills, Abyei, and Nuba
mountains), and security issues.
Previous Negotiations / Pre-
Negotiations / Entry Points
There have been many steps towards peace between
North and South Sudan. Between 1972
and 2005, there have been at least 25 formats for
direct or third-party-facilitated talks between different
parties involved in the conflict, including
mediation efforts by at least seven different mediators/mediation
teams. 199
IGAD-led Process until the Machakos
Protocol
The IGAD, a regional organization interested in
the stability in the region, concerned about the
spread of political Islam and aiming at the unity
of Sudan, began a process in 1994 between the
SPLM/A, SPLM/A-United, and the GoS. The
198 National Islamic Front (NIF); in 1998 and 2000 parts of the
NIF became the NCP.
199 Mason, Simon: “Learning from the Swiss Mediation and Facilitation
Experiences in Sudan”, Working Paper, Mediation Support
Project (Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology/swisspeace) (2007), (http://www.swisspeace.ch/
mediation).
parties joined the IGAD process in 1994 because
they feared sanctions and isolation from the
IGAD countries. The talks led to the Declaration
of Principles (DoP) of 20 July 1994, on the right
to self-determination of South Sudan, the priority
on maintaining the unity of Sudan, and the relationship
of state and religion. The DoP was a useful
framework, yet it was not binding, its implementation
was unclear, and it was only accepted
with reservations by the GoS in 1997. The talks
between 1994 and 2002 can be viewed as a prenegotiation
phase or as confidence-building talks,
with both sides testing the waters, finding out
how far each side could go, but also becoming
aware of the costs and difficulties involved in serious
negotiations. Essential to this phase was the
agreement on key principles that set the framework
for the talks. The agreement on the
Machakos protocol in July 2002, clarifying and
consolidating the DoP was a milestone.
Machakos ensured the South the right of selfdetermination,
and gave the North the right to
introduce sharia law. Both actors focused on the
unity of Sudan, but the possibility of secession
was envisaged for the case of failed negotiations.
Renewal of Peace Process as of 2002
Besides the IGAD-led process, other events and
processes also helped to bring about the talks that
finally led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
in 2005. This included the new geopolitical
context after the attacks in New York and Washington
in 2001, internal political and military developments
in Sudan, greater international involvement
in the IGAD process, and a new proposal
(Machakos protocol) drafted by a qualified
mediation team, based on previous initiatives. 200
Sudan’s international posture was directly affected
by the attacks on the US in 2001. Due to
Osama bin Laden’s links to Sudan and the fundamentalist
Muslim policies of the GoS, the US
was strongly suspicious of Sudan. After the attacks
on its territory, the US wanted to find out
where the Sudanese government stood. To do
this, the goodwill of the Sudanese was to be
200 Rogier, Emeric: “Designing an Integrated Strategy for Peace,
Security and Development in Post-Agreement Sudan”, The
Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations
‘Clingendael’ Conflict Resolution Unit (2006), p. 45.
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