Parties, Candidates and Citizens On-Line - Åbo Akademi

these scholarly visions (e.g. Corrado & Firestone 1997; Rash 1997), Margolis and
colleagues (Margolis et al. 2003, 58) state that the equalization theory contains the
following core argument:
“…the advent of the internet, seen initially as a democratic force, led to
expectations that information and communications technologies (ICTs) might
disproportionately benefit fringe and minor parties thus assisting the growth
of anti-establishment parties […] the lack of editorial control and relative low
cost of creating a website meant that minor political movements could
establish a platform for their view more easily than in the mainstream media
and could reach a considerably larger audience. In short, the internet could
help level the electoral playing field” (Margolis et al. 2003, 58)
The internet lowers the costs of publishing large-scale information and multimedia via
political websites. It also provides senders of political messages with the ability to
maintain control of the conveyed message without editorial intervention (e.g. Carlson &
Djupsund 2001, 69; Coleman & Goetze 2001, 5; Hill & Hughes 1998, 22; Margolis et al
2003, 58). These particular features of the internet provide potential benefits to all
political actors. These benefits, however, ought to be relatively more central for the fringe
and minor political actors who, in many cases, find it difficult to stay in stride with the
major actors via traditional communication channels (cf. Margolis et al. 2003, 58; Norris
2001b, 170; Sadow & James 1999, 5). These actors would now be able to compete on
more equal terms with their major counterparts than via campaigning in traditional massmedia.
There are some empirical findings which lend support to the equalization theory
which merit attention here. Norris (2003, 42-43) concludes that her cross-national analysis
of 134 party websites in the EU countries indicated that the smaller parties’ websites did
give them more “voice and visibility” than these parties had received via traditional media.
Newell’s (2001, 81-82) analysis of Italian party websites revealed that the smaller parties
appeared more inclined to turn to the ‘new’ medium than their major counterparts. Cunha
and colleagues (Cunha et al. 2003, 87-88) also argue that their findings concerning party
websites in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, facilitate “party-competition levelling”.
Tkach-Kawasaki even states that: “the Internet is clearly opening up new channels for
smaller parties, candidates, interest groups…” (Tkach-Kawasaki 2003, 118). Other
scholars have noted the tendency of smaller party candidates to use the internet at a
higher rate than major party candidates (e.g. Herrnson & Stokes 2003; Sadow & James
1999).
Contrary to the situation depicted in the equalization theory, scholars have put
forward a “normalization” theory. According to this theory, the internet will merely
produce a “no-change” situation in regards to its impact on the electoral competition
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