Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes agenda for secession. 70 Spill-over of the Liberia conflict and alleged implications of Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaoré hampered the quest for peace, though. Previous Negotiations / Entry Points / Pre-Negotiations Previous Negotiations Immediate reactions of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) led to a first round of talks and the signing of a ceasefire agreement on 17 October 2002 in Lomé. 71 The early reluctance came mainly from the side of the GoIC, which still believed in a military victory. Gbagbo’s stance was manifested through the procurement of tanks, additional mercenaries, and the rejection of the French military presence that was securing the de-militarized zone between the conflict parties. 72 Mediation efforts were therefore largely due to external pressure of ECOWAS and France. The list of talks and agreements before the Ouagadougou agreement (OA) includes: • Lomé-Ceasefire Agreement in 2002; • Accra-Agreement I and II in 2002 and 2003, concerning the ECOWAS peacekeepers; • Lina-Marcoussis-Agreement (LMA) in 2003, brokered by France; • Accra-Agreement III in 2004 under the auspices of ECOWAS, reaffirming the LMA’s principles; • Pretoria-Agreement in 2005, brokered by the AU-mandated Thabo Mbeki. The logic behind these agreements was to mandate an even-handed government of national reconciliation with the implementation of the 70 International Crisis Group: “Faut-il croire à l’accord de Ouagadougou?” (27 June 2007), p. 4, (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4916&l=2). 71 Gramizzi (2003), op. cit., p.21. 72 “Nous n’avons pas demandé l’intervention des troupes françaises [...] Nous ne demanderons même pas l’intervention de quelque pays africain que ce soit.” Ivoirian Minister of Defence quoted in: “Les chefs d’Etat africains décident l’envoi d’une force en Côte d’Ivoire”, in: Le Temps (30 September 2002); Gramizzi (2003), op. cit., p. 17f. 36 agreement, while the main conflict parties were seen as spoilers that had to be kept on a short leash through an International Working Group (GTI, which proved to be ineffective). 73 None of the above agreements succeeded. The FN dismissed Mbeki as mediator after a South African statement in the UNSC that made reference to Gbagbo’s “positive attitude”. 74 President Gbagbo, in turn, repeatedly rejected any external pressure to change the constitution so as to limit his own power, and completely marginalized the internationally supported Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny. Entry Points and Third-Parties Involved Gbagbo eventually proposed direct talks with the leader of the FN and the MPCI, Guillaume Soro, on 19 December 2006. He thereby sidelined the international interventions and opted for a regional solution with Blaise Compaoré, a mediator who was biased towards the FN. Campaoré had followed and supported all regional efforts of the ECOWAS and was its incumbent president in 2007/2008. More importantly, though, the FN cadres circulated freely in Burkina Faso throughout the whole conflict. During the early years of the conflict, the northern president was therefore seen as enemy by the GoIC. 75 At the same time, he was well suited to put pressure on the FN cadres. In addition, the Rome-based religious community of Sant’Egidio was called on by Compaoré, who had previously worked with them in the Inter-Togolese dialog. The community had used its longstanding presence in Côte d’Ivoire to follow all previous peace agreements. 76 Negotiations Participation and Inclusiveness Unlike the previous agreements, the Ouagadougou Process restricted participation to the two delegations of FN leader Soro and President 73 International Crisis Group (2007): op. cit., p. 19. 74 UN Doc S/PV.5253, cited in: “Médiation remise en cause en Côte d’Ivoire”, in: Le Monde (1 September 2005). 75 La Croix: “La crise ivoirienne menace de sétendre” (3 December 2002); International Crisis Group (2007): op. cit., p. 5f. 76 Interview with Mario Giro (2 August 2007): “Personne ne doit se sentir exclu du processus de paix” (http://www.santegidio.org).
Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agreement Gbagbo (the Lina-Marcoussis-Agreement had been signed by seven major delegations and additional small parties). More importantly, direct talks were held between Soro and the government, the latter being represented at the table by Minister of the Interior Désiré Tagro. Mediation Team and Third-Party Coordination Three mediators were involved: Djibril Yipènè Bassolé, at that time minister of security of Burkina Faso; the legal councilor of the president of Burkina Faso; and Mario Giro from the community of Sant’Egidio. In difficult situations, all the mediators and participants went to President Compaoré. Minister Bassolé acted as the head of the mediating team during the sessions. Mediation Style and Strategy 77 Previous attempts had been characterized by external pressure and the imposition of solutions. 78 Mario Giro describes the activities of the GTI on the eve of the Ouagadougou talks as expropriation of the Ivorians with regard to their peace process. By contrast, according to Mario Giro, there was no pressure either from international actors or from the lead or assisting mediators in the Ouagadougou talks. 79 This mediation differed essentially from other mediation attempts, as the mediators abstained from intervening in the substance, and the negotiations took place directly between the two parties’ leaders. Therefore, the entire responsibility rested upon these two leaders. During the sessions, there was no need for ground rules. For most of the time, the three mediators were just sitting in the room and watching the delegations “shouting at each other”, indicating that the parties were responsible for their actions: “ ‘If you want to reach an agreement, do so; we are here to assist you, and we don’t need to be here.’ If you put things like this, the parties feel 77 The following description of the mediation style and thirdparty coordination is based on a conversation of the author with Mario Giro (22 July 2008). 78 See, for instance, the declaration of France on 30 January 2006 (http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr). 79 Interview with Mario Giro (2 August 2007): “Personne ne doit se sentir exclu.” the responsibility and stop playing games.” 80 This sense of responsibility had been missing in previous mediation attempts. There was no deadline, and the two parties were free to reach whatever outcome they had in mind. Furthermore, the mediating team did not take the initiative with regard to putting documents on the table. The parties themselves drafted the relevant documents separately. Subsequently, the mediators put the positions together and gave the resulting document back to the parties for further discussion. Formulation and suggestions were rarely applied. One element in the agreement that goes back to a suggestion by the mediation team is a code of conduct for the implementation phase. This code was formulated jointly between the parties and the mediators. This ‘nonthreatening’ mediation is certainly an example for facilitative, low-powered mediation. Negotiation Setup and Process The negotiation set-up of the talks reflected the facilitative approach used. The confidential atmosphere in the conference hotel was ensured by limiting contact to journalists and reducing the total number of persons involved in the organization and chairing of the meetings to a maximum of ten persons. Only the three mediators were constantly in the room with the parties. No audience was allowed, since spectators would undoubtedly have increased the sense of pressure and of being ‘observed’. The smaller the setting, the easier it is also for the negotiators to test ideas without being bound to them by an audience. The talks were partly conducted directly between Soro and Tagro, who was in constant contact with Gbagbo, and partly in separate meetings with the mediators. In a first phase (approximately from 5–24 February 2007), the two delegations held separate talks, with the facilitators acting as go-betweens. In a second phase (20 February – 4 March), both delegations met directly. The discussions took place in a confidential atmosphere, with the aim of maintaining the par- 80 Mario Giro (22 July 2008). From a social psychological perspective, this approach complies with the basic preconditions for a shift in attitude or perception. Commitment and recognition must be achieved without pressure in order to create cognitive dissonance, which in turn initiates shifts in perception. 37
Page 1 and 2: Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation
Page 3: Table of Content Foreword..........
Page 7 and 8: “If you want to make peace with y
Page 9 and 10: Mediation in African Peace Processe
Page 21 and 22: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process Burun
Page 23 and 24: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process ing t
Page 25 and 26: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process idea
Page 27 and 28: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process insti
Page 29 and 30: Central African Republic, Inclusive
Page 35: Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agree
Page 39 and 40: Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agree
Page 41 and 42: D. R. Congo/Kivu, Conference on Pea
Page 47 and 48: Kenya, The National Accord and Reco
Page 55 and 56: North-Mali and North-Niger, Libya E
Page 61 and 62: Northern Uganda, Juba Negotiations
Page 67 and 68: Somalia, Khartoum Negotiations 2006
Page 73 and 74: Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Pe
Page 79 and 80: Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations an
Page 85 and 86: Western Sahara, The Baker Plans Wes
Page 87 and 88:
Western Sahara, The Baker Plans poi
Page 89 and 90:
Western Sahara, The Baker Plans as
Page 91 and 92:
Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation
Page 93 and 94:
Acronyms MSU UN Mediation Support U
show all

Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?