<strong>Unpack<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mystery</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Mediation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>African</strong> <strong>Peace</strong> Processes 40 Ivorian”. 92 The recognition <strong>of</strong> such claims will be a major challenge <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> next month, as it is l<strong>in</strong>ked to <strong>the</strong> right to vote. The mediators have to assess this process very carefully, as it is likely that <strong>the</strong> parties will ask for arbitration regard<strong>in</strong>g this issue. 92 RFI: “Audiences fora<strong>in</strong>es en Côte d'Ivoire: les sans-papiers my<strong>the</strong> ou réalité?” (26 December 2007), (http://www.rfi.fr/radi<strong>of</strong>r/editions/072/edition_52_20071226.asp).
D. R. Congo/Kivu, Conference on <strong>Peace</strong>, Security and Development 2008 D. R. Congo/Kivu, Conference on <strong>Peace</strong>, Security and Development 2008 By Sab<strong>in</strong>a Laederach, <strong>Mediation</strong> Desk, Swiss Federal Department <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs* In a Nutshell Despite <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> war <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Democratic Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Congo (DRC), which was achieved through negotiations <strong>in</strong> Sun City <strong>in</strong> 2002 and a peace accord signed <strong>in</strong> 2003, fight<strong>in</strong>g went on <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> two prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>of</strong> North and South Kivu, pitch<strong>in</strong>g a vast number <strong>of</strong> different rebel groups (Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda/FDLR, Conseil National pour la Défense du Peuple/CNDP, mouvements Mayi- Mayi, etc.) aga<strong>in</strong>st each o<strong>the</strong>r and aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> Congolese Army. The Conference on <strong>Peace</strong>, Security and Development <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> two prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>of</strong> North and South Kivu, which aimed to end this fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Eastern Congo, took place <strong>in</strong> Goma from 6–23 January 2008. Due to <strong>the</strong> large number <strong>of</strong> participants (approximately 1,500 representatives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Congolese state, <strong>the</strong> different rebel groups, civil society, traditional chiefs, religious leaders, and <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational community) and <strong>the</strong> public nature <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> talks, <strong>the</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g was unusual. The talks were mandated by <strong>the</strong> government, and <strong>the</strong> two ma<strong>in</strong> mediators were Abbé Appoll<strong>in</strong>aire Malu Malu and Vital Kamerhe. The talks took place on two levels: on <strong>the</strong> one side, <strong>the</strong>re was an atypical, highly public event that <strong>in</strong>cluded all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1,500 participants and was widely covered by <strong>the</strong> media. The different groups present at <strong>the</strong> conference had <strong>the</strong> opportunity to express <strong>the</strong>ir views on <strong>the</strong> conflict. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side, more traditional negotiations on <strong>the</strong> crucial issues such as how to implement <strong>the</strong> agreed ceasefire and especially <strong>the</strong> fate <strong>of</strong> General Nkunda from <strong>the</strong> CNDP were conducted far from <strong>the</strong> public gaze beh<strong>in</strong>d closed doors and among a more restricted number <strong>of</strong> participants. The goal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conference was not so much to sign an agreement, but ra<strong>the</strong>r to formulate different recommendations to <strong>the</strong> Congolese government on how to improve <strong>the</strong> situation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two prov<strong>in</strong>ces. In addition to <strong>the</strong> recommendations elaborated by <strong>the</strong> 1,500 participants, <strong>the</strong> conference also produced an “Acte d’engagement” signed by some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> participants that laid <strong>the</strong> groundwork for a ceasefire, <strong>the</strong> demobilization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various armed groups, and an amnesty for most crimes committed dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> war. Key Messages Inclusiveness can lead to greater ownership: A high degree <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>clusiveness can help to dissipate some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mistrust between <strong>the</strong> different groups and make an entire region feel concerned about its future, <strong>the</strong>reby streng<strong>the</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> a peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g process. Decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g levels affect participation: However, participation alone is not all that matters. The different levels <strong>of</strong> decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g must be evaluated as well, as <strong>the</strong>y require different formats <strong>of</strong> participation. Comb<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> consultation and negotiation fora: The example <strong>of</strong> Goma shows how consultations and negotiations can be comb<strong>in</strong>ed to lead to a more holistic approach. Limits <strong>of</strong> per-diem diplomacy: In order to assure <strong>the</strong> effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g, it is important to make sure that <strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> participants is not only motivated by factors such as <strong>the</strong> per diem, food, or o<strong>the</strong>r potential <strong>in</strong>centives for dragg<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>the</strong> process. Get <strong>the</strong> regional stakeholders on board: In conflicts with a regional dimension, it is essential to <strong>in</strong>vite neighbor<strong>in</strong>g states to take part <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> peace negotiations, as participants or observers. Agree on implementation mechanisms dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> negotiation phase: Implementation mechanisms must be decided on dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> talks, not afterwards. The role <strong>of</strong> “<strong>in</strong>sider” mediators: Their role was central for <strong>the</strong> public part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conference, which was conceived as be<strong>in</strong>g organized by <strong>the</strong> Congolese for <strong>the</strong> Congolese. *This study was written with<strong>in</strong> a research program toge<strong>the</strong>r with MSP and does not represent <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Swiss FDFA. 41
- Page 1 and 2: Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation
- Page 3: Table of Content Foreword..........
- Page 7 and 8: “If you want to make peace with y
- Page 9 and 10: Mediation in African Peace Processe
- Page 11 and 12: Mediation in African Peace Processe
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- Page 17 and 18: Mediation in African Peace Processe
- Page 19 and 20: Mediation in African Peace Processe
- Page 21 and 22: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process Burun
- Page 23 and 24: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process ing t
- Page 25 and 26: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process idea
- Page 27 and 28: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process insti
- Page 29 and 30: Central African Republic, Inclusive
- Page 31 and 32: Central African Republic, Inclusive
- Page 33 and 34: Central African Republic, Inclusive
- Page 35 and 36: Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agree
- Page 37 and 38: Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agree
- Page 39: Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agree
- Page 43 and 44: D. R. Congo/Kivu, Conference on Pea
- Page 45 and 46: D. R. Congo/Kivu, Conference on Pea
- Page 47 and 48: Kenya, The National Accord and Reco
- Page 49 and 50: Kenya, The National Accord and Reco
- Page 51 and 52: Kenya, The National Accord and Reco
- Page 53 and 54: Kenya, The National Accord and Reco
- Page 55 and 56: North-Mali and North-Niger, Libya E
- Page 57 and 58: North-Mali and North-Niger, Libya E
- Page 59 and 60: North-Mali and North-Niger, Libya E
- Page 61 and 62: Northern Uganda, Juba Negotiations
- Page 63 and 64: Northern Uganda, Juba Negotiations
- Page 65 and 66: Northern Uganda, Juba Negotiations
- Page 67 and 68: Somalia, Khartoum Negotiations 2006
- Page 69 and 70: Somalia, Khartoum Negotiations 2006
- Page 71 and 72: Somalia, Khartoum Negotiations 2006
- Page 73 and 74: Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Pe
- Page 75 and 76: Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Pe
- Page 77 and 78: Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Pe
- Page 79 and 80: Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations an
- Page 81 and 82: Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations an
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- Page 85 and 86: Western Sahara, The Baker Plans Wes
- Page 87 and 88: Western Sahara, The Baker Plans poi
- Page 89 and 90: Western Sahara, The Baker Plans as
- Page 91 and 92:
Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation
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Acronyms MSU UN Mediation Support U