Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Western Sahara, The Baker Plans
points of the proposals, which later became
known as the “Settlement Plan”, were a ceasefire
and a popular referendum on the future status of
Western Sahara. 236 The UN Mission for the Referendum
in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established
in 1991, the main points of its mandate
being the monitoring of the ceasefire and the organization
of a free and fair referendum. 237 The
ceasefire was announced on 6 September 1991 in
agreement with both parties and has largely held
until today. In 1993, the UN set up an Identification
Commission (IDC) mandated with the task
of compiling a list of voters for the referendum.
The process was repeatedly stalled by recurring
disagreements between the parties over the criteria
for registration and the definition of the electorate.
The IDC concluded its activities in 2004
after having presented two provisional voter
lists. 238
On 18 March 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan appointed former US secretary of state
James A. Baker his personal envoy for Western
Sahara. After visiting the region and separately
meeting with the leaders of the two parties, he invited
the government of Morocco, the Frente
Polisario, and the governments of Algeria and
Mauritania to direct talks in London. All the parties
sent their delegations. After four rounds of direct
talks in London, Lisbon, and Houston, on
14-16 September 1997 an agreement was reached
on a number of critical issues, including voter
identification, refugee issues, and prisoners of
war. However, the agreement did not lead to a
breakthrough towards peace, and the fundamental
positions of the parties remained far apart. In
May 2000, Baker arranged again direct meetings
with the parties with the aim to resolve the problems
relating to the implementation of the Settlement
Plan. However, several rounds of talks
did not lead to any compromise. Rather, Baker
concluded that the talks had even deepened the
differences between the parties. 239 Annan agreed
with Baker that there were “serious doubts
236 United Nations: “Security Council Resolution 690” (29 April
1991).
237 MINURSO: “Overview of the Mission Mandate“,
(http://www.minurso.unlb.org/mission.html).
238 MINURSO: “Milestones in the Western Sahara Conflict”, p. 3,
(http://www.minurso.unlb.org/milestones.pdf).
239 Jensen, Erik: “Western Sahara – Anatomy of a Stalemate”,
Colorado USA: Lynne Riener Publishers (2005), p. 103.
whether the Settlement Plan can be implemented
in its present form” 240 and that an alternative solution
had to be found
Negotiation Phase
Negotiation Setup and Process
In 2001, Baker worked out a plan entitled the
Personal Envoy’s Draft Framework Agreement,
also known as Baker Plan I, and presented it to
the parties. The document was strenuously rejected
by representatives of Polisario, who stated
that it aimed at “the precipitous integration of the
Saharan Territory into Morocco”. 241 Both Polisario
and Algeria refused to even discuss it any
further, and Baker soon had to accept its complete
failure.
In March 2003, Annan presented to the Security
Council Baker’s “Peace Plan for Self-
Determination of the People of Western Sahara”,
which would also be known as the Baker Plan
II. 242 The Frente Polisario initially expressed extensive
criticism concerning different points of
the Baker Plan II. However, in a surprising move,
it soon officially accepted it. This was seen by
some as a tactical maneuver, since Morocco had
counted on Polisario to reject the plan. By the
time of Polisario’s acceptance of the plan, Morocco
had already replied critically to many aspects
of the plan. In a letter to Baker dated 9
April 2004, the government of Morocco rejected
the Baker Plan II. In June 2004, Baker resigned
as personal envoy.
Key Issues during Negotiations
The main element of dispute is a UN-backed referendum
on the political status of Western Sahara;
particularly contentious are the scope of the
referendum as well as the voting population. Polisario
has insisted that only individuals who were
registered during a census held in 1974 would
qualify. That census only registered part of the
Sahrawi population, since a lot of the inhabitants
240 Ibid., p. 106.
241 United Nations: “Report of the Secretary-General S/2003/41”
(10 January 2002).
242 United Nations: “Peace plan for self-determination of the people
of Western Sahara”, in: Report of the Secretary-General
S/2003/565, Annex II (2003).
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