Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

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Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes Sudan-Chad conflict play a role as well, but are not a central driving force of the conflict. 45 Previous Negotiations / Entry Points / Pre-Negotiation 46 Previous Negotiations There have been two major attempts to reconcile the different political factions in the CAR: a National Reconciliation Conference in 1998, following various mutinies in 1996/1997, and a National Dialog in 2003, conducted by Bozizé. 47 Both dialogs embraced a comprehensive assessment of the political, cultural, social, economic, and security situation in the CAR. The 2003 dialog lasted from 9 September to 15 October and ended with some 100 recommendations for reforms, which are to be monitored by a follow-up committee. However, only some ten reform measures have been implemented so far. Participation and Inclusiveness in the DPI Pre-talks The CPDPI comprised 25 commissioners from the following constituencies: • Majority parties rallied around the Kwa Na Kwa presidential party (five delegates); • Political opposition alliance Forces Vives de la Nation (five delegates); • State administration (five delegates); • Civil society groups (five delegates); • Other opposition parties (two delegates); • UFDR (one delegate) • FDPC (one delegate) • APRD (one delegate, who only joined the talks for the last three days) The inclusiveness is mostly based on this list of constituencies. For the actual talks, two more 45 International Crisis Group (2007), op. cit., p. 30. 46 The following is based on the author’s own observations and conversations with participants to the dialog. He visited the talks and acted as consultant for the organization of a workshop for the CPDPI in February 2008. The DPI is scheduled for late 2008; this study therefore covers only the period of the pretalks. 47 A comprehensive documentation of the dialogs can be found on (http://dialogue.national.free.fr/). 30 constituencies are called to participate: Religious groups and eminent personalities. 48 At the beginning, security issues and the unclear role of Patassé in the process hampered the inclusion of the APRD. The Bureau d’appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République Centrafricaine (BONUCA) assured side talks with the APRD all along the pre-talks, through shuttle diplomacy, and finally managed to broker a ceasefire agreement. 49 The APRD joined the pre-talks during the last days of the CPDPI’s mandate. Mediation Team and Third-Party Coordination The UN has been engaged in the CAR since 2000 through the BONUCA. 50 In 2007 François Lonseny Fall became the new SRSG. During this transition period of BONUCA, international pressure increased to find a solution for the armed conflict and the severe socio-economic problems. BONUCA, however, was not in a position to take over the lead in organizing talks between the conflict parties. With the new head of BONUCA recently appointed, it had to first redefine its position and role in the country. At that time, HD had just opened an office in Bangui. The organization was asked by Bozizé to facilitate the pre-talks for a political dialog. HD appointed a facilitator from Ethiopia, the late Prof. Berhanu Abébé, who led the talks of the preparatory committee from January to March 2008 in Bangui. BONUCA sponsored the talks and cooperated with HD throughout the preparation. 51 Ad- 48 CPDPI: “Résumé Général” (2008). These final recommendations are unpublished and can be obtained from the author. 49 A UN representative confirmed to the author that the UN main role in early 2008 was to make sure there would be contacts with the APRD. SRSG Fall later talked directly to the APRD. Guinea Forum: “François Lonsény Fall, médiateur et promoteur du Dialogue politique inclusif” (2008), (http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article- 19707700.html). 50 BONUCA is a mission of the UN Department of Political Affairs, as opposed to the major missions in the region (DRC / Sudan) that are part of the UN Dept. for Peacekeeping Operations. 51 After the pre-talks, HD terminated its mission in CAR and handed over the responsibility to BONUCA. The role of facilitation has not been conferred on BONUCA, though, but to the president of Gabon, El Hadj Omar Bongo Odimba. Thus, a regional facilitation within the framework of ECCAS has been preferred. The new facilitator will be much more of an insider than the facilitator of the pre-talks.
Central African Republic, Inclusive Political Dialog (Pre-talks only) ditionally, the Mediation Support Project 52 / swisspeace and the UN Mediation Support Unit were called in early 2008 to support the work of the CPDPI with a workshop. The Swiss Federal Government and BONUCA sponsored this engagement. The situation in the CAR is characterized by changes in the facilitation and coordination roles. Until 2006, BONUCA was exclusively in charge of the dialog between the government and the political opposition. HD took over the lead facilitation in 2007 and handed it back to BONUCA in 2008. However, neither BONUCA nor HD has been able to meet all of the prerequisites for an effective facilitation of the talks on its own. While HD staff certainly benefited from their extensive experience in facilitation, BONUCA was able to provide the necessary international legitimacy, which was needed to engage in talks with the APRD without Bozizé’s explicit consent. Mediation Style and Strategy Prof. Abebe’s status as a respected elder was coupled with an outstanding cultural and linguistic knowledge. His language and speeches were characterized by great respect for the commissioners and awareness of his own limitations. This status enabled him to act as a moral authority, which partly became clear in the relationship between him and the commissioners and the respect shown by the commissioners during plenary meetings. 53 The facilitator’s task was mainly to repeat (not rephrase) each intervention in order to ensure the correct wording in the final report. He also had to make decisions pertaining to procedural matters if there was no consensus. From the beginning, HD enjoyed little room for maneuver, due to its lack of power and clout. Consequently, the mediation by HD during the preparation talks was exclusively low-power mediation, i.e., facilitative. There were at least two important limits to the facilitation: Firstly, HD had to stick rigorously to the provisions of the presidential decree establishing the 52 The Mediation Support Project is a joint venture between swisspeace and the Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich. 53 Observations based on a plenary meeting assisted by the author as well as several discussions with the facilitator. preparatory committee and mandating facilitation by HD. 54 For instance, any engagement in informal dialog with additional conflict parties that had been excluded from the pre-talks would have immediately led to HD’s expulsion from the CAR. Secondly, HD had few opportunities to influence the pace and content of the discussions. The aim of the preparatory work of the CPDPI was to establish an agenda for the actual dialog that contained all issues at stake as well as a rough timeframe. The facilitation could not prevent the commissioners from designing an agenda with a myriad of issues to be discussed in only 17 days – despite the explicit concerns of the facilitation team with regard to an ‘overloaded agenda’. 55 Negotiation Setup and Process The negotiations took place in a small compound in Bangui, which was built specifically for the CPDPI. It comprised a plenary room and two additional rooms for the facilitation office. The meetings took place from January to March and lasted 90 working days, as stipulated by the presidential decree. Besides the plenary sessions (which took up less than half of the discussion time), the CPDPI met in three working groups, each of which was presided by one of the CPDPI members. Each group had to define the agenda for the three issues of concern, namely security and armed groups, the socio-economic situation, and politics and governance. The results of the working groups were reported to the plenary. Perceptions by the Conflict Parties The perception of the inclusive political dialog varied. Generally speaking, the dialog is seen as a presidential initiative. Bozizé highlighted his ownership over the process on several occasions. The indisputability of the 2004 constitution and the 2005 elections was a conditio sine qua non for the dialog. Furthermore, to highlight the state’s sovereignty, Bozizé issued presidential decrees mandating the work of the preparatory committee and designating the members of the committee. Since the names in this decree had been agreed beforehand, this procedure only served to 54 Presidential decree no. 07.356 (30 November 2007). 55 Author’s conversation with HD representative in Bangui (February 2008). 31
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Page 3: Table of Content Foreword..........
Page 7 and 8: “If you want to make peace with y
Page 9 and 10: Mediation in African Peace Processe
Page 21 and 22: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process Burun
Page 23 and 24: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process ing t
Page 25 and 26: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process idea
Page 27 and 28: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process insti
Page 29: Central African Republic, Inclusive
Page 33 and 34: Central African Republic, Inclusive
Page 35 and 36: Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agree
Page 41 and 42: D. R. Congo/Kivu, Conference on Pea
Page 47 and 48: Kenya, The National Accord and Reco
Page 55 and 56: North-Mali and North-Niger, Libya E
Page 61 and 62: Northern Uganda, Juba Negotiations
Page 67 and 68: Somalia, Khartoum Negotiations 2006
Page 73 and 74: Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Pe
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Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations an
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Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations an
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Western Sahara, The Baker Plans Wes
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Western Sahara, The Baker Plans poi
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Western Sahara, The Baker Plans as
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Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation
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Acronyms MSU UN Mediation Support U
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