Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

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Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes smuggling routes in the Sahara and Sahel zones. 146 Previous and Parallel Negotiations / Entry Points Previous Negotiations Peace deals in both Mali and Niger brought an end to major fighting more than a decade ago, but low-level fighting has continued. Some of the main talks and agreements are: 1) the National Pact in 1992 between the Mali government and a coalition of Tuareg rebels; 2) the Ouagadougou Agreement in 1998 between the Niger government and the MNJ, initiated and brokered by Burkina Faso’s president Blaise Compaoré; 3) the Algiers Agreement in 2006 between the Malian government and the DAC, mediated by Algeria; 4) various unofficial attempts in 2007 to negotiate with Bahanga, led by Tuareg elders; and 5) the process involving the former Tuareg rebel leader Iyad Ag Ghaly, accompanied by Algerian delegates, in which they met officially with Bahanga in Algiers in late 2007 to revive the peace process between the Mali government and the rebels. Furthermore, the parties professed their interest to enter into dialog in the talks initiated by Algeria in early 2008. This process was interrupted during the four-month (March-June) Libyan engagement, but was taken up again in late July. Entry Points The Mali rebels are based in the far-north region of Mali, near the Algerian border. Several incidents of attacks by the armed militia in the Mali Sahel region have been registered close to the Nigerien border with Libya. 147 The risk of escalation further set in motion a process of political consultation and created pressure to initiate dialog with the rebels. In 2008, a mission was formed on a Libyan initiative, operating under the name of ‘Delegation of Tribal Chiefs of the Great Sahara’ (the Delegation), in order to make contact with all conflict parties. It consisted of sheiks and sul- 146 Reuters: “Climate, arms, drugs make lethal mix in Sahel” (5 June 2008), (http://africa.reuters.com). 147 IRIN News: “Western diplomats warn about ‘deterioration’ in north” (11 September 2007), (http://www.irinnews.org). 56 tans from 14 Muslim countries who enjoyed prominent social status in their countries and in the Sahara in general. 148 Libya’s leader Muammar Gaddafi arranged for talks to be held between the interested parties in Tripoli, Libya, in early April. At the same time, Gaddafi is also alleged to have provided weapons and vehicles to the rebellion in Niger, with the assumed objective of reversing the government’s decision to undertake oil exploration in the border region of Libya and Niger. 149 Negotiation Participation and Inclusiveness During the first stage of the Libya-initiated peace process, only the Malian president was willing to enter into negotiations. Niger refused to come to the negotiating table despite repeated requests by the MNJ to do so. Therefore, the Libyan ceasefire agreement included only the Malian parties to the conflict. It was not until all parties were approached separately in a second phase that all states and groups were simultaneously involved in the continuing process. From the armed nonstate actors, the Malian side was represented by both Bahanga’s faction as well as those Tuaregs standing by the 2006 Algiers agreement. Mediation Team and Third-Party Coordination Two entities were in charge of organizing and coordinating the talks: the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation (GICDF), a charitable organization chaired by the Libyan leader’s son, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi; and the Popular and Social League of the Great Sahara Tribes (the League), which was launched in 2006 under the aegis of Gaddafi as a movement comprising traditional and religious leaders from 21 African and Asian countries. The League provided a platform for the organization of the talks and mandated the Delegation. The GICDF was in charge of facilitating the talks during the first phase. 148 The mission delegation consisted of representatives from Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Chad, and Tanzania. 149 Zounmenou, David: “Niger: Making Sense of the New Tuareg Rebellion”, The Institute for Security Studies (27 July 2007), (http://www.issafrica.org).
North-Mali and North-Niger, Libya Engagement However, the ‘High Mediator’ behind the scenes was Gaddafi, who at the time presided over the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN- SAD). Mediation Style and Strategy Through the use of manipulative mediation – with his political and military power in the region, and by using ‘carrots and sticks’ – Gaddafi induced the parties involved in the various stages of Libya’s engagement to pursue the result he wished to attain, namely a signed ceasefire and (at least officially) goodwill towards further dialog. Libya offered financial assistance to the region, and with its full engagement, weight, and influence made certain that the parties understood the need to meet Libya’s expectations. The Gaddafi International Foundation, which officially initiated the talks, used formulative and facilitative mediation in its effort to bring the parties together and agree on a ceasefire agreement, drafted by the Foundation. Negotiation Setup and Process In a first phase (March–April 2008), separate talks were held on the one side with the Malian government’s delegation and on the other side with the Tuareg representatives on 26 March. President Touré and Tuareg leader Bahanga never came to the negotiation table. Already after the first day, a memorandum of understanding regarding a ceasefire that was to take force on 3 April 2008 was signed by the Mali government and representatives of Bahanga. 150 Nevertheless, the conflict continued to escalate throughout April. The Libyan CEN-SAD secretary-general urged the Malian and Nigerien rebel groups to lay down their arms. Any movement that agreed would be compensated by the ‘High Mediator’, while any aggression against one member country would be considered an attack against the entire organization. 151 This time, Libya hoped to make 150 Colombant, Nico: “Cease-Fire Deal Reached Between Mali government, Tuareg Fighters” (3 April 2008), (http://voanews.com). 151 African Press Agency: “CEN-SAD urges rebels to swap weapons for Libyan support” (26 April 2008), (http://www.apanews.net); African Press Agency: “CEN-SAD member countries okay ‘intervention force” (27 April 2008), (http://www.apanews.net). the parties enter into a dialog with the use of indirect threats. During a second phase (May–June 2008), the Delegation visited the northern regions of Mali, and later Niger, over a period of two weeks for a mediation mission with the aim of understanding the conflict parties’ positions better and establishing dialog between the governments and the rebel groups. In a statement released by the Malian president’s office, the objective was ‘to convince the dissidents […] to give up weapons and reintegrate the nation’. According to the head of the Delegation, Sheik Harika Azdine, its mission was rather about ‘defusing tensions that could lead to war’. 152 Key Issues during Negotiations The Mali Tuareg rebels called for a regulation of the activities of companies involved in the mining of uranium in order to address the environmental hazards affecting the local people. The Niger rebellion also claimed that political and economic autonomy was ‘essential’ to the improvement of living conditions in the North. 153 The governments of Mali and Niger were, however, accusing the rebels of using unreasonable political and economic demands to obfuscate their real goal of controlling cross-border smuggling routes. 154 After the Delegation’s visit to the different parties, Gaddafi spoke in positive terms of the notion of a Tuareg state, thereby supporting the rebels’ secessionist claims. 155 Implementation Outcome and Impact The League’s president and Azdine reported to Gaddafi in Libya after the mission, informing him that they had made contact with all parties concerned. All parties accepted the Delegation as a mediator to support peace efforts. Nonetheless, 152 African Press Agency: “Leaders from 14 Muslim countries on goodwill mission to Mali” (19 May 2008), (http://www.apanews.net). 153 IRIN News: “UN Secretary-General warns of deteriorating situation” (23 May 2008), (http://www.irinnews.org). 154 BBC News: “Mali’s Tuareg rebels agree truce” (19 September 2007), (http://news.bbc.co.uk). 155 Robert, David: “Krise in Mali weitet sich aus”, Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung (2008). 57
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Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation
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Table of Content Foreword..........
Page 7 and 8: “If you want to make peace with y
Page 9 and 10: Mediation in African Peace Processe
Page 21 and 22: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process Burun
Page 23 and 24: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process ing t
Page 25 and 26: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process idea
Page 27 and 28: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process insti
Page 29 and 30: Central African Republic, Inclusive
Page 35 and 36: Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agree
Page 41 and 42: D. R. Congo/Kivu, Conference on Pea
Page 47 and 48: Kenya, The National Accord and Reco
Page 55: North-Mali and North-Niger, Libya E
Page 59 and 60: North-Mali and North-Niger, Libya E
Page 61 and 62: Northern Uganda, Juba Negotiations
Page 67 and 68: Somalia, Khartoum Negotiations 2006
Page 73 and 74: Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Pe
Page 79 and 80: Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations an
Page 85 and 86: Western Sahara, The Baker Plans Wes
Page 87 and 88: Western Sahara, The Baker Plans poi
Page 89 and 90: Western Sahara, The Baker Plans as
Page 91 and 92: Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation
Page 93 and 94: Acronyms MSU UN Mediation Support U
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Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

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