Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes
since Museveni came to power two decades ago.
Among others, the GoU commits itself to making
the central government more inclusive, promoting
proportional representation of all regions in
the Ugandan army and police, promoting economic
development in the poorest regions such as
Northern Uganda, and respecting the land rights
of the Acholi as well as their right to participate
in democratic processes.
The agreements on reconciliation and accountability
propose different mechanisms of transitional
justice that serve different purposes. Local
reconciliation and the reintegration of LRA fighters
in their communities are achieved through
traditional reconciliation processes, such as mato
oput. A truth commission is created to empower
victims and promote national reconciliation. To
achieve formal legal accountability, the most serious
crimes would be prosecuted by a special division
within the High Court of Uganda – which
would require a change in national legislation.
The drafters of the agreement had two aims: they
sought to satisfy victims and lay the basis for
post-conflict reconciliation, while at the same
time trying to deactivate the ICC’s jurisdiction
via the principle of complementarity. The result
is a comprehensive and sophisticated transitional
justice framework for Northern Uganda.
Participation
Officially, the Juba peace talks were facilitated by
the GoSS, and its participants were representatives
of the Ugandan government, on the one
side, and of a non-state armed group, the LRA,
on the other side – which points to a classical
track-1 process of mediation. However, a variety
of Ugandan actors, from the government as well
as civil society, intervened, making it difficult to
clearly classify the Juba talks. Furthermore, due to
the ICC indictments and lack of security guarantees
for the top leadership of the LRA, the LRA
delegation did not consist of the top decisionmakers
of the movement, necessitating frequent
check-backs and visits to the bush.
Third-Party Coordination and “Forum-
Shopping”
Towards the end of 2006, the LRA and Pax
Christi voiced dissatisfaction about the Juba talks.
64
They wanted to give priority to ICC-related issues,
as opposed to the Acholi parliamentarians,
who were interested in the bigger political questions
concerning Northern Uganda. The LRA
also accused Riek Machar of being biased in favor
of the GoU. 171 Consequently, the LRA and Pax
Christi went to look for an alternative mediator
and forum for negotiations. Thus, several preliminary
meetings were held in neighboring
countries, most importantly in Mombasa, Kenya.
The intervention of UN Special Envoy Chissano,
appointed in December 2006, was required to
consolidate the Juba talks. His involvement was
both a blessing and a curse for the initial mediator,
Riek Machar. It was a blessing because Chissano’s
commitment to the GoSS initiative invalidated
other mediation processes and definitely
brought the talks back to Juba in spring 2007. It
was also a curse in the sense that it deprived
Machar of full control of the process. For example,
Chissano imposed five regional ambassadors
as facilitators of the Juba talks, which marginalized
the initial support team.
The Role of the ICC in the Juba talks
The ICC got involved in Northern Uganda when
President Museveni referred the situation concerning
the LRA to the ICC Prosecutor in December
2003. At the time, Museveni planned to
step up the military campaign against the LRA,
and the ICC was useful in this context, stigmatizing
the LRA internationally and enhancing the
legitimacy of UPDF military action. Subsequently,
the ICC started investigations and in
July 2005 issued arrest warrants against five LRA
leaders including Kony and Otti. In 2006, as
mentioned above, Museveni’s strategy for dealing
with the LRA shifted from war to peace-making,
and the role of the ICC changed in this context.
172
From the start of the peace process, the ICC was
an important actor. It is important to mention
171 Schomerus, Mareike: “The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A
History and Overview”, Geneva: Small Arms Survey (September
2007), pp. 34-40.
172 For an overview of arguments see Lanz, David: “The ICC’s Intervention
in Northern Uganda: Beyond the Simplicity of Peace
vs. Justice”, Working Paper, The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy (May 2007), (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/
rwb.nsf/db900sid/PANA-78VKGJ?OpenDocument).