Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Somalia, Khartoum Negotiations 2006
Background of the Conflict
The state collapse following the demise of Barre’s
regime set in motion the fragmentation of the
country into five territorial entities that broadly
corresponded to the distribution and settlement
of major clan groups. 177 It also caused massive internal
displacement of the civilian population,
which along with fierce competition for the leadership
of the territorial governments and control
of the strategic economic infrastructure and assets
fuelled and magnified the effects of the factional
conflicts. By 1992, almost 4.5 million people –
more than half of the Somali population – were
threatened by starvation, severe malnutrition, and
related diseases.
The TFG was created in 2004, 178 in a step that
seemed to signify an effort towards stabilizing the
situation. Due to security concerns, the TFG established
itself in Baidoa, at some distance from
Mogadishu. The interim government turned out
to be ill-managed, 179 weakly supported – it was
not regarded as legitimate by the Somali population,
as it was unable to control the capital – and
controlled only small regions in the Somali countryside.
A number of Islamic courts grew
stronger, 180 mainly because they offered some sort
of stability and security through a system of sharia
law and order as well as social services. When a
US-sponsored secular warlord alliance took over
Mogadishu in February 2006, the CIC fought
and won against the militia. The victory was welcomed
by the TFG until it became clear that, as
of early June 2006, the CIC now controlled the
capital and most of southern Somalia. The CIC’s
claims over what is known as Greater Somalia –
Somali-inhabited territory in Djibouti, Eastern
177 Under British and Italian rule, clan structures were used to consolidate
the ruler’s power. Similarly, Siad Barre’s regime used
clan structures as a basis of political loyalty, but without openly
mentioning or referring to them. Thus, the clans’ traditional
functions became distorted and blended into a scientific Socialist
ideological framework.
178 The TFG was created in Kenya after lengthy reconciliation talks
hosted by the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD).
179 In October 2005, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that
friction among Somalia’s leaders was preventing the country’s
federal institutions from functioning effectively.
180 The Muslim extremist groups were financially supported by
Eritrea. Eritrea was not the principal financing force, however;
many Somalis living outside the country and businessmen who
wanted some form of order contributed money. Moreover, clan
structures played a part in strengthening the CIC.
Ethiopia, Northern Kenya, and Somaliland –
were seen as unacceptable by the neighboring
states. There was also growing international concern,
particularly in Ethiopia and the US, over
the movement’s possible links to militants, its political
goals, and the question of whether an outpost
of extremist Islam would be established in
the strategic Horn of Africa. 181 In the past, Somalia’s
relationship with its neighbors (especially
Ethiopia) has been far from friendly, with a history
of armed conflict, support of opposition
movements in the other countries, and border
disputes that go back several decades.
Previous Negotiations / Mediation
Engagements
Views differ as to why mediation efforts have so
consistently failed. 182 Apart from the lack of coordination
and resulting contradictions among
simultaneous regional initiatives, the failure of regional
and international efforts to settle the Somali
conflict include the nature of Somalia as a
‘failed state’, clan-driven divisions and local disputes,
as well as external spoilers, such as neighboring
states (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti,
and some Gulf states), the US, and the UK.
Some of the main negotiation efforts on Somalia
have been: the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1993,
a framework and implementation agreement
sponsored and facilitated by UNOSOM and
Ethiopia; the Arta Agreement in 2000, a powersharing
agreement hosted and facilitated by Djibouti;
and the Transitional Federal Charter of the
Somali Republic in 2003–2004, a comprehensive
agreement mediated by seven Horn of Africa
states under guidance of the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD).
181 Bengali, Shashank: “Somalia’s interim government, Islamist militias
to meet”, in: McClatchy Washington Bureau (21 June
2006),
(http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/shashank_bengali/story/14
087.html).
182 Many observers blame domestic spoilers (warlords, local actors)
and Somalia’s leadership deficit and divisive political culture;
others point to external spoilers that seem to have vested interests
in keeping Somalia in a state of collapse, in particular Ethiopia.
Some argue that a lack of international political willpower
and analytical acumen, together with rival interests and a series
of missed opportunities for external mediators, have caused the
failures of mediation (Menkhaus, Ken: “Mediation efforts in
Somalia”, in: Africa Mediators’ Retreat (2007), pp. 38–41).
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