Additional information for shareholdersliquidity, shareholder returns <strong>and</strong>/or implementation of its strategic agenda,particularly in the US. These potential liabilities may continue to have amaterial adverse effect on the group’s results <strong>and</strong> financial condition. SeeFinancial statements – Note 2 on pages 190-194 for information regardingthe financial impact of the Incident.Investigations <strong>and</strong> reports relating to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill<strong>BP</strong> is subject to a number of investigations related to the Incident bynumerous agencies of the US government. The related published reportsare available on the websites of the agencies <strong>and</strong> commissions referred tobelow.On 11 January <strong>20</strong>11, the National Commission on the <strong>BP</strong>Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill <strong>and</strong> Offshore Drilling (National Commission),established by President Obama, published its report on the causes of theIncident <strong>and</strong> its recommendations for policy <strong>and</strong> regulatory changes foroffshore drilling. On 17 February <strong>20</strong>11, the National Commission’s ChiefCounsel published a separate report on his investigation that providesadditional information regarding the causes of the Incident.In a report dated <strong>20</strong> March <strong>20</strong>11, with an Addendum dated30 April <strong>20</strong>11, the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) for the Marine Board ofInvestigation established by the US Coast Guard <strong>and</strong> Bureau of OceanEnergy Management (BOEMRE) issued the Final <strong>Report</strong> of the ForensicExamination of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Preventer (BOP) preparedby Det Norske Veritas (BOP <strong>Report</strong>). The BOP <strong>Report</strong> concludes thatthe position of the drill pipe against the blind shear rams prevented theBOP from functioning as intended. Subsequently, <strong>BP</strong> helped to sponsoradditional BOP testing conducted by Det Norske Veritas under courtauspices, which concluded on 21 June <strong>20</strong>11. <strong>BP</strong> continues to review theBOP <strong>Report</strong> <strong>and</strong> is in the process of evaluating the data obtained from theadditional testing.On 22 April <strong>20</strong>11, the US Coast Guard issued its report (Maritime<strong>Report</strong>) focused upon the maritime aspects of the Incident. The Maritime<strong>Report</strong> criticizes Transocean’s maintenance operations <strong>and</strong> safety culture,while also criticizing the Republic of the Marshall Isl<strong>and</strong>s – the flag stateresponsible for certifying Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon vessel.The US Chemical Safety <strong>and</strong> Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)is also conducting an investigation of the Incident that is focused on theexplosions <strong>and</strong> fire, <strong>and</strong> not the resulting oil spill or response efforts. TheCSB is expected to issue a single investigation report in <strong>20</strong>12 that willseek to identify the alleged root cause(s) of the Incident, <strong>and</strong> recommendimprovements to <strong>BP</strong> <strong>and</strong> industry practices <strong>and</strong> to regulatory programmesto prevent recurrence <strong>and</strong> mitigate potential consequences.Also, at the request of the Department of the Interior, the NationalAcademy of Engineering/National Research Council established aCommittee (Committee) to examine the performance of the technologies<strong>and</strong> practices involved in the probable causes of the Incident <strong>and</strong> to identify<strong>and</strong> recommend technologies, practices, st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> other measures toavoid similar future events. On 17 November <strong>20</strong>10, the Committee publiclyreleased its interim report setting forth the Committee’s preliminaryfindings <strong>and</strong> observations on various actions <strong>and</strong> decisions including welldesign, cementing operations, well monitoring, <strong>and</strong> well control actions.The interim report also considers management, oversight, <strong>and</strong> regulation ofoffshore operations. On 14 December <strong>20</strong>11, the Committee published itsfinal report, including findings <strong>and</strong> recommendations. A second, unrelatedNational Academies Committee will be looking at the methodologiesavailable for assessing spill impacts on ecosystem services in the Gulf ofMexico, with a final report expected in late <strong>20</strong>12 or early <strong>20</strong>13, <strong>and</strong> a thirdNational Academies Committee will be studying methods for assessing theeffectiveness of safety <strong>and</strong> environmental management systems (SEMS)established by offshore oil <strong>and</strong> gas operators.On 10 March <strong>20</strong>11, the Flow Rate Technical Group (FRTG),Department of the Interior, issued its final report titled “Assessmentof Flow Rate Estimates for the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Well OilSpill.” The report provides a summary of the strengths <strong>and</strong> limitations ofthe different methods used by the US government to estimate the flowrate <strong>and</strong> a range of estimates from 13,000 b/d to over 100,000 b/d. Thereport concludes that the most accurate estimate was 53,000 b/d justprior to shut in, with an uncertainty on that value of ±10% based on FRTGcollective experience <strong>and</strong> judgement, <strong>and</strong>, based on modelling, the flow onday one of the Incident was 62,000 b/d.On 18 March <strong>20</strong>11, the US Coast Guard ISPR team released its finalreport capturing lessons learned from the Incident as well as makingrecommendations on how to improve future oil spill response <strong>and</strong> recoveryefforts.Additionally, since April <strong>20</strong>10, <strong>BP</strong> representatives have testifiedmultiple times before the US Congress regarding the Incident. <strong>BP</strong> hasprovided documents <strong>and</strong> written information in response to requests fromMembers, committees <strong>and</strong> subcommittees of the US Congress.Other legal proceedingsThe US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) <strong>and</strong> the USCommodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) are currently investigatingseveral <strong>BP</strong> entities regarding trading in the next-day natural gas market atHouston Ship Channel during September, October <strong>and</strong> November <strong>20</strong>08.The FERC Office of Enforcement staff notified <strong>BP</strong> on 12 November <strong>20</strong>10of their preliminary conclusions relating to alleged market manipulation inviolation of 18 C.F.R. Sec. 1c.1. On 30 November <strong>20</strong>10, CFTC Enforcementstaff also provided <strong>BP</strong> with a notice of intent to recommend chargesbased on the same conduct alleging that <strong>BP</strong> engaged in attempted marketmanipulation in violation of Section 6(c), 6(d), <strong>and</strong> 9(a)(2) of the CommodityExchange Act. On 23 December <strong>20</strong>10, <strong>BP</strong> submitted responses to theFERC <strong>and</strong> CFTC November <strong>20</strong>10 notices providing a detailed responsethat it did not engage in any inappropriate or unlawful activity. On 28 July<strong>20</strong>11, the FERC staff issued a Notice of Alleged Violations stating that ithad preliminarily determined that several <strong>BP</strong> entities fraudulently tradedphysical natural gas in the Houston Ship Channel <strong>and</strong> Katy markets<strong>and</strong> trading points to increase the value of their financial swing spreadpositions. Other investigations into <strong>BP</strong>’s trading activities continue to beconducted from time to time.On 23 March <strong>20</strong>05, an explosion <strong>and</strong> fire occurred in theisomerization unit of <strong>BP</strong> Products North America’s (<strong>BP</strong> Products) TexasCity refinery as the unit was coming out of planned maintenance. Fifteenworkers died in the incident <strong>and</strong> many others were injured. <strong>BP</strong> Productshas resolved all civil injury claims arising from the March <strong>20</strong>05 incident.In March <strong>20</strong>07, the US Chemical Safety <strong>and</strong> Hazard InvestigationBoard (CSB) issued a report on the incident. The report containedrecommendations to the Texas City refinery <strong>and</strong> to the board of directorsof <strong>BP</strong>. In May <strong>20</strong>07, <strong>BP</strong> responded to the CSB’s recommendations. <strong>BP</strong> <strong>and</strong>the CSB will continue to discuss <strong>BP</strong>’s responses with the objective of theCSB’s agreeing to close out its recommendations.On 25 October <strong>20</strong>07, the DoJ announced that it had enteredinto a criminal plea agreement with <strong>BP</strong> Products related to the March<strong>20</strong>05 explosion <strong>and</strong> fire. On 4 February <strong>20</strong>08, <strong>BP</strong> Products pleadedguilty, pursuant to the plea agreement, to one felony violation of the riskmanagement planning regulations promulgated under the US Clean AirAct (CAA) <strong>and</strong> on 12 March <strong>20</strong>09, the court accepted the plea agreement.In connection with the plea agreement, <strong>BP</strong> Products paid a $50-millioncriminal fine <strong>and</strong> was sentenced to three years’ probation which is setto expire on 12 March <strong>20</strong>12. Compliance with a <strong>20</strong>05 US OccupationalSafety <strong>and</strong> Health Administration (OSHA) settlement agreement (<strong>20</strong>05Agreement) <strong>and</strong> a <strong>20</strong>06 agreed order entered into by <strong>BP</strong> Products withthe Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) are conditions ofprobation.The Texas Office of Attorney General, on behalf of the TexasCommission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), has filed a petition against<strong>BP</strong> Products asserting certain air emissions <strong>and</strong> reporting violations at theTexas City refinery from <strong>20</strong>05 to <strong>20</strong>10. <strong>BP</strong> Products settled this lawsuit byan Agreed Final Judgment entered by the court on <strong>20</strong> December <strong>20</strong>11.The Texas Attorney General filed a separate petition against <strong>BP</strong>Products asserting emissions violations relating to a 6 April <strong>20</strong>10 flaringevent. This lawsuit was also settled by the Agreed Final Judgmentmentioned in the preceding paragraph. This emissions event is also thesubject of a number of civil suits by many area workers <strong>and</strong> residentsalleging personal injury <strong>and</strong> property damages <strong>and</strong> seeking substantialdamages. In addition, this emissions event is the subject of a federalgovernmental investigation.In September <strong>20</strong>09, <strong>BP</strong> Products filed a petition to clarify specificrequired actions <strong>and</strong> deadlines under the <strong>20</strong>05 Agreement with OSHA.That agreement resolved citations issued in connection with the March<strong>20</strong>05 Texas City refinery explosion. OSHA denied <strong>BP</strong> Products’ petition.164 <strong>BP</strong> <strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Form</strong> <strong>20</strong>-F <strong>20</strong>11
Additional information for shareholdersIn October <strong>20</strong>09 OSHA issued citations to the Texas City refinery seekinga total of $87.4 million in civil penalties for alleged violations of the <strong>20</strong>05Agreement <strong>and</strong> alleged process safety management violations.A settlement agreement between <strong>BP</strong> Products <strong>and</strong> OSHA inAugust <strong>20</strong>10 (<strong>20</strong>10 Agreement) resolved the petition filed by <strong>BP</strong> Productsin September <strong>20</strong>09 <strong>and</strong> the alleged violations of the <strong>20</strong>05 Agreement.<strong>BP</strong> Products has paid a penalty of $50.6 million in that matter <strong>and</strong>agreed to perform certain abatement actions. Compliance with the <strong>20</strong>10Agreement (which is set to expire on 12 March <strong>20</strong>12) is also a condition ofprobation due to the linkage between this <strong>20</strong>10 Agreement <strong>and</strong> the <strong>20</strong>05Agreement.On 6 May <strong>20</strong>10, certain persons qualifying under the US CrimeVictims’ Rights Act as victims in relation to the Texas City plea agreementrequested that the federal court revoke <strong>BP</strong> Products’ probation basedon alleged violations of the Court’s conditions of probation. The allegedviolations of probation relate to the alleged failure to comply with the <strong>20</strong>05Agreement.The OSHA process safety management citations issued in October<strong>20</strong>09 were not resolved by the August <strong>20</strong>10 settlement agreement.The proposed penalties in that matter are $30.7 million. The matter iscurrently before the OSH Review Commission which has assigned anAdministrative Law Judge for purposes of mediation. These citations donot allege violations of the <strong>20</strong>05 Agreement.A shareholder derivative action was filed against several current<strong>and</strong> former <strong>BP</strong> officers <strong>and</strong> directors based on alleged violations of the USClean Air Act (CAA) <strong>and</strong> Occupational Safety <strong>and</strong> Health Administration(OSHA) regulations at the Texas City refinery subsequent to the March<strong>20</strong>05 explosion <strong>and</strong> fire. An investigation by a special committee of<strong>BP</strong>’s board into the shareholder allegations has been completed <strong>and</strong> thecommittee has recommended that the allegations do not warrant actionby <strong>BP</strong> against the officers <strong>and</strong> directors. <strong>BP</strong> filed a motion to dismiss theshareholder derivative action <strong>and</strong> a plea to the jurisdiction. On 16 June<strong>20</strong>11, the court granted <strong>BP</strong>’s plea to the jurisdiction <strong>and</strong> dismissed theaction in its entirety. The shareholder has appealed the dismissal <strong>and</strong> theappeal is pending.In March <strong>and</strong> August <strong>20</strong>06, oil leaked from oil transit pipelinesoperated by <strong>BP</strong> Exploration (Alaska) Inc. (<strong>BP</strong>XA) at the Prudhoe Bay uniton the North Slope of Alaska. Several legal proceedings resulted fromthese events. On 29 November <strong>20</strong>07, <strong>BP</strong>XA entered into a criminal pleaagreement with the DoJ relating to these leaks. <strong>BP</strong>XA’s guilty plea, to amisdemeanour violation of the US Water Pollution Control Act, includeda term of three years’ probation. On 29 November <strong>20</strong>09, a spill ofapproximately 360 barrels of crude oil <strong>and</strong> produced water was discoveredbeneath a line running from a well pad to the Lisburne Processing Centerin Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. On 17 November <strong>20</strong>10, the US Probation Officerfiled a petition in federal district court to revoke <strong>BP</strong>XA’s probation basedon allegations that the Lisburne event was a criminal violation of state<strong>and</strong> federal law <strong>and</strong> therefore <strong>BP</strong>XA was in violation of its probationobligations. <strong>BP</strong>XA contested the petition at an evidentiary hearing thatwas completed on 7 December <strong>20</strong>11 in U.S. District Court in Anchorage,Alaska. On 27 December <strong>20</strong>11, the Court issued a decision <strong>and</strong> orderfinding that <strong>BP</strong>XA did not violate the terms of its probation, dismissing thegovernment’s petition <strong>and</strong> terminating <strong>BP</strong>XA’s probation.On 12 May <strong>20</strong>08, a <strong>BP</strong> p.l.c. shareholder filed a consolidatedcomplaint alleging violations of federal securities law on behalf of a putativeclass of <strong>BP</strong> p.l.c. shareholders against <strong>BP</strong> p.l.c., <strong>BP</strong>XA, <strong>BP</strong> America, <strong>and</strong>four officers of the companies, based on alleged misrepresentationsconcerning the integrity of the Prudhoe Bay pipeline before its shutdownon 6 August <strong>20</strong>06. On 8 February <strong>20</strong>10, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appealsaccepted <strong>BP</strong>’s appeal from a decision of the lower court granting in part<strong>and</strong> denying in part <strong>BP</strong>’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit. On 29 June<strong>20</strong>11, the Ninth Circuit ruled in <strong>BP</strong>’s favour that the filing of a trust relatedagreement with the SEC containing contractual obligations on the part of<strong>BP</strong> was not a misrepresentation which violated federal securities laws. The<strong>BP</strong> p.l.c. shareholder has filed an amended complaint, in response to which<strong>BP</strong> filed a new motion to dismiss, which is pending. On 31 March <strong>20</strong>09,the United States filed a complaint seeking civil penalties <strong>and</strong> damagesrelating to the events at Prudhoe Bay. The complaint also involved claimsrelated to asbestos h<strong>and</strong>ling, allegations of non-compliance at multiplefacilities for failure to comply with EPA’s spill prevention plan regulations,<strong>and</strong> for non-compliance with US Department of Transportation orders <strong>and</strong>regulations. The parties settled the dispute <strong>and</strong> on 13 July <strong>20</strong>11 the Courtentered a Consent Agreement in which <strong>BP</strong>XA agreed to pay a $25-millionpenalty <strong>and</strong> to perform certain injunctive measures over the next threeyears with respect to pipeline inspection <strong>and</strong> maintenance. On 31 March<strong>20</strong>09, the State of Alaska filed a complaint seeking civil penalties <strong>and</strong>damages relating to these events. The complaint alleges that the tworeleases <strong>and</strong> <strong>BP</strong>XA’s corrosion management practices violated variousstatutory, contractual <strong>and</strong> common law duties to the State, resultingin penalty liability, damages for lost royalties <strong>and</strong> taxes, <strong>and</strong> liability forpunitive damages. In December <strong>20</strong>11, the State of Alaska <strong>and</strong> <strong>BP</strong>XAentered into a Dispute Resolution Agreement concerning this matter thatwill result in arbitration of the amount of the State’s lost royalty income <strong>and</strong>payment by <strong>BP</strong>XA of the additional amount of $10 million on account ofother claims in the complaint.Approximately <strong>20</strong>0 lawsuits were filed in state <strong>and</strong> federal courtsin Alaska seeking compensatory <strong>and</strong> punitive damages arising out of theExxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound in March 1989. Most ofthose suits named Exxon (now ExxonMobil), Alyeska Pipeline Service<strong>Company</strong> (Alyeska), which operates the oil terminal at Valdez, <strong>and</strong> theother oil companies that own Alyeska. Alyeska initially responded tothe spill until the response was taken over by Exxon. <strong>BP</strong> owns a 46.9%interest (reduced during <strong>20</strong>01 from 50% by a sale of 3.1% to Phillips)in Alyeska through a subsidiary of <strong>BP</strong> America Inc. <strong>and</strong> briefly indirectlyowned a further <strong>20</strong>% interest in Alyeska following <strong>BP</strong>’s combination withAtlantic Richfield. Alyeska <strong>and</strong> its owners have settled all the claims againstthem under these lawsuits. Exxon has indicated that it may file a claim forcontribution against Alyeska for a portion of the costs <strong>and</strong> damages that ithas incurred. If any claims are asserted by Exxon that affect Alyeska <strong>and</strong> itsowners, <strong>BP</strong> will defend the claims vigorously.Since 1987, Atlantic Richfield <strong>Company</strong> (Atlantic Richfield), asubsidiary of <strong>BP</strong>, has been named as a co-defendant in numerous lawsuitsbrought in the US alleging injury to persons <strong>and</strong> property caused by leadpigment in paint. The majority of the lawsuits have been ab<strong>and</strong>oned ordismissed against Atlantic Richfield. Atlantic Richfield is named in theselawsuits as alleged successor to International Smelting <strong>and</strong> Refining<strong>and</strong> another company that manufactured lead pigment during the period19<strong>20</strong>-1946. Plaintiffs include individuals <strong>and</strong> governmental entities.Several of the lawsuits purport to be class actions. The lawsuits seekvarious remedies including compensation to lead-poisoned children, costto find <strong>and</strong> remove lead paint from buildings, medical monitoring <strong>and</strong>screening programmes, public warning <strong>and</strong> education of lead hazards,reimbursement of government healthcare costs <strong>and</strong> special education forlead-poisoned citizens <strong>and</strong> punitive damages. No lawsuit against AtlanticRichfield has been settled nor has Atlantic Richfield been subject to a finaladverse judgment in any proceeding. The amounts claimed <strong>and</strong>, if suchsuits were successful, the costs of implementing the remedies sought inthe various cases could be substantial. While it is not possible to predictthe outcome of these legal actions, Atlantic Richfield believes that it hasvalid defences. It intends to defend such actions vigorously <strong>and</strong> believesthat the incurrence of liability is remote. Consequently, <strong>BP</strong> believes thatthe impact of these lawsuits on the group’s results, financial position orliquidity will not be material.On 8 March <strong>20</strong>10, OSHA issued citations to <strong>BP</strong>’s Toledo refineryalleging violations of the Process Safety Management St<strong>and</strong>ard, withpenalties of approximately $3 million. These citations resulted from aninspection conducted pursuant to OSHA’s Petroleum Refinery ProcessSafety Management National Emphasis Program. <strong>BP</strong> Products hascontested the citations, <strong>and</strong> the matter is currently scheduled for trialbefore the OSH Review Commission in June <strong>20</strong>12.In April <strong>20</strong>09, Kenneth Abbott, as relator, filed a US False ClaimsAct lawsuit against <strong>BP</strong>, alleging that <strong>BP</strong> violated federal regulations, <strong>and</strong>made false statements in connection with its compliance with thoseregulations, by failing to have necessary documentation for the Atlantissubsea <strong>and</strong> other systems. <strong>BP</strong> is the operator <strong>and</strong> 56% interest ownerof the Atlantis unit in production in the Gulf of Mexico. That complaintwas unsealed in May <strong>20</strong>10 <strong>and</strong> served on <strong>BP</strong> in June <strong>20</strong>10. Abbott seeksdamages measured by the value, net of royalties, of all past <strong>and</strong> futureproduction from the Atlantis platform, trebled, plus penalties. In September<strong>20</strong>10, Kenneth Abbott <strong>and</strong> Food & Water Watch filed an amendedAdditional information for shareholders<strong>BP</strong> <strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Form</strong> <strong>20</strong>-F <strong>20</strong>11 165
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Miscellaneous termsIn this document
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Chairman’s letterCarl-Henric Svan
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