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Chapter 2

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directly and indirectly: allowing consumers more choice (full freedom to choose their<br />

own health insurer and, in most cases, their health provider) and giving a more active<br />

role to insurers (representing patients’ interests). The new health insurance scheme<br />

has a private structure. Citizens will no longer be insured automatically but will be<br />

obliged to purchase a health plan themselves. The integration of the social and private<br />

insurance schemes implies that the coverage of the old public scheme will be<br />

extended to the whole population (standard package of essential health care). The<br />

level of the nominal insurance premium differs between insurers (range in 2006: €<br />

990-€ 1.172 per year), as an incentive for competition among the health insurers and<br />

for cost consciousness among the insured. Indeed an unexpected 25% of insured<br />

changed over to a new health insurer at the introduction of the new system in<br />

January. This was also triggered by discounts on the premiums offered to employees<br />

in the context of collective contracts between employers and insurers. Furthermore,<br />

health care insurers do not have to sign individual contracts with all providers. By<br />

abolishing this, the provision and the price of health care can be negotiated at the<br />

level of insurer and supplier. Health care providers compete with each other on the<br />

basis of price and quality. Some health insurers offer 2 insurance policies: one with<br />

limited freedom to choose one’s provider but with no charge to the insured and one<br />

with complete freedom with reimbursement to the insured, the latter policy being<br />

more expensive than the former.<br />

2.5.2 A new hospital financing system<br />

As the old system of fixed budgets for hospitals was not compatible with the model<br />

of regulated competition and consequent negotiation about prices of health care services<br />

a new system for hospital finance was introduced as well. The hospital production<br />

can be seen as built up from a large number of Diagnosis Treatment Combinations<br />

(in Dutch: Diagnose Behandeling Combinaties, DBCs), a kind of DRG-system. A DBC<br />

is defined as the whole set of activities and interventions of the hospital and medical<br />

specialist resulting from the first consultation and diagnosis of the medical specialist<br />

in the hospital. Expert opinion was used to define DBCs an estimate duration of each<br />

procedure, on which basis an initial price was determined. The total number of DBCs<br />

is huge (about 29.000). Clearly it is impossible for the hospitals to compute costs for<br />

all DBCs and then negotiate about the level of reimbursement with health insurers.<br />

Two strategies are implemented to reduce the impact of the transition to the DBCsystem.<br />

First, negotiation on prices for DBCs is introduced step by step. At the<br />

moment the price is fixed for most DBCs, but prices for a specific set of DBCs (about<br />

10% of hospital production, mostly non acute care) are subject to negotiation<br />

between hospitals and health insurers. The set of DBCs subject to free pricing is to be<br />

extended over successive years. Second, it has been recognized that a small part<br />

(about 20%) of the DBCs determines a large part of the volume of resource use and<br />

the costs (about 80%). For that reason health insurers and hospitals can limit their<br />

negotiations to a subset of all DBCs. For that purpose the DBCs were categorized into<br />

3 to 61 homogeneous product groups per professional area.<br />

[143]<br />

CEIS Health Report 2006

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