Nuclear Energy

makes fabricating MOX several times as expensive as the cost of low enriched uranium fuel.
Further, the spent fuel from FBR typically has a greater buildup of highly radioactive fission
products. Thus, the impact of an accident would be much more severe than in a Light Water or
Heavy Water Reactor. dlvi
This is why even after six decades and expenditure of $100 billion (in 2007 dollars) dlvii , the
promise of fast breeder reactors remains largely unfulfilled. In the 1970s, breeder advocates were
claiming that there would be thousands of reactors in operation by 2010. Today, the dream is nearly
dead. The US, UK and Germany have abandoned their breeder reactor development programs.
France still claims that fast breeders have a future, but the country has no operating FBRs, not even
demonstration units. Superphénix, the 1200 MW flagship of the French breeder program, and the
only commercial-size plutonium fueled breeder reactor in nuclear history, was shut down in 1998
after an endless series of very costly technical, legal and safety problems which rendered it
inoperative for the majority of its 11-year lifetime. The other remaining 233 MW demonstration
reactor Phenix shut down in 2009. No replacement fast breeder reactor is planned for at least a
decade. The Japanese prototype fast reactor Monju shut down in 1995 after a sodium coolant leak
caused a fire. After repairs and many delays, it finally restarted 15 years later on May 8, 2010. This
is only a prototype; Japan hopes to build a follow-on demonstration fast breeder reactor by 2025;
only if that succeeds will construction of a commercial fast breeder reactor begin. It is doubtful if
these projections will ever be fulfilled, and Tokyo has been reducing the funding for its breeder
program for decades. dlviii
Apart from India, only Russia is attempting to develop demonstration fast breeders, while
China is considering buying two such units from Russia. Russia has one operational fast breeder,
the BN-600. But this reactor hardly qualifies as a successful breeder. The Soviet Union/Russia
never closed the fuel cycle and has never operated BN-600 with MOX fuel. Furthermore, it has also
suffered repeated sodium leaks and fires. Despite these multiple fires, its operators continue to
operate it – another example of the extreme callousness of Russia’s nuclear establishment. dlix
India's Fast Breeder Program
Despite this worldwide evidence, the DAE continues to persist with its uneconomical and
risky fast breeder reactor program.
As discussed in Chapter 7, breeder reactors in India were originally proposed in the 1950s as
the second stage of a three-stage nuclear program. This was seen as a way to develop a large
autonomous nuclear power program despite India’s relatively small known reserves of uranium ore.
However, the DAE began work on fast breeder reactors only in 1965, when a fast reactor section
was opened in BARC and design work on a 10-MW experimental fast reactor was initiated. It soon
became clear that foreign assistance was required. This project was therefore abandoned, and in
1969, the DAE entered into collaboration with France. It took designs from it for what was to be
India's first breeder reactor, the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR). The DAE sent scientists to
France for training, and they formed the nucleus of the Reactor Research Centre (RRC) that was set
136