Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Northern Uganda, Juba Negotiations
tarians and traditional leaders held in Northern
Uganda contributed to enhancing the legitimacy
and securing the support of affected communities
for the Juba talks. 168 The challenge, however, was
how to achieve congruence between the different
processes.
The biggest problem was the discrepancy between
the progress of the official talks in Juba, on the
one hand, and the position and perception of Joseph
Kony and LRA combatants in the bush, on
the other. It appears that LRA delegates in Juba
pushed the talks forward and concluded agreements
that Kony was not ready for or did not
fully understand. This backfired and fostered
Kony’s mistrust of LRA negotiators as well as the
mediators. This may have been a part of the reason
for the killing in October 2007 of Kony’s
deputy, Vincent Otti, who was perhaps the preferred
LRA interlocutor of the facilitation team as
well as international observers. The circumstances
of his assassination are opaque, but it appears that
he was killed because Kony suspected Otti of
concluding a separate deal or negotiating his own
liberty in exchange for Kony’s. Likewise, it is unclear
why Kony decided not to sign the final
peace accord in April 2008, but the feeling that
he was not sufficiently involved in the Juba talks
or their outcome is likely to have played a role.
Change of context: As explained above, the broader
military and political context in 2006 was favorable
to peacemaking in Northern Uganda. This
changed in 2007, as the SPLM decided to leave
the government of national unity (GNU) in
Khartoum. As a result, the option of the North
and South resuming warfare became more realistic
and the potential strategic value of the LRA as
a proxy force for the North increased. Second, serious
disagreements and rifts within the LRA
came to the fore, as demonstrated by the killing
of Vincent Otti. And third, the GoU increasingly
grew impatient and seriously considered regional
military action against the LRA. Fears of a military
escalation were heightened in September
2007, when Museveni concluded an agreement
168 International Crisis Group: “Northern Ugandan Peace Process:
The Need to Maintain Momentum”, Africa Briefing, no. 46
(14 September 2007), (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5078).
with the DRC on joint military action to drive
the LRA out of the DRC. 169
However, the Juba talks did not fall apart – on
the contrary. The CPA crisis was partly resolved
when the SPLM re-entered GNU in December
2007. Also, Museveni’s military posturing increased
the pressure on the LRA to conclude a
peace settlement. Against this background, the
talks gained momentum in February 2008, and
within a month, all remaining issues were resolved,
at least on paper. Unfortunately, Kony
failed to turn up for the signing of the final peace
accords.
Key Issues and Content of Peace
Agreements
Key issues: The Juba talks started with the adoption
of an agenda, which the facilitation team had
drafted. It included five points:
1. Cessation of hostilities
2. Comprehensive solutions to the marginalization
of Northern Uganda
3. Reconciliation and accountability
4. Ceasefire agreement
5. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
of the LRA
This agenda reflects the double aim of the Juba
talks. The first one was to deal with the LRA and
to neutralize the specific security threat it posed
in Northern Uganda and in the region (points 1,
4, and 5); the second objective was to address the
root causes of the conflict, i.e., to remedy the
marginalization within Uganda of the Acholi as a
group and of Northern Uganda as a region
(points 2 and partly 3).
Peace agreements: The two most significant agreements,
which will undoubtedly stand as references
for future efforts to make peace in Northern
Uganda, are those on comprehensive solutions
(May 2007) and transitional justice (June
2007 and February 2008). 170 The former lays out
a set of principles geared towards fostering the
participation of Acholi in Ugandan politics and
tackling the discrimination they have suffered
169 Quaranto, Peter J: “Northern Uganda: Emerging Threats to
Peace Talks”, Pretoria: ISS (13 November 2007).
170 For the texts of all peace agreements of the Juba talks, see
(http://www.resolveuganda.org/peaceagreement).
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