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BP Annual Report and Form 20-F 2011 - Company Reporting

BP Annual Report and Form 20-F 2011 - Company Reporting

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Additional information for shareholdersliquidity, shareholder returns <strong>and</strong>/or implementation of its strategic agenda,particularly in the US. These potential liabilities may continue to have amaterial adverse effect on the group’s results <strong>and</strong> financial condition. SeeFinancial statements – Note 2 on pages 190-194 for information regardingthe financial impact of the Incident.Investigations <strong>and</strong> reports relating to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill<strong>BP</strong> is subject to a number of investigations related to the Incident bynumerous agencies of the US government. The related published reportsare available on the websites of the agencies <strong>and</strong> commissions referred tobelow.On 11 January <strong>20</strong>11, the National Commission on the <strong>BP</strong>Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill <strong>and</strong> Offshore Drilling (National Commission),established by President Obama, published its report on the causes of theIncident <strong>and</strong> its recommendations for policy <strong>and</strong> regulatory changes foroffshore drilling. On 17 February <strong>20</strong>11, the National Commission’s ChiefCounsel published a separate report on his investigation that providesadditional information regarding the causes of the Incident.In a report dated <strong>20</strong> March <strong>20</strong>11, with an Addendum dated30 April <strong>20</strong>11, the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) for the Marine Board ofInvestigation established by the US Coast Guard <strong>and</strong> Bureau of OceanEnergy Management (BOEMRE) issued the Final <strong>Report</strong> of the ForensicExamination of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Preventer (BOP) preparedby Det Norske Veritas (BOP <strong>Report</strong>). The BOP <strong>Report</strong> concludes thatthe position of the drill pipe against the blind shear rams prevented theBOP from functioning as intended. Subsequently, <strong>BP</strong> helped to sponsoradditional BOP testing conducted by Det Norske Veritas under courtauspices, which concluded on 21 June <strong>20</strong>11. <strong>BP</strong> continues to review theBOP <strong>Report</strong> <strong>and</strong> is in the process of evaluating the data obtained from theadditional testing.On 22 April <strong>20</strong>11, the US Coast Guard issued its report (Maritime<strong>Report</strong>) focused upon the maritime aspects of the Incident. The Maritime<strong>Report</strong> criticizes Transocean’s maintenance operations <strong>and</strong> safety culture,while also criticizing the Republic of the Marshall Isl<strong>and</strong>s – the flag stateresponsible for certifying Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon vessel.The US Chemical Safety <strong>and</strong> Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)is also conducting an investigation of the Incident that is focused on theexplosions <strong>and</strong> fire, <strong>and</strong> not the resulting oil spill or response efforts. TheCSB is expected to issue a single investigation report in <strong>20</strong>12 that willseek to identify the alleged root cause(s) of the Incident, <strong>and</strong> recommendimprovements to <strong>BP</strong> <strong>and</strong> industry practices <strong>and</strong> to regulatory programmesto prevent recurrence <strong>and</strong> mitigate potential consequences.Also, at the request of the Department of the Interior, the NationalAcademy of Engineering/National Research Council established aCommittee (Committee) to examine the performance of the technologies<strong>and</strong> practices involved in the probable causes of the Incident <strong>and</strong> to identify<strong>and</strong> recommend technologies, practices, st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> other measures toavoid similar future events. On 17 November <strong>20</strong>10, the Committee publiclyreleased its interim report setting forth the Committee’s preliminaryfindings <strong>and</strong> observations on various actions <strong>and</strong> decisions including welldesign, cementing operations, well monitoring, <strong>and</strong> well control actions.The interim report also considers management, oversight, <strong>and</strong> regulation ofoffshore operations. On 14 December <strong>20</strong>11, the Committee published itsfinal report, including findings <strong>and</strong> recommendations. A second, unrelatedNational Academies Committee will be looking at the methodologiesavailable for assessing spill impacts on ecosystem services in the Gulf ofMexico, with a final report expected in late <strong>20</strong>12 or early <strong>20</strong>13, <strong>and</strong> a thirdNational Academies Committee will be studying methods for assessing theeffectiveness of safety <strong>and</strong> environmental management systems (SEMS)established by offshore oil <strong>and</strong> gas operators.On 10 March <strong>20</strong>11, the Flow Rate Technical Group (FRTG),Department of the Interior, issued its final report titled “Assessmentof Flow Rate Estimates for the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Well OilSpill.” The report provides a summary of the strengths <strong>and</strong> limitations ofthe different methods used by the US government to estimate the flowrate <strong>and</strong> a range of estimates from 13,000 b/d to over 100,000 b/d. Thereport concludes that the most accurate estimate was 53,000 b/d justprior to shut in, with an uncertainty on that value of ±10% based on FRTGcollective experience <strong>and</strong> judgement, <strong>and</strong>, based on modelling, the flow onday one of the Incident was 62,000 b/d.On 18 March <strong>20</strong>11, the US Coast Guard ISPR team released its finalreport capturing lessons learned from the Incident as well as makingrecommendations on how to improve future oil spill response <strong>and</strong> recoveryefforts.Additionally, since April <strong>20</strong>10, <strong>BP</strong> representatives have testifiedmultiple times before the US Congress regarding the Incident. <strong>BP</strong> hasprovided documents <strong>and</strong> written information in response to requests fromMembers, committees <strong>and</strong> subcommittees of the US Congress.Other legal proceedingsThe US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) <strong>and</strong> the USCommodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) are currently investigatingseveral <strong>BP</strong> entities regarding trading in the next-day natural gas market atHouston Ship Channel during September, October <strong>and</strong> November <strong>20</strong>08.The FERC Office of Enforcement staff notified <strong>BP</strong> on 12 November <strong>20</strong>10of their preliminary conclusions relating to alleged market manipulation inviolation of 18 C.F.R. Sec. 1c.1. On 30 November <strong>20</strong>10, CFTC Enforcementstaff also provided <strong>BP</strong> with a notice of intent to recommend chargesbased on the same conduct alleging that <strong>BP</strong> engaged in attempted marketmanipulation in violation of Section 6(c), 6(d), <strong>and</strong> 9(a)(2) of the CommodityExchange Act. On 23 December <strong>20</strong>10, <strong>BP</strong> submitted responses to theFERC <strong>and</strong> CFTC November <strong>20</strong>10 notices providing a detailed responsethat it did not engage in any inappropriate or unlawful activity. On 28 July<strong>20</strong>11, the FERC staff issued a Notice of Alleged Violations stating that ithad preliminarily determined that several <strong>BP</strong> entities fraudulently tradedphysical natural gas in the Houston Ship Channel <strong>and</strong> Katy markets<strong>and</strong> trading points to increase the value of their financial swing spreadpositions. Other investigations into <strong>BP</strong>’s trading activities continue to beconducted from time to time.On 23 March <strong>20</strong>05, an explosion <strong>and</strong> fire occurred in theisomerization unit of <strong>BP</strong> Products North America’s (<strong>BP</strong> Products) TexasCity refinery as the unit was coming out of planned maintenance. Fifteenworkers died in the incident <strong>and</strong> many others were injured. <strong>BP</strong> Productshas resolved all civil injury claims arising from the March <strong>20</strong>05 incident.In March <strong>20</strong>07, the US Chemical Safety <strong>and</strong> Hazard InvestigationBoard (CSB) issued a report on the incident. The report containedrecommendations to the Texas City refinery <strong>and</strong> to the board of directorsof <strong>BP</strong>. In May <strong>20</strong>07, <strong>BP</strong> responded to the CSB’s recommendations. <strong>BP</strong> <strong>and</strong>the CSB will continue to discuss <strong>BP</strong>’s responses with the objective of theCSB’s agreeing to close out its recommendations.On 25 October <strong>20</strong>07, the DoJ announced that it had enteredinto a criminal plea agreement with <strong>BP</strong> Products related to the March<strong>20</strong>05 explosion <strong>and</strong> fire. On 4 February <strong>20</strong>08, <strong>BP</strong> Products pleadedguilty, pursuant to the plea agreement, to one felony violation of the riskmanagement planning regulations promulgated under the US Clean AirAct (CAA) <strong>and</strong> on 12 March <strong>20</strong>09, the court accepted the plea agreement.In connection with the plea agreement, <strong>BP</strong> Products paid a $50-millioncriminal fine <strong>and</strong> was sentenced to three years’ probation which is setto expire on 12 March <strong>20</strong>12. Compliance with a <strong>20</strong>05 US OccupationalSafety <strong>and</strong> Health Administration (OSHA) settlement agreement (<strong>20</strong>05Agreement) <strong>and</strong> a <strong>20</strong>06 agreed order entered into by <strong>BP</strong> Products withthe Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) are conditions ofprobation.The Texas Office of Attorney General, on behalf of the TexasCommission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), has filed a petition against<strong>BP</strong> Products asserting certain air emissions <strong>and</strong> reporting violations at theTexas City refinery from <strong>20</strong>05 to <strong>20</strong>10. <strong>BP</strong> Products settled this lawsuit byan Agreed Final Judgment entered by the court on <strong>20</strong> December <strong>20</strong>11.The Texas Attorney General filed a separate petition against <strong>BP</strong>Products asserting emissions violations relating to a 6 April <strong>20</strong>10 flaringevent. This lawsuit was also settled by the Agreed Final Judgmentmentioned in the preceding paragraph. This emissions event is also thesubject of a number of civil suits by many area workers <strong>and</strong> residentsalleging personal injury <strong>and</strong> property damages <strong>and</strong> seeking substantialdamages. In addition, this emissions event is the subject of a federalgovernmental investigation.In September <strong>20</strong>09, <strong>BP</strong> Products filed a petition to clarify specificrequired actions <strong>and</strong> deadlines under the <strong>20</strong>05 Agreement with OSHA.That agreement resolved citations issued in connection with the March<strong>20</strong>05 Texas City refinery explosion. OSHA denied <strong>BP</strong> Products’ petition.164 <strong>BP</strong> <strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Form</strong> <strong>20</strong>-F <strong>20</strong>11

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