Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

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Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes Context Neither the Frente Polisario nor the government of Morocco have been willing to make any concessions on their respective positions. As a report by the International Crisis Group dated 11 June 2007 states, “the parties have deemed the stalemate bearable.” 262 This is despite the great suffering that the situation causes for the population in Western Sahara, which the Frente Polisario represents, and the huge financial costs for Morocco as well as damage to its international reputation and the suffering of many of its soldiers. It could therefore be said that although there is a mutually hurting stalemate, it seems not to be hurting the parties enough to get them to make any concessions. This is also a result of the ceasefire that has been observed for many years. Although this has to be seen as a great success, it has reduced the cost of the stalemate for both sides to a level they seem to regard as bearable. 263 As Peter van Walsum, James Baker’s successor as personal envoy, observed, a number of states with a potential role in the peace process see the status quo as a “tolerable solution”, which spares them the necessity of taking sides in the conflict. 264 In the wider context, one major factor for failure, namely the lack of pressure on the parties, stems from the regional interests of the US and France, which prevent the UN from taking any measure against the will of Morocco. President George W. Bush stated that he would not let the Security Council impose a solution unacceptable to the US’s ally in its socalled “war on terrorism”, just as France has officially opposed the imposition of any solution against Morocco’s will. 265 262 International Crisis Group: “Western Sahara: the Cost of the Conflict“, Middle East/North Africa Report n. 56 (11 June 2007), p. 9, (http://www.crisisgroup.org/ home/index.cfm?l=1&id=5235). 263 Jensen (2005): op. Cit., p. 118. 264 United Nations: “Consultations du Conseil de Sécurité sur la situation au Sahara occidental” (21 and 30 April 2008), p. 1. 265 Ibid., p. 113. 90 Outlook Alvaro de Soto was SRSG for Western Sahara after James Baker, from 2004 until May 2005. In July 2005, Peter van Walsum was appointed UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy, and on the 1st September 2005, Francesco Bastagli was appointed as the new SRSG. He was succeeded by Julian Harston in March 2007. UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy Peter van Walsum has moved away from the possibility of Western Sahara’s independence and assessed that “an independent Western Sahara is not a realistic proposition.” 266 The Security Council subsequently endorsed the recommendation that “realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to maintain the momentum of the process of negotiations.” 267 Thus, the UN seems to support the position of Morocco, which in April 2007 proposed for the Western Sahara autonomy inside the state of Morocco. The great success of the UN’s mediation efforts in Western Sahara is certainly the implementation of the ceasefire in 1991. However, the Frente Polisario has discussed the option of returning to armed conflict at its congress in December 2007. 268 266 United Nations: “Assessment of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara” (21 April 2008), p. 1. 267 United Nations: “Security Council Resolution 1813” (2008), p. 2. 268 United Nations: “Report of the Secretary-General S/2008/251” (14 April 2008), p. 1.
Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes Acronyms AL Arab League AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan ANSA Armed Non-State Actor APRD Armée populaire pour la restauration de la république et la démocratie (CAR) ATNMC Alliance Tuareg Nord-Mali pour le changement AU African Union BONUCA Bureau d’appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République Centrafricaine CAR The Central African Republic CCP Concerned Citizens for Peace (Kenya) CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States CEO Chief Executive Officer CHMT Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team CIC Council of Islamic Courts (Somalia) CNDD-FDD Center for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (Burundi) CNDP Conseil national pour la défense du peuple (D.R. Congo) CoH Cessation of Hostilities CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement (e.g. Government of Sudan and SPLM/A) CPC Cadre permanent de concertation / Permanent Coordination Committee (Ivory Coast) CPDPI Comité préparatoire du dialogue politique inclusif (CAR) DAC Democratic Alliance for Change (Mali) DDDC Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (Sudan) DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration DoP Declaration of Principles DPA Darfur Peace Agreement DPI Dialogue politique inclusif (CAR) DRC Democratic Republic of Congo ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States ECOWAS Economic Community of West African Sates EU European Union EUFOR European Union Force FDC Foundation for Community Development in Mozambique FDFA Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 91
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Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation
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Table of Content Foreword..........
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“If you want to make peace with y
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Mediation in African Peace Processe
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Burundi, Arusha Peace Process Burun
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Burundi, Arusha Peace Process idea
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Burundi, Arusha Peace Process insti
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Central African Republic, Inclusive
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Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agree
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Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agree
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Page 41 and 42: D. R. Congo/Kivu, Conference on Pea
Page 47 and 48: Kenya, The National Accord and Reco
Page 55 and 56: North-Mali and North-Niger, Libya E
Page 61 and 62: Northern Uganda, Juba Negotiations
Page 67 and 68: Somalia, Khartoum Negotiations 2006
Page 73 and 74: Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Pe
Page 79 and 80: Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations an
Page 85 and 86: Western Sahara, The Baker Plans Wes
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Page 93 and 94: Acronyms MSU UN Mediation Support U
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