Electronic Discovery and Computer Forensics Case List - Kroll Ontrack
Electronic Discovery and Computer Forensics Case List - Kroll Ontrack
Electronic Discovery and Computer Forensics Case List - Kroll Ontrack
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equesting “any <strong>and</strong> all electronic storage media including hard drives, zip drives, thumb drives,<br />
CD’s, DVD’s, etc. from <strong>and</strong> pertaining to any computer including desk top computers <strong>and</strong>/or<br />
laptops, used by [the plaintiff] from January 1, 2002 to the present.” Before terminating the plaintiff,<br />
the defendant hired a computer consultant to analyze the plaintiff’s hard drive to determine the<br />
authenticity of certain e-mails. Following this, the defendant retained a computer forensics expert,<br />
<strong>Kroll</strong> <strong>Ontrack</strong> Inc., to create a forensic image of the hard drive, conduct a more thorough<br />
investigation of the computer media, <strong>and</strong> store the hard drive with the defendant’s law firm for<br />
preservation. Although the defendant withheld the computer consultant’s records, the defendant<br />
provided the plaintiff with the more in-depth report by <strong>Kroll</strong> <strong>Ontrack</strong>, insisting the plaintiff conduct its<br />
own forensic analysis if unsatisfied with the investigation. Arguing it had maintained strict chain-ofcustody<br />
procedures, the defendant submitted affidavits stating “there has been no change in the<br />
data or information on the hard drive from the time it was retrieved…to the present.” Finding the<br />
plaintiffs failed to show evidence that information on the hard drive had been altered, the court<br />
granted the defendant’s motion to quash <strong>and</strong> ruled the plaintiffs had not met their burden in<br />
demonstrating substantial need for the computer consultant’s analysis or showing they would suffer<br />
undue hardship in obtaining the relevant information through other means. The court continued by<br />
granting the plaintiff’s motion to quash, noting a party cannot issue a subpoena to another party<br />
under Rule 45, but should have requested production of the plaintiff’s personal computer pursuant<br />
to Rule 34.<br />
� QZO, Inc. v. Moyer, 594 S.E.2d 541 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004). A corporation alleged that the<br />
defendant, a former officer <strong>and</strong> shareholder of the corporation, violated state trade secret laws by<br />
planning to compete with the corporation. The corporation requested the defendant turn over a<br />
computer, which allegedly contained evidence of the defendant’s plans to compete. The trial court<br />
granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing the defendant to h<strong>and</strong> over the computer to<br />
the corporation or to a neutral third party. The defendant waited until seven days after the TRO was<br />
issued to deliver the computer to the corporation. After receiving the computer, the corporation<br />
hired a computer expert to inspect <strong>and</strong> retrieve any potential evidence from the computer’s hard<br />
drive. The expert discovered the hard drive had been reformatted a day before the defendant<br />
delivered the computer to the corporation, which erased any evidence that may have been on the<br />
computer. The corporation requested sanctions in the form of a default judgment against the<br />
defendant for intentionally violating the TRO. The trial court granted the corporation’s motion for<br />
sanctions <strong>and</strong> entered the default judgment in favor of the corporation. The defendant appealed<br />
stating that the evidence was insufficient to support such severe sanctions. On appeal, the<br />
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, determining that the sanctions were not too<br />
severe.<br />
West Virginia<br />
� Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, 2011 WL 5201430 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011).<br />
In this case, the plaintiff sought production of a defendant-employee’s e-mails with his attorney.<br />
The plaintiff contended that the employer’s data policy, which stated that employee e-mails were<br />
not confidential <strong>and</strong> were subject to review, constituted a waiver of any existing attorney-client<br />
privilege. The defendant, while conceding awareness of the policy, tried to show that he<br />
nonetheless believed the e-mails were confidential by relying on a different section of the policy.<br />
The relevant section provided that other employees should regard messages as confidential <strong>and</strong><br />
accessible only by the intended recipient. Noting that the defendant’s reliance was misplaced as it<br />
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