Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Agreement
The agreement was very inclusive in terms of topics,
and precise in terms of implementation.
However, even if the agreement should be fully
implemented, some challenges remain: The parties
agreed in the CPA to focus on the priority of
the unity of Sudan, but the agreement also gave
South Sudan the tools (e.g., an army, wealth, and
a border) should it opt for independence. Elections
to be held four years after signing could also
change the power constellation in the government,
yet the decision on postponing the referendum
lies in the hands of the NCP and SPLM/A,
irrespective of these elections. Thus, if the referendum
should lead to secession, many parts of
the agreement would have to be negotiated
afresh. Finally, due to the limited mandate of the
IGAD, neither the Darfur nor the Beja conflict
were addressed.
Context
The North-South process managed to survive a
rapidly changing context, and indeed, even succeeded
in influencing this very context. While the
events of 11 September 2001 and the US’ socalled
“war on terrorism” were important context
factors at the onset, the Darfur crisis and the reaction
from the side of the US and China to this
crisis were important context factors between
2003 and 2005. During the implementation, important
factors include the tensions and lack of
governance structure in the South, the question
of how to truly integrate the opposition in the
North, and the large amounts of money flowing
into the South (and later to Darfur in the form of
humanitarian aid) with the potential to cause corruption.
Outlook
The death of John Garang just over six months
after signing the agreement was a blow to the implementation
of the CPA and the vision of a
“New Sudan”. Concerning sensitive implementation
issues, the SPLM listed the following reasons
for their withdrawal from the Government of National
Unity on 11 October 2007 (they returned
in December 2007 after talks and agreement on
various issues): 209
Abyei: the status of Abyei has not been agreed
upon, as the NCP rejected the findings of the international
experts of the Abyei Boundaries
Commission. This also means that no formal
administrative structures have been put in place.
Tensions escalated to the point of direct clashes
between the SPLA and Messiria fighters / GoS
soldiers between December 2007 and March
2008.
The redeployment of forces: the deployment has
been and continues to be delayed on both sides,
with the NCP concerned that the SPLA has not
retreated southwards, and SPLA concerned that
the GoS forces have not left the oil-producing areas.
The census: The census was delayed, and then
problems arose on how it was carried out. Its validity
as a basis for the elections is contested, e.g.,
because insecure areas such as Darfur are not
fairly represented and elsewhere it was not well
carried out due to lack of documents and registering
officers. 210
The demarcation of the North-South border: The
establishment of the North-South Technical Border
Committee was long delayed, and its reports
will be very sensitive, as they impact on many issues.
The transparency of the oil sector: The SPLM had
little insight into the production and marketing
of the oil, and therefore had no way of knowing
whether the share of revenues it was receiving
were fair. The December 2007 agreement partly
rectified this.
209 Summarized from: International Crisis Group: “Sudan’s Comprehensive
Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis”, Africa Briefing
No 50 (13 March 2008), (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/b50_sudan_cpa_beyon
d_the_crisis.pdf).
210 See also: Santschi, Martina, “Briefing: Counting 'New Sudan'”,
in: African Affairs, 1-10. September (2008).
77