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ANNUAL REPORT 2008 - Polymer Bank Notes of the World

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market tensions, particularly for longer maturities, as well as increases in market expectationsregarding <strong>the</strong> future path <strong>of</strong> key ECB interest rates, which were at <strong>the</strong> time more pronouncedfor <strong>the</strong> latter part <strong>of</strong> <strong>2008</strong> and thus had a greater impact on rates with longer maturities. Securedrates continued to be broadly stable, with <strong>the</strong> result that <strong>the</strong> spread between unsecured andsecured rates was again determined mainly by <strong>the</strong> behaviour <strong>of</strong> unsecured rates. This period sawgreater volatility in <strong>the</strong> EONIA and an increased need for liquidity provided by <strong>the</strong> Eurosystem,as suggested by <strong>the</strong> higher marginal rates in <strong>the</strong> main refinancing operations. The continuation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Eurosystem’s liquidity measures helped to address <strong>the</strong>se needs to a large extent.The period from June to September <strong>2008</strong>The period between mid-June and mid-September <strong>2008</strong> was, overall, a period <strong>of</strong> stability in<strong>the</strong> markets. Fur<strong>the</strong>r events related to financial stability in o<strong>the</strong>r major economies (such as <strong>the</strong>US government takeover <strong>of</strong> government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on7 September) did not trigger any agitation in money markets. Unsecured markets, albeit stillstrained, were more stable, while a slight increase tended to be observed in interest rates in <strong>the</strong>secured markets, in line with <strong>the</strong> Governing Council’s decision to increase <strong>the</strong> minimum bid ratein <strong>the</strong> main refinancing operations to 4.25% on 3 July. As a consequence, <strong>the</strong> spread betweenunsecured and secured rates at <strong>the</strong> three-month horizon declined, but did not reach <strong>the</strong> low levels <strong>of</strong>January and February. The EONIA enjoyed a period <strong>of</strong> low volatility from July until <strong>the</strong> beginning<strong>of</strong> September, when tensions resurfaced prior to <strong>the</strong> events <strong>of</strong> mid-September.The period from September <strong>2008</strong> onwardsA more troubled period started in mid-September, strongly affecting <strong>the</strong> behaviour <strong>of</strong> moneymarkets until <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> year. There was a resurgence in tensions, which reached unprecedentedlevels in mid-September, when, in <strong>the</strong> space <strong>of</strong> a few days, <strong>the</strong> markets witnessed <strong>the</strong> selling<strong>of</strong>f<strong>of</strong> Merrill Lynch and <strong>the</strong> bankruptcy <strong>of</strong> Lehman Bro<strong>the</strong>rs (two <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> four remaining globalinvestment banks), <strong>the</strong> US government’s provision <strong>of</strong> emergency liquidity to AIG, <strong>the</strong> biggestUS insurance company, and <strong>the</strong> seizing by federal regulators <strong>of</strong> Washington Mutual, <strong>the</strong> largestsavings and loan association in <strong>the</strong> United States. In October spillover effects were felt morewidely in <strong>the</strong> euro area, while money markets suffered fur<strong>the</strong>r tensions as a result <strong>of</strong> a sharpslump in equity markets amid <strong>the</strong> deteriorating macroeconomic environment.Market tensions intensified significantly and credit risk premia increased to levels above thoseseen previously during <strong>the</strong> period <strong>of</strong> financial turmoil. Unsecured market rates, especially forshort maturities, rose sharply after <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> Lehman Bro<strong>the</strong>rs as <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> that defaultcascaded through <strong>the</strong> euro area banking system. The implied volatility derived from options onthree-month EURIBOR futures, which experienced a prolonged period <strong>of</strong> decline from Marchto September, increased dramatically in mid-September and reached unprecedented levels inOctober (see Chart B).The Eurosystem acted quickly and decisively in response to <strong>the</strong> acute reintensification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> turmoil.The Governing Council made a number <strong>of</strong> temporary changes to its liquidity implementationframework, aimed, in particular, at streng<strong>the</strong>ning its intermediation function and reassuring <strong>the</strong>markets about liquidity risks. Specifically, on 8 October <strong>the</strong> Eurosystem took <strong>the</strong> exceptionaldecision to temporarily conduct its main refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedureswith full allotment at <strong>the</strong> main refinancing rate and to reduce <strong>the</strong> corridor formed by <strong>the</strong> standingECBAnnual Report<strong>2008</strong>33

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