Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agreement
Gbagbo (the Lina-Marcoussis-Agreement had
been signed by seven major delegations and additional
small parties). More importantly, direct
talks were held between Soro and the government,
the latter being represented at the table by
Minister of the Interior Désiré Tagro.
Mediation Team and Third-Party
Coordination
Three mediators were involved: Djibril Yipènè
Bassolé, at that time minister of security of Burkina
Faso; the legal councilor of the president of
Burkina Faso; and Mario Giro from the community
of Sant’Egidio. In difficult situations, all the
mediators and participants went to President
Compaoré. Minister Bassolé acted as the head of
the mediating team during the sessions.
Mediation Style and Strategy 77
Previous attempts had been characterized by external
pressure and the imposition of solutions. 78
Mario Giro describes the activities of the GTI on
the eve of the Ouagadougou talks as expropriation
of the Ivorians with regard to their peace
process. By contrast, according to Mario Giro,
there was no pressure either from international
actors or from the lead or assisting mediators in
the Ouagadougou talks. 79 This mediation differed
essentially from other mediation attempts, as the
mediators abstained from intervening in the substance,
and the negotiations took place directly
between the two parties’ leaders. Therefore, the
entire responsibility rested upon these two leaders.
During the sessions, there was no need for
ground rules. For most of the time, the three mediators
were just sitting in the room and watching
the delegations “shouting at each other”, indicating
that the parties were responsible for their actions:
“ ‘If you want to reach an agreement, do so;
we are here to assist you, and we don’t need to be
here.’ If you put things like this, the parties feel
77 The following description of the mediation style and thirdparty
coordination is based on a conversation of the author with
Mario Giro (22 July 2008).
78 See, for instance, the declaration of France on 30 January 2006
(http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr).
79 Interview with Mario Giro (2 August 2007): “Personne ne doit
se sentir exclu.”
the responsibility and stop playing games.” 80 This
sense of responsibility had been missing in previous
mediation attempts.
There was no deadline, and the two parties were
free to reach whatever outcome they had in mind.
Furthermore, the mediating team did not take
the initiative with regard to putting documents
on the table. The parties themselves drafted the
relevant documents separately. Subsequently, the
mediators put the positions together and gave the
resulting document back to the parties for further
discussion. Formulation and suggestions were
rarely applied. One element in the agreement that
goes back to a suggestion by the mediation team
is a code of conduct for the implementation
phase. This code was formulated jointly between
the parties and the mediators. This ‘nonthreatening’
mediation is certainly an example for
facilitative, low-powered mediation.
Negotiation Setup and Process
The negotiation set-up of the talks reflected the
facilitative approach used. The confidential atmosphere
in the conference hotel was ensured by
limiting contact to journalists and reducing the
total number of persons involved in the organization
and chairing of the meetings to a maximum
of ten persons. Only the three mediators were
constantly in the room with the parties. No audience
was allowed, since spectators would undoubtedly
have increased the sense of pressure
and of being ‘observed’. The smaller the setting,
the easier it is also for the negotiators to test ideas
without being bound to them by an audience.
The talks were partly conducted directly between
Soro and Tagro, who was in constant contact
with Gbagbo, and partly in separate meetings
with the mediators. In a first phase (approximately
from 5–24 February 2007), the two delegations
held separate talks, with the facilitators
acting as go-betweens. In a second phase (20 February
– 4 March), both delegations met directly.
The discussions took place in a confidential atmosphere,
with the aim of maintaining the par-
80 Mario Giro (22 July 2008). From a social psychological perspective,
this approach complies with the basic preconditions
for a shift in attitude or perception. Commitment and recognition
must be achieved without pressure in order to create cognitive
dissonance, which in turn initiates shifts in perception.
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