Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Burundi, Arusha Peace Process
Burundi, Arusha Peace Process
By Simon J A Mason, Mediation Support Project, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich
In a Nutshell
Political manipulation of ethnic and class differences
goes back to pre-independence of Burundi
in 1962. In 1993, Melchior Ndadaye, the very
first Hutu president ever elected, was assassinated,
launching the country once again into crisis.
Some 250,000 people were killed between 1993
and 2003. Hutu uprisings were followed by repression
from the side of the Tutsi-dominated
army. Serious efforts to mediate the Burundi crisis
began in 1996, with regional states imposing
sanctions on Burundi. The Arusha talks were first
led by the chief mediator Julius Nyerere and later
by Nelson Mandela. 19 parties signed the “Arusha
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi”
in 2000, creating institutions for transition
to democracy, power-sharing, and security
sector reform. Political parties and some of the
armed groups participated in the Arusha process.
However, some of the armed splinter groups continued
fighting in the hills, so that ceasefires with
these armed groups had to be negotiated after the
peace agreement (various ceasefires were signed
between 2003 and 2008). The Arusha Accords
were more successful than expected, key challenges
remain with regard to the definitive settlement
of the armed conflict with the remaining
armed group Palipehutu-FNL.
Key Messages
Regional mediation effort: The Arusha process was
a regional process, with less influence from outside
the continent than some more recent peace
processes in Africa. The decision of the heads of
states of the regional countries to impose sanctions
in 1996, following Pierre Buyoya’s coup,
was a fundamental shift in inter-African relations.
Outspoken role of facilitator: Both Julius Nyerere
and later Nelson Mandela greatly shaped the
process by their personality. Unlike the Western
notion of a “neutral” mediator, Nelson Mandela
showed how the role of a moral chief mediator, or
“facilitator” as he called himself, can be under-
taken in a very outspoken manner. He worked for
mutually acceptable solutions, but at the same
time he was openly critical of the government
(e.g., about how they held political prisoners),
and he compared the IDP camps to concentration
camps. This form of “moral pressure” cannot
be exerted by anyone, but when exercised by
Mandela, with his personal reputation as the “Father
of Africa”, it was effective.
Participation: The Arusha talks included all political
parties, and some, but not all, of the armed
groups. The number of parties grew from 17 to
19 towards the end of the process, thereby being
an example of a rather inclusive process. Nevertheless,
some splinter armed groups did not sign,
and called for separate ceasefire agreements later
on.
Use of sufficient consensus: All important parties
must be included and engaged in successful political
negotiations. However, the more parties are
involved, the more difficult and complex the
talks. There is also a danger that parties are
formed in order to enhance the weight of one’s
position at the table (or to get paid for attending).
One way of dealing with this, and that began to
take effect towards the end of the Arusha talks, is
the use of “sufficient consensus”, where the mediators
work towards a consensus between the
large parties, and these then try to pull the smaller
parties along with their decision.
Use of a draft to overcome deadlock: It is always a
delicate matter when mediators propose a draft,
as it is probable that they will be seen as being biased.
However, there are times when talks do not
move ahead, and the presentation of a draft can
help to overcome deadlock. In the Arusha negotiations
this was successful, but the parties also
had ample time to adapt the draft.
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