The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project in Chicago

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police, probation and youth workers, and to a lesser extent the neighborhood organizer. Theteam approach, however, did not translate into involvement and support by administrators ofpolice and probation once the Project was underway. There was relatively limited directcommunication and involvement between the street-level staff and administrators from theChicago Police Department and Cook County Department of Adult Probation. The CPD andCCDAP probably did not clearly know or understand what the street-level staff were doing. Thepolice tactical team and probation officers on the Project were largely on their own and did nothave sufficient backup and supervision.The close interaction between police and youth workers on the Project served not only toprovide better targeted police-suppression efforts, but also helped the Project police to becomeaware of and focus on the needs of gang youth for social assistance and service. The closeinteraction of team members also required the youth workers to take greater responsibility fordirectly supervising and controlling gang youth behavior, alerting Project police to gangincidents, and at times assisting police directly and indirectly with their law-enforcement role.The probation officers had a close relationship with police on the Project early on, and oftenwent on patrol with them. In the later years of the Project, the probation officers participatedless in joint patrolling with police, probably due to increased rigidity of probation agency policy,in part due to a failure to work out general collaboration arrangements with the CPD.A major limitation of the Project was a lack of commitment to community organizing andinteragency coordination in regard to the gang problem at the citywide level. Local agency andneighborhood organization efforts were weak, and resources too limited for effective grassrootsand interagency work. Community organization efforts should have been carried out by both17.16
local and citywide groups and organizations (particularly in violent and high gang-crime areas ofthe city) under the auspices of the Mayor’s office, with the Chicago Police Department as thelead agency. More time and resources should have been allocated to support services for targetgang youth and coordination efforts among local agencies.Another key factor contributing to the lack of full development and implementation ofthe GVRP model was the failure by the Project Coordinator and the Chicago Police Departmentto stimulate the creation of an interagency set of administrators as an integral component of asteering committee for the Project, particularly agencies providing staff to the Project. TheProject Coordinator was too involved in the day-to-day development and oversight of the GVRP,and should have more strongly insisted from the start that the CPD and the CCAPD meet itsleadership and administrative responsibilities for supporting the Project. Efforts should havebeen made by the CPD to integrate community policing with the GVRP, involving the area andDistrict Commanders, as well as other police units such as the youth and narcotics divisions. Acommunity-based and interagency project cannot be created without considerable commitmentand involvement, not only of top community political leaders, but also of mid-level leadership.High-level policy discussions should have been undertaken with city government andpolitical leaders, particularly with the Mayor, before the Project began; discussions which fullyinvolved the Mayor throughout its development. A strategic political error may have been theassumption by the academic, the leader of a state planning agency, and the head of a researchand development of a major city criminal justice agency, that the achievement of Project goalsand objectives (and even the availability of funding) was sufficient to sustain a gang program.The fact is that the Project and its positive achievements did not make sense in political and17.17
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FiguresFigure 2.1 - Youth Gang Crim
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Table 10.12 - Best Model Predicting
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Arrests, Youth With and Without “
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...................................
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Chapter 1Introduction and Review of
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Gang problems have radically increa
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for youth with school officials if
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various agencies sponsoring the you
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the specialized youth-gang projects
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ehavior of the youngsters residing
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work” (manpower training and job
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(separately from the efforts of TWO
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impact of CIN was not conducted (Cr
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procedures that have often been an
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developed programs to address the g
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members, representing 56 agencies i
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Grasmick (1993) recommend “the re
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and expulsion practices in dealing
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membership, school, job, and commun
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Assessment, planning and evaluation
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Human Services (DHS) was terminatin
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IVProgram StrategyThe strategy to a
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Community Advisory GroupA group of
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policies and procedures which affec
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component. The expectation was that
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social opportunities and mobilize c
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collective involvement of police, c
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Figure 2.1Youth Gang Crime: A Theor
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assistant to Alderman Guttierez, wh
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involved in the Project and believe
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pattern of communication between wo
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mainly in the late afternoon, night
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him.November 12, 7:00 PM. The 16-ye
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station intimidating local citizens
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Developing the Roles and Responsibi
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on individual contact with gang you
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individual youth. The completion of
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tactical officers were assigned ful
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disrespecting” the gang members.
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Probation would be contributing thr
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Department: “it appears criticall
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payment to Center staff for mainten
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Neighborhood Organization (UNO), th
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survey. The request was possibly re
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Gang Member Survey served both prog
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ideologies as they interacted and w
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their probation officers at probati
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peripheral, or associate gang membe
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This statement puzzled the rest of
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the development of the Project were
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from outside the community who inva
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not all activities or operations of
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Interrelated activity by Project pe
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with the same youth, then disagreed
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the father, in a federal penitentia
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gangs were to be provided outreach
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target youth to disassociate themse
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where the youth and gangs to which
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educational background or ability t
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areas. They were able to inconspicu
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out across racial or ethnic groups
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marched into the Two Six territory
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school to gain readmission to a reg
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would have to travel through enemy
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e more successful in the process of
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other youth.The youth work Supervis
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members, permitting the youth to st
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problems arose that affected the ne
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attles, or to take care of gang mem
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Project, wrote in one of his record
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officers of the violent crime unit
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Rolando, a former leader of a facti
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1. not give undue publicity to part
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double homicide. Manuel had grown u
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These expectations were not always
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not wearing a shirt. His old gang t
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former gang members, in a team arra
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the tactical officers. The adult pr
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field operations were expected to s
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expected to help probation respond
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Chicago Police Department. A key pr
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the CPD as the senior partner) in t
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past and present history of all Pro
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gangs as part of their police tacti
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say we’re just talking to these g
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R.C.We call the detectives to see i
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I.S.What are you doing that’s dif
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G.S.We locked this one guy up. He w
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indirectly at first where to go. It
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“a real good kid. This is the fir
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G.S.That’s part of the problem, y
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R.C.He’s not active in the gang,
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family, helping the worker get to a
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G.S.As we said before, before you g
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Chapter 7Community MobilizationIntr
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organizational processes which affe
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consistently made it clear that his
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do approach of the CPD. Citizen inv
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youth were also part of an illegal
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seeking applicants for jobs in boom
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part of the community.There appeare
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epresentatives of the Chicago Parks
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problem, especially as it affected
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In the application for funding to t
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with the African-American gang prob
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purpose of the meetings was to rais
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interagency meeting, which was fina
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provided to the state funding agenc
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activity, especially violence and g
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expelling more gang members than ev
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Chapter 8Characteristics of Program
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youth who entered the program in ov
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expectations, peer relationships, a
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To determine the representativeness
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neighborhood characteristics, as we
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was evidence, however, that some of
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legal sources; at Time II it was 71
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ehavior and arrests when we later e
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cultural institutions (e.g., povert
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prone to attacking the Latin Kings
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changed, and to what extent the red
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52.0% to 70.0% of the interview sam
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aspired to clerical, trade, and fac
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positive at Time I and Time III, bu
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in Little Village, who were gang me
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involved and violent youth and assi
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inaccuracies and inconsistencies in
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we excluded the twelve youth over 2
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(30.4%) and the comparison group (1
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violence which includes, in additio
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Chapter 9Program-Worker Contacts, S
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easons, failed to provide tracking
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Project police officers served or c
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in contact with a youth 13 times pe
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We describe the proportion of diffe
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younger youth) were provided with s
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involved in job-related contacts wi
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Youth Response to the ProjectFinall
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members of the two targeted gangs i
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individual youth in a group context
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Job-Related Services, the primary o
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Aggregating Types of Services (Acti
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workers. Of interest are the gang s
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proportion of younger or older gang
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Table 9.2Types of Services (Activit
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Table 9.4Type of Service (Activity)
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Table 9.6Job-Related Services, by T
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Table 9.8Criminal-Justice-Related S
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Table 9.10Aggregated Types of Perso
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Table 9.12Project Strategies, by Yo
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Table 9.14Services (Activities), by
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Chapter 10Self-Reported Offense, Ar
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7) breaking into a car and stealing
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Similar sharp declines in frequenci
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also in our analysis using official
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offense and arrest categories betwe
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(-48.3%). The least decline was for
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a crime in the community. All of th
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suppression effect, particularly at
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present at Time III. There are no s
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violence arrests and serious violen
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with offending behavior. In the res
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0.001), drug selling (r = 0.259, p
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Finally, we began to test the utili
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employment status (1= currently emp
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includes six variables: one control
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significance are: youth over 19 yea
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Our best model for predicting chang
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All of these reductions were highly
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it in the future; and the higher th
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The above models suggest that a var
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Table 10.2Mean Frequencies of Self-
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Offenses/Arrests bTable 10.4Mean Fr
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Table 10.6Mean Frequencies of Self-
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Table 10.8Self-Reported Offenses -
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Table 10.10Best Model Predicting Se
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Table 10.12Best Model Predicting Se
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Table 10.14Best Model Predicting Ch
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decreased or remained the same betw
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the types and scope of arrests, and
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Program-Period Arrest PatternsThe f
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p = 0.039. This model explains 43.6
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violence at Time I increases its ar
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Model IV: Property ArrestsThe same
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The drug-change model was construct
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Our analysis procedure is the same
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types of arrests, comparing Time I
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were at Time II, at least for relat
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Figure 11.1Distribution of Youth in
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Four Levels of Arrests for theThree
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11.3(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Tot
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11.4(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Ser
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Table 11.5An Analysis of Variance o
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11.5(f) Adjusted Mean Change in Tot
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11.6(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Pro
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11.7(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Dru
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Table 11.8An Analysis of Variance o
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11.8(f) Adjusted Mean Change in Oth
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11.9(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Spe
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Chapter 12Modeling Program Effects:
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variables. We used the number of an
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when the outcome variable was chang
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delinquency patterns over the progr
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and self-reported-offense variables
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Again, most variables are derived f
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(p = 0.032), but a positive relatio
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We try to identify those specific c
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likelihood of more youth spending l
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outcome, using police arrest data f
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Table 12.1Pre-Program a Arrest Patt
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Table 12.3Best Model Predicting Cha
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Table 12.5Best Model Predicting Cha
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12.6.B-1 Job Referral Success by Wo
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12.6.E-1 Length of Service Contact
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Chapter 13Typology of Gang YouthFor
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markets, resulting in high levels o
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individual gang youth in our Little
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“other” crimes. Nevertheless, f
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type of youth-arrestee subsample, i
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and a greater increase or “specia
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these youth were represented in the
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number of offenses at Time I, but a
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Total Arrests. In the model with th
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The 19-and-over program sample also
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We find similar and proportionate d
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Table 13.2Yearly Arrests of Youth i
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Table 13.3 continuedFootnotesaArres
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13.4(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total
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13.4(f) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total
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13.5(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Seriou
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Table 13.6Analysis of Variance of C
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13.6(e) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total
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13.7(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug A
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Table 13.8Analysis of Variance of C
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13.8(e) Adjusted Mean Yearly Other
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Chapter 14The Effectiveness of the
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of the specific types of services p
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The success rate was relatively hig
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in respect to the outcome or depend
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(odds ratio = 3.31) and the Latin K
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violent behavior, was associated wi
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drug arrests, in a model together w
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SummaryIn general, “very effectiv
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than do non-services contacts. The
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per youth, and the perceptions by t
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educing violence arrests, and viole
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assume, because of small size, that
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program subsample (39.1%). Also, th
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patterns, in particular types or co
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Table 14.1Summary of Logistic Regre
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Table 14.11Summary of Logistic Regr
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Table 14.19Comparison of Odds Ratio
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Table 14.21Most Serious Sentencing
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Table 14.23Arrestee Typology of You
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Chapter 15Aggregate-Level Changes I
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Comparable Police Districts and Bea
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and aggravated assaults with a hand
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Section I[Refer to Tables 15.1 to 1
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It is also important to note that l
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target gangs during the last two ye
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than the average percentage increas
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number of offenders in the District
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involved in drug arrests. Again, a
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accounted for only a small increase
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Table 15.1 aGang Incident Data - Vi
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Table 15.3 aGang Incident Data - To
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Table 15.5 aGang Incident Data - Dr
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Table 15.7 aGang Offender Data - Vi
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Table 15.9 aGang Offender Data - Vi
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Table 15.11 aGang Offender Data - V
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Table 15.13 aGang Offender Data - L
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Table 15.15 aGang Offender Data - A
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Table 15.17 aGang Offender Data - A
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Table 15.19 aGang Offender Data - W
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Table 15.21 aGang Offender Data - D
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Table 15.23 aGang Offender Data - D
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Table 15.25 aGang Offender Data - F
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Table 15.27 aNon-Gang Incidents - V
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years of its existence than in the
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crime is best sustained during both
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Figure 15.1AComparison of Average Y
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Figure 15.3ATen-Year Trend of Gang
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Figure 15.1BComparison of Average Y
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Figure 15.3BSix-Year Trend of Gang
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the gang problem (i.e., number of s
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Section IVwith Rolando V. SosaIncid
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SummaryThe aggregate patterns of ch
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Village the serious gang violence r
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cultural, and health institutions s
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II. While every attempt was made to
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worse had dropped by almost half be
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few respondents in either community
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Pilsen). These declines between tim
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I (n = 94) to 20.0% at Time II (n =
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(Chisquare = 4.723, df = 1, p # 0.0
Page 608 and 609: territory), there was no longer a s
Page 610 and 611: increase in Little Village can be a
Page 612 and 613: Time I and Time II. Slightly more o
Page 614 and 615: can be associated with the GVRP (pa
Page 616 and 617: Pilsen respondents did. Pilsen repr
Page 618 and 619: and from 84.5% to 67.3% in Pilsen (
Page 620 and 621: educe the presence of gangs in the
Page 622 and 623: followed by improved schools, incre
Page 624 and 625: particular, were less afraid in the
Page 626 and 627: Table 16.1Community Characteristics
Page 628 and 629: Table 16.3Problems in the Community
Page 630 and 631: Table 16.5Gang-Motivated and Non Ga
Page 632 and 633: Table 16.7What Police Do to Deal wi
Page 634 and 635: Table 16.9Amount of Gang-Motivated
Page 636 and 637: Table 16.11What Police Do to Deal w
Page 638 and 639: Table 16.13Organizations Believe Co
Page 640 and 641: Table 16.15Amount of Gang-Motivated
Page 642 and 643: Table 16.17What Probation Officers
Page 644 and 645: he quickly assumed coordination and
Page 646 and 647: • Communication: Perhaps more imp
Page 648 and 649: to your proposal.”In a November 1
Page 650 and 651: foundations, and other sources. The
Page 652 and 653: knowledge or permission of the Coor
Page 654 and 655: although we expect to expand many e
Page 656 and 657: Project staff were notified of prog
Page 660 and 661: ideological terms between 1992 and
Page 662 and 663: esponsibility of Project operations
Page 664 and 665: • Program features: The program h
Page 666 and 667: In a November 1996 monthly report,
Page 668 and 669: activities with adult probation. Th
Page 670 and 671: conflict with each other. MLG and t
Page 672 and 673: program might look like.We have ben
Page 674 and 675: arrangement was delayed and interru
Page 676 and 677: CPD and CCDAP probably did not clea
Page 678 and 679: 18.18
Page 680 and 681: Carney, Frank J., Hans W. Mattick a
Page 682 and 683: Klein, Malcolm W. 1968 (July). The
Page 684 and 685: Short, James F., Jr, and Fred L. St
Page 686: Swans, Bennie J. 1981 (May 11). Cri
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The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project in Chicago

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