Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Somalia, Khartoum Negotiations 2006
people, on the other hand, were less optimistic.
Many saw the agreement as a ploy to attract
funds from oil-rich AL states; others believed that
the deal was signed to please the host country,
Sudan. 195
Context
Increasingly radical policies within the SCIC,
such as calls for jihad against Ethiopia and recruitment
of foreign fighters, set in motion a confrontation
with the increasingly weakening and
withering government and, more importantly,
with Ethiopia, which already had battle-ready
troops inside Somalia. In December 2006, the
SCIC was ousted from power in an offensive
launched by Ethiopian forces. The TFG entered
Mogadishu to try and govern from the capital,
while a counter-insurgency was launched by remnants
from the SCIC to target Ethiopian and
government troops.
Process and Participation
Despite the high-level participation from the government
and the symbolic value of the AL’s engagement
in the conflict – thereby symbolically
forming a “Muslim bond’ in the eyes of the SCIC
– several factors combined resulted in the failure
of the Khartoum talks. Most importantly, the
willingness of the parties to participate in a political
dialog and reach a settlement was only attributed
to the moderate group within the Islamic
courts; it did not include the radical and militant
leader and members, who supported neither the
dialog nor the deals brokered with the TFG.
Partly, the parties came to the table due to concerns
about face-saving and tactical reflections,
rather than being prepared for a long-term peace
process. However, this is a typical state of affairs
at the onset of negotiations. External developments,
e.g., Ethiopian military operations, prevented
this tactical phase from developing into a
more solid process. As it turned out, rather than
being a prelude to peace and reconciliation, the
talks between the parties in Sudan were a mere
interlude between fierce fighting and competition
for control of power, or a very last tentative effort
to solve the issue before using force. 196
195 Ibid.
196 Mail & Guardian (23 June 2006): op. cit.
Outlook
Independently of the Khartoum talks, an AU
peacekeeping force was later deployed to Somalia,
but due to insufficient personnel was unable to
stem the armed conflict. Recent talks ended in
another cease-fire agreement between the TFG
and elements from the opposition. It remains to
be seen whether the June 2008 Djibouti agreement
is capable of bringing peace and stability to
Somalia. 197 The agreement is, however, similar to
other agreements that have failed in that it relies
heavily on external actors, rather than the Somalis,
to do the task. Key challenges include:
The humanitarian crisis: More than one-third of
the Somali population is in desperate need of assistance,
a key priority at the moment.
Addressing inclusiveness in the peace process: A
number of factions refuse to commit themselves
to a negotiated agreement with the TFG and are
intent on fighting. The question is whether an international
stabilization force may serve to encourage
dialog or merely make matters worse?
The ambiguousness of regional involvement: The
involvement of regional actors, particularly of
Ethiopia, seriously hampered the attempts for
peace in Somalia; however, engagement by external
actors in the form of international pressure
may prove to be essential if peace is to be
achieved.
The lack of resources and capacity: Ever since the
creation of Somalia, the country has been dependent
on foreign aid. This will not change
overnight. Financial resources are required to create
effective institutions, but this is dependent on
a gradual build-up while taking into account
what the Somalis want.
197 Security Council Report: “Somalia July 2008” (2008),
(http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.
4278477/).
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