Nuclear Energy

The second and more important reason is design problems with the EPR reactor. In order to
cut down lead time, the Finnish and French authorities allowed construction of Olkiluoto and
Flamanville reactors to begin before the design was finalised and fully approved by them. Whereas
the correct procedure is that designs should be complete and full safety regulatory approval given
before construction is allowed to begin, so that in case there are design changes, these do not disrupt
construction. ccclxviii
Over time, the Finnish and French regulators realised that there were serious design
problems with the reactor. They found the design of the control and instrumentation system – the
nerve center of the reactor – to be at odds with basic principles of nuclear safety. Its back up system
was not sufficiently independent of the main system for it to be able to provide reliable back-up if
the main system fails – in other words, if the main control system fails, there is a risk that the back-
up system will fail for the same reason. ccclxix And so they asked for design modifications. But
because construction had already begun on the basis of the old design, making these modifications
was difficult. ccclxx This is another reason for the serious quality control problems, construction
delays and cost overruns of the two reactors.
The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) of the UK, which is conducting a detailed
review of the EPR design, has also expressed similar concerns about the design of the control and
instrumentation (C&I) system of the EPR in a letter to Areva. In its letter, the NII said the EPR
technology was significantly compromised because of the interconnectivity of what were meant to
be independent systems designed to operate the plant and ensure its safety. The letter also
highlighted concerns about the absence of safety display systems or manual controls that would
allow the reactor to be shut down, either in the station’s control room or at an emergency remote
shutdown station. ccclxxi
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which is also carrying out a review of the EPR
design, has in a communiqué issued as recently as July 23, 2010, also expressed reservations on the
control systems and other issues. ccclxxii
The Roussely Report
As the problems with construction of the EPRs at Olkiluoto and Flamanville mounted, the
French government ultimately acknowledged that all was not well with the French nuclear industry
and in October 2009 commissioned a former CEO of EDF, Francois Roussely, to review what was
going wrong with the EPR. The report, The Future of the French Civilian Nuclear Sector was
published in July 2010. Roussely stated in his report that experience with Olkiluoto and Flamanville
had ‘seriously shaken ... the credibility of the EPR model and of the capacity of the French nuclear
industry to succeed in new nuclear plant construction.’
He attributed the problems to the complexity of the EPR model "including ... the redundancy
of safety systems.” The report suggested that this complexity “is certainly a handicap for its
implementation and therefore its cost”, and partly explains the difficulties encountered in Olkiluoto
and Flamanville. ccclxxiii
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