Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace ... - Swisspeace

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Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes Background of the Conflict The conflict in Burundi goes back to preindependence in 1962. The Belgian colonial government used and exacerbated ethnic differences between the majority Hutu (85 per cent) and dominant minority Tutsi (14 per cent) and the Batwa or Twa (1 per cent) by following the adage of “divide and rule”. Large-scale fighting in 1965 (5,000 killed), 1972 (150,000 killed), 1988 (thousands killed), and 1993–2003 (some 250,000 killed) generally followed the pattern of Hutu uprisings with subsequent repression by the Tutsi-dominated army. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians sought refuge in the neighboring countries. In 1987, Pierre Buyoya – a Tutsi – became president of Burundi in a coup d’état and remained in power until 1993. A constitution was drafted and widely accepted in a referendum in 1992. In 1993, army extremists assassinated the recently elected Melchior Ndadaye and six Hutu ministers, and in 1994, his successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira, as well as Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana were killed when their plane was shot down over Kigali. Civil war intensified, with civilian massacres orchestrated by the parties and fighting between the Tutsi dominated army and the Hutu rebels, e.g., the armed wing of the National Center for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD- FDD), the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People – National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu- FNL), and the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU). Buyoya returned to power in 1996 after a second coup. Regional pressure led to allparty talks in Arusha in 1998. 12 What distinguishes the violent conflict in Burundi from so many others is the extent to which elite-led politico-ethnic rivalry for power became entwined with mass killing and fears of group extinction. Ethnic violence is the result not of ancient tribal hatreds, but of divisive colonial policies and the post-independence struggle for power 12 International Crisis Group: “Burundi’s Peace Process, the Road to Arusha”, Africa Report no. 2 (20 July 1998), (se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=7&fileid=AB1 12B67-27F8-B5C9-E99C-1A01EF56E0C4&lng=en). 22 among politico-ethnic elites in a polarized country. 13 Previous Negotiations / Mediation Engagements As the Burundian civil war intensified in late 1995, members of the international community undertook different approaches to prevent genocide and foster political reconciliation. A multitude of external actors initiated a large number of mediation-oriented activities in Burundi. 14 The focal point of mediation efforts changed several times. At first, mediation centered on the UN and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU); then the focus shifted to the official and private efforts of the Carter Center and of Julius Kamparage Nyerere, who had been appointed as African facilitator; then to ‘secret’ mediation efforts by the Community of Sant’Egidio, which worked in parallel with efforts of regional states; and then back to the Arusha process and Nyerere, who also worked in coordination with the EU, Switzerland, and the US. Parallel processes of internal dialog were actively supported by private actors, such as Synergies Africa, and official actors, such as UNESCO and the Vatican. 15 Although the engagements had their advantages and accomplishments, the various and competing definitions of the problems resulted in a mismatch of responses: more than a dozen special envoys worked alongside private mediators, with both complementary and contradictory initiatives and agendas. The Burundians were clearly able to profit from this confusion, with actors manipulat- 13 Weissman, Stephen: “Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons from International Diplomacy”, in: Peaceworks, United States Institute for Peace (1998). 14 Fabienne Hara explains the multitude of activities and agents: ‘Impelled by a mixture of guilt toward the Rwandan genocide, genuine indignation in light of the massacres’ scope and cruelty, and an oversimplified view of the Burundian problem, the international community became obsessed with the threat of impeding genocide in Burundi. Many […] saw Burundi as a laboratory to test […] new conflict resolution and prevention approaches’ (Hara, Fabienne: “Burundi: A Case of Parallel Diplomacy”, in: Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, ed., Herding Cats: multiparty mediation in a complex world, United States Institute for Peace (1999), p. 142). 15 Ibid.
Burundi, Arusha Peace Process ing the different negotiators in order to gain maximum legitimacy. 16 Pre-Negotiation to the Arusha Agreement Several East and Central African States, in conjunction with the OAU, developed a broad peace initiative to the crisis in Burundi. In 1996 and 1997, Rwanda, Uganda, DR Congo, Kenya, and Ethiopia (joined by Zambia after October 1996) demonstrated an unusual degree of cohesion and determination in pushing for a negotiated settlement. The countries held five Presidential Summit Meetings on Burundi between 1996 and 1997, which brought together leaders of neighboring nations to address the Burundi situation and forced the international community to recognize the conflict’s regional character. 17 They also engaged former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere as their ‘facilitator’ and sponsored four major political discussions, hosted by Nyerere, among the Burundian parties. 18 In an exceptional move, nine regional states19 adopted economic sanctions in 1996 aimed at persuading the Burundian government to restore constitutional legality and participate in all-party negotiations. This represented a fundamental shift in inter- African relations: For the first time, a group of leaders declared they would not accept a coup d’état as a legitimate way for an individual to come to power. The Arusha talks between June 1998 and August 2000 were carried out within this regional 16 Claiming commitment to democratic principles, FRODEBU gained the support of certain international parliamentary organizations. Opposing FRODEBU and playing on Western guilt about the Rwandan genocide, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), a Tutsi group, along with members of the military, sought to gain international endorsement by denouncing what they claimed was a Hutu plot to exterminate all Tutsis (Ibid., p. 149.) 17 Hara (1999): op.cit., p. 145. The war involved neighboring states as well. Many CNDD-FDD combatants were based in Tanzania and launched incursions into Burundi from there, despite apparent efforts by the Tanzanian government to discourage the activities (Human Rights Watch: “Burundi - Escalating Violence Demands Attention”, Briefing Paper (November 2002), (http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/burundi/burundi1128.pdf)). 18 Weissman (1998): op. cit. 19 DR Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. framework, facilitated by Julius Nyerere, and by Nelson Mandela after the death of Nyerere in 1999. Nyerere approached the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) for support. The Burundian parties wanted French speakers and also some experts that were not from the Nyerere foundation (to balance a perceived bias), thus they short-listed countries that would be acceptable as countries that might send experts, and proposed South Africa and Switzerland for the constitutional issues. Negotiation phase Participation and Inclusiveness All political parties to the conflict and some of the armed groups were included in the Arusha talks. 20 The process was very inclusive, as the parties agreed that all political parties could attend. However, this also led to the increase in parties as the process developed (with more than 200 delegates). The ensuing dynamic was for the large parties to bring in “their” parties and “their” civil society actors, so that no real new perspectives were integrated, although there were more and more people. This was then brought down to a manageable number through the “sufficient consensus” approach, getting the large parties to agree, and then working with the large parties to get “their” smaller parties to come on board. Thus, there was a G7, G8, and G3 group. Some of the political parties had a military branch, so that the armed groups were in part also represented at the talks. However, at times there were differences between the political and military branch of the same movement, so that the respective armed movement did not feel adequately represented. The CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL split from their political wings during the Arusha talks and wanted to replace these delegations in the talks. The other negotiation parties rejected this, however; thus, these two 20 Key actors on the Tutsi side were: the army, dominated by the Tutsi until the elections of 2005, the UPRONA party, the MRC of Colonel Bayanganakandi, and the movement AC Genocide etc. On the Hutu side: the FRODEBU party, the former rebel groups CNDD-FDD, CNDD, FROLINAT, and Palipehutu-FLN as well as its dissidents. 23
Page 1 and 2: Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation
Page 3: Table of Content Foreword..........
Page 7 and 8: “If you want to make peace with y
Page 9 and 10: Mediation in African Peace Processe
Page 21: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process Burun
Page 25 and 26: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process idea
Page 27 and 28: Burundi, Arusha Peace Process insti
Page 29 and 30: Central African Republic, Inclusive
Page 35 and 36: Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agree
Page 41 and 42: D. R. Congo/Kivu, Conference on Pea
Page 47 and 48: Kenya, The National Accord and Reco
Page 55 and 56: North-Mali and North-Niger, Libya E
Page 61 and 62: Northern Uganda, Juba Negotiations
Page 67 and 68: Somalia, Khartoum Negotiations 2006
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Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Pe
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Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations an
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Western Sahara, The Baker Plans Wes
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Western Sahara, The Baker Plans poi
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Western Sahara, The Baker Plans as
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Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation
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Acronyms MSU UN Mediation Support U
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