Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes
North-Mali and North-Niger, Libya
Engagement
By Annika Åberg, Mediation Support Project, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich
In a Nutshell
The Tuareg are a nomadic pastoralist ethnic
group residing in several West African countries.
During the 1990s, conflicts emerged between the
Tuareg and the Malian as well as the Nigerien
governments, as the Tuareg demanded more
autonomy, participation in the political process,
and economic development of the countries. In
July 2006, Algerian mediation efforts led to an
agreement between the government of Mali and
the rebel group Democratic Alliance for Change
(DAC), which was rejected by one faction led by
Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. The Niger government refused
altogether to talk to the Tuareg movement
on its side of the border, the Mouvement des Nigeriens
pour la Justice (MNJ).
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi initiated peace
talks between the Bahanga faction, the DAC, and
the Malian government in March 2008 through
his Gaddafi International Charity and Development
Foundation and through the Popular and
Social League of the Great Sahara Tribes, which
comprises traditional and religious leaders from
21 African and Asian countries. The Nigerien
government still refused to talk to the MNJ.
In a first phase, talks were held in Tripoli on 26
and 27 March 2008. They ended with a ceasefire
agreement. However, this agreement could not
prevent the parties from continuing fighting during
the subsequent weeks. In a second phase, a
delegation of tribal chiefs from 14 African and
Asian countries was sent by the Popular and Social
League to contact all parties in Mali and Niger
to convince them to join the peace initiative.
Although all parties thereafter pledged to participate
in a new round of talks, there were no signs
of an abatement of the conflict. On the contrary,
the Malian government changed its rather conciliatory
policy after a series of deadly attacks by
the Bahanga faction. The Libyan initiative must
therefore be characterized as a failure, as it could
not provide any substantial contribution to a
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transition of the conflict. Although Gaddafi’s approach,
including a variety of traditional actors
and prominent personalities, seemed to distinguish
itself from other Libyan mediation attempts
(e.g., in Chad), it failed due to a lack of commitment
to the signed agreement from all sides.
Key Messages
Implementation mechanisms are crucial: The ceasefire
agreement did not include clear and realistic
timeframes and implementation mechanisms to
assure that agreed-upon promises were delivered.
Agreement vs. post-agreement commitment: Sticks
and carrots during the negotiations helped to
achieve an agreement, but could not assure the
parties’ commitment to adhere to its provisions.
Regional conflicts require regional approaches: The
transnational character of the Tuareg community
would have made it necessary to coordinate the
actions and responses of all states concerned in
order to prevent spill-over of conflict. Niger’s refusal
to engage in the process was certainly an obstacle
in the peace process.
Political agenda of the mediator can be problematic:
It can be detrimental for a lasting peace process if
mediators are pursuing a political agenda of their
own in a conflict (in the case of Gaddafi, the Pan-
Arabic discourse), because then the mediator does
not focus on facilitating a solution that is in the
interests of all the parties to the conflict.
Difficulties of financial incentives: High financial
incentives for agreeing to a peace accord can
bring the parties to agree to a ceasefire although
they never had the intention to respect it.