Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes
Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Peace
Agreement
By Simon J A Mason, Mediation Support Project, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich
In a Nutshell
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between
the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
(SPLM/A) based in South Sudan ended a war
that cost the lives of some 2 million people and
lasted between 1983 and 2005. Among the main
causes of the conflict were unequal socioeconomic
development, distribution of political
power, and control over natural resources between
the center and the periphery. In 1994, the
regional organization Intergovernmental Authority
on Development (IGAD) initiated talks between
the GoS and the SPLM/A. Talks only
moved ahead seriously in 2002, however. The
Machakos Protocol in 2002 set the framework for
the negotiations. The parties agreed on the principles
of self-determination for the South, sharia
law for the North, and the common aim of building
a united Sudan. This framework agreement
was essential to guide the subsequent talks, but
negotiations still took nearly another three years.
The CPA signed on 9 January 2005 consisted of
various protocols. The CPA is generally considered
to be inclusive in terms of topics and to be
balanced between the GoS (i.e. National Congress
Party NCP) and SPLM, as well as being
specific on implementation modalities. The key
remaining challenges are the implementation of
the CPA and the other conflicts in Sudan (e.g.
Darfur). The IGAD had a mandate that was limited
to only negotiate the North-South conflict.
Even if it tried to get the Darfur included within
its mandate from December 2003 onwards, the
NCP refused this. Thus the Darfur conflict was
not explicitly addressed.
Key Messages
Key role of a Regional Organization as mediator:
The Regional Organization IGAD had the necessary
leverage to initiate peace talks, due to its uni-
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fied stance towards Sudan and its interest in regional
stability. Later, internal differences weakened
its influence on the peace process, and pressure
and support came more from the US, Britain,
Norway, and the EU. Chief mediator Lt.
General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, appointed by IGAD,
remained in the lead and managed to protect the
process from too much external pressure.
Pressure and dialog have to be balanced: Too much
pressure can break a process, while insufficient
pressure can prevent talks from moving ahead.
While dialog and pressure are complementary, it
is often useful to split the roles of the parties exerting
pressure and those facilitating, respectively.
Incremental Confidence-Building: The Nuba
Mountains ceasefire agreement, mediated by a
US-Swiss team in 2002, was a test and key step of
confidence-building between North and South
Sudan. It helped to show that steps towards peace
were possible, and was thus able to invigorate the
IGAD-led process.
Political role of the chief mediator, operational role
of the trained mediators: The chief mediator (in
this case Lazaro Sumbeiywo) is the moral guarantor
of the process. Typically, this is a person with
a political background and a high reputation, e.g.,
an elder state official. Their role is to link up with
the regional and global stakeholders, letting useful
people participate in the process, and keeping the
others out. The more operational nuts and bolts
of mediation, moderating the talks and drafting
the agreement, are then carried out by trained
mediators (in this case, Nicholas Haysom and
Julian Thomas Hottinger).
Increased decision-making level as negotiations proceed:
The way forward after the Nakuru deadlock
was to have negotiation delegations with greater
decision-making power (John Garang and Ali
Taha).