Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes
were outside the territory at the time, many in
Morocco. 243 Morocco, on the other hand, has insisted
that members of all Saharan tribes linked to
the former Spanish Sahara must be eligible to
vote. Since the partial occupation of Western Sahara,
Morocco has used all possible means to
support settlement by Moroccans in the territory
in order to increase the Moroccan constituency.
According to the Spanish census, in 1974, 73,500
of Western Sahara’s 95,000 inhabitants were Sahrawis
and the rest Europeans. 244 In 2000, the UN
Identification Commission identified 250,000
inhabitants, only 86,425 of whom it deemed eligible
to vote. 245 The Baker Plan I proposed that
“to be qualified to vote in such a referendum a
voter must have been a full-time resident of
Western Sahara for at least one year.” 246
On the second dispute, concerning the ballot
choice, the Baker Plan II named independence,
integration in Morocco, or autonomy as options
of the referendum which was to be held after 5
years of a peace agreement. 247 In the meantime,
Morocco would be in charge of, amongst other
things, “exclusive competence over foreign relations,
[…] national security and external defence
[…] and the preservation of the territorial integrity
against secessionist attempts”. 248 Furthermore,
the plan stated: “All laws passed by the Assembly
[…] must respect and comply with the
constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco.” 249 .
Nevertheless, Morocco rejected full independence
as an option, claiming the territory as part of the
kingdom on historical grounds. 250 This position
opposes a statement by the International Court of
Justice made in 1975, which did not confirm
243 Ibid., p. 59.
244 United Nations: “Peace plan for self-determination of the people
of Western Sahara”, in: Report of the Secretary-General
S/2003/565, Annex II (2003), p. 13.
245 MINURSO: “Milestones in the Western Sahara Conflict”, p. 3,
(http://www.minurso.unlb.org/milestones.pdf).
246 United Nations: “Framework agreement on the Status of Western
Sahara”, in: Report of the Secretary-General S/2001/613, Annex
I (2001).
247 United Nations: “Peace plan for self-determination of the people
of Western Sahara”, in: Report of the Secretary-General
S/2003/565, Annex II (2003).
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
250 International Crisis Group: “Western Sahara: the Cost of the
Conflict“, Middle East/North Africa Report n. 56 (11 June
2007), p. 9, (http://www.crisisgroup.org/
home/index.cfm?l=1&id=5235).
88
“any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory
of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of
Morocco.” 251 Polisario, on the other hand, has insisted
that independence be presented to the voters
as an option.
The Baker Plan II failed, although Kofi Annan
had written that he believed that it provided a
“fair and balanced approach towards a political
solution […] providing each side some, but perhaps
not all, of what it wants.” 252
Participation and Inclusiveness
Although Baker had arranged face-to-face meetings
and consultations on track 1 before, in the
creation of the Baker Plan I, neither the Frente
Polisario nor the Moroccan government were directly
involved in the elaboration phase. The plan
was formulated by the mediator independently of
the parties, who could not present any amendments
to its contents before it was completed and
submitted to them for their approval. After its rejection,
Baker drafted the Baker Plan II based on
the parties’ criticisms of the first one, but again
without the direct involvement of either Morocco
or the Frente Polisario. Although he consulted
the leaders of all parties beforehand, he did not
bring them to the same table to work out a compromise
plan together. Instead, he drafted the
text independently and then submitted it to the
parties, hoping they would accept the compromise
that he had worked out for them, as he had
done with the previous plan. 253
Mediation Style and Strategy
One main feature of Baker’s engagement was that
he never pressured the parties to accept a certain
agreement. No decision taken was ever binding
on the parties if they did not agree with it. 254 The
UN was never in a position to enforce any decision
against the wishes of the parties. The Baker
Plan II suggested that the UN would give a binding
opinion on the electorate in the referendum
251 International Court of Justice (1975): op. cit., p. 117.
252 United Nation: “Report of the Secretary-General S/2003/565”
(23 May 2003), p. 10.
253 Jensen (2005): op. cit., p. 113.
254 Zartman, William and Touval, Saadia: “International Mediation
in the Post-Cold War Era”, in: Crocker, Chester and Osler
Hampson with Pamela Tall, ed.: Managing Global Chaos
(1996), pp. 455 – 461.