Chapter 2
Chapter 2
Chapter 2
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directly and indirectly: allowing consumers more choice (full freedom to choose their<br />
own health insurer and, in most cases, their health provider) and giving a more active<br />
role to insurers (representing patients’ interests). The new health insurance scheme<br />
has a private structure. Citizens will no longer be insured automatically but will be<br />
obliged to purchase a health plan themselves. The integration of the social and private<br />
insurance schemes implies that the coverage of the old public scheme will be<br />
extended to the whole population (standard package of essential health care). The<br />
level of the nominal insurance premium differs between insurers (range in 2006: €<br />
990-€ 1.172 per year), as an incentive for competition among the health insurers and<br />
for cost consciousness among the insured. Indeed an unexpected 25% of insured<br />
changed over to a new health insurer at the introduction of the new system in<br />
January. This was also triggered by discounts on the premiums offered to employees<br />
in the context of collective contracts between employers and insurers. Furthermore,<br />
health care insurers do not have to sign individual contracts with all providers. By<br />
abolishing this, the provision and the price of health care can be negotiated at the<br />
level of insurer and supplier. Health care providers compete with each other on the<br />
basis of price and quality. Some health insurers offer 2 insurance policies: one with<br />
limited freedom to choose one’s provider but with no charge to the insured and one<br />
with complete freedom with reimbursement to the insured, the latter policy being<br />
more expensive than the former.<br />
2.5.2 A new hospital financing system<br />
As the old system of fixed budgets for hospitals was not compatible with the model<br />
of regulated competition and consequent negotiation about prices of health care services<br />
a new system for hospital finance was introduced as well. The hospital production<br />
can be seen as built up from a large number of Diagnosis Treatment Combinations<br />
(in Dutch: Diagnose Behandeling Combinaties, DBCs), a kind of DRG-system. A DBC<br />
is defined as the whole set of activities and interventions of the hospital and medical<br />
specialist resulting from the first consultation and diagnosis of the medical specialist<br />
in the hospital. Expert opinion was used to define DBCs an estimate duration of each<br />
procedure, on which basis an initial price was determined. The total number of DBCs<br />
is huge (about 29.000). Clearly it is impossible for the hospitals to compute costs for<br />
all DBCs and then negotiate about the level of reimbursement with health insurers.<br />
Two strategies are implemented to reduce the impact of the transition to the DBCsystem.<br />
First, negotiation on prices for DBCs is introduced step by step. At the<br />
moment the price is fixed for most DBCs, but prices for a specific set of DBCs (about<br />
10% of hospital production, mostly non acute care) are subject to negotiation<br />
between hospitals and health insurers. The set of DBCs subject to free pricing is to be<br />
extended over successive years. Second, it has been recognized that a small part<br />
(about 20%) of the DBCs determines a large part of the volume of resource use and<br />
the costs (about 80%). For that reason health insurers and hospitals can limit their<br />
negotiations to a subset of all DBCs. For that purpose the DBCs were categorized into<br />
3 to 61 homogeneous product groups per professional area.<br />
[143]<br />
CEIS Health Report 2006