<strong>Unpack<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mystery</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Mediation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>African</strong> <strong>Peace</strong> Processes is tricky, but not impossible if it is done carefully. The first reason why this comparison is delicate is due to <strong>the</strong> multi-causal nature <strong>of</strong> peace processes – what was <strong>the</strong> key factor affect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> outcome: <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conflict, <strong>the</strong> negotiat<strong>in</strong>g parties, <strong>the</strong> mediators, <strong>the</strong> process, <strong>the</strong> peace agreement, <strong>the</strong> context, or someth<strong>in</strong>g else? As all <strong>the</strong>se aspects are <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>ked, compar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> isolation is problematic. The second reason why comparison is tricky is due to <strong>the</strong> significant difference <strong>in</strong> scale between a basic agreement on pr<strong>in</strong>ciples or cessation <strong>of</strong> hostilities on <strong>the</strong> one hand, and a full-blown comprehensive peace agreement on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. For example, <strong>the</strong> pre-talks agreement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Central <strong>African</strong> Republic (CAR) or <strong>the</strong> Tuareg or Somalia ceasefire agreements consist <strong>of</strong> only a very few pages, where implementation modalities are miss<strong>in</strong>g. The Kivu talks took place over a period <strong>of</strong> some 17 days. In contrast, <strong>the</strong> Sudan Comprehensive <strong>Peace</strong> Agreement is a 260-page document address<strong>in</strong>g major security, political, <strong>in</strong>stitutional, and constitutional aspects. The negotiations that led to <strong>the</strong> agreement took nearly three full years. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> comparison is not just between apples and oranges; one is actually compar<strong>in</strong>g peanuts with pumpk<strong>in</strong>s! Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> advantage <strong>of</strong> such a comparative approach is that <strong>the</strong> tentative lessons one generates are <strong>of</strong> a more general value than if <strong>the</strong>y are derived from one case only. The problems <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>kages between factors and <strong>the</strong> very different scales must be kept <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d, however, and any lessons from <strong>the</strong>se comparisons should also 8 be seen as work<strong>in</strong>g hypo<strong>the</strong>ses, or as food for fur<strong>the</strong>r study, ra<strong>the</strong>r than as truth writ <strong>in</strong> stone. Case selection: How were <strong>the</strong> cases selected? We focused on cases <strong>in</strong> Africa to limit <strong>the</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> study. The comparison between mediation processes is also easier with<strong>in</strong> one cont<strong>in</strong>ent, as <strong>the</strong> conflicts are more likely to share at least some common denom<strong>in</strong>ators, such as a similar geopolitical context or <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regional dimension (conflict spill-over). Most conflicts experienced numerous peace processes, mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> choice <strong>of</strong> a specific peace process difficult. The two criteria <strong>of</strong> selection were: First, <strong>the</strong> process was to be a recent one, e.g., one that had occurred dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> last ten years. The second condition was that sufficient material had to be available to provide lessons about <strong>the</strong> nuts and bolts <strong>of</strong> mediation. This micro-level view on mediation does not make sense without an understand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> how <strong>the</strong> mediation approach adopted fits <strong>the</strong> respective conflict context. For this reason, we also describe <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various cases and expla<strong>in</strong> how <strong>the</strong> mediation engagement is embedded <strong>the</strong>re<strong>in</strong>. The peace processes we analyze are: Burundi (Arusha Accords 2000), Central <strong>African</strong> Republic (pretalks 2007), Democratic Republic <strong>of</strong> Congo (Kivu process 2008), Ivory Coast (Ouagadougou negotiations 2007), Kenya (post election peace negotiations 2008), Somalia (Khartoum negotiations 2006), Sudan (North-South negotiations 2005), Sudan (Darfur <strong>Peace</strong> Process 2006), Mali/Niger- Tuareg (Libyan led talks 2007), Uganda LRA (Juba negotiations 2008), and Western Sahara (UN-led negotiations 2003). A summary <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cases, parties, and mediators, can be found <strong>in</strong> map 1.
<strong>Mediation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>African</strong> <strong>Peace</strong> Processes: Carefully Compar<strong>in</strong>g Apples and Oranges Map 1: <strong>Mediation</strong> processes exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> this study 9
- Page 1 and 2: Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation
- Page 3: Table of Content Foreword..........
- Page 7: “If you want to make peace with y
- Page 11 and 12: Mediation in African Peace Processe
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- Page 21 and 22: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process Burun
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- Page 29 and 30: Central African Republic, Inclusive
- Page 31 and 32: Central African Republic, Inclusive
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- Page 35 and 36: Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agree
- Page 37 and 38: Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agree
- Page 39 and 40: Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agree
- Page 41 and 42: D. R. Congo/Kivu, Conference on Pea
- Page 43 and 44: D. R. Congo/Kivu, Conference on Pea
- Page 45 and 46: D. R. Congo/Kivu, Conference on Pea
- Page 47 and 48: Kenya, The National Accord and Reco
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North-Mali and North-Niger, Libya E
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Northern Uganda, Juba Negotiations
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Northern Uganda, Juba Negotiations
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Northern Uganda, Juba Negotiations
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Somalia, Khartoum Negotiations 2006
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Somalia, Khartoum Negotiations 2006
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Somalia, Khartoum Negotiations 2006
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Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Pe
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Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Pe
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Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Pe
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Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations an
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Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations an
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Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations an
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Western Sahara, The Baker Plans Wes
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Western Sahara, The Baker Plans poi
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Western Sahara, The Baker Plans as
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Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation
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Acronyms MSU UN Mediation Support U