The Roman Army: A Social and Institutional History - Karatunov.net

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The Roman A rmy
Livy’s legion ever existed, but it has also been suggested that the very idiosyncrasies
in the account actually support its veracity (Connolly, 1998). According
to Livy, each legion was 5,000 strong, drawn up in three main battle lines. At the
front were fifteen maniples of hastati, heavy infantry composed of the younger
m en , and attach ed to each maniple were twen ty ligh t - a rm ed soldiers (l eve s) ,
e ach carrying a spear and light javel i n s . Th eir task was pre su m a bly to form a
s c reen for the whole army and to opera te as skirm i s h ers . Behind the h a s t a ti
were another fifteen maniples of pri n ci pe s who were older and more ex perienced
soldiers. The third battle line consisted of three types of troops: first the
veterans (triarii), then the less experienced men of the rorarii, and finally the accensi.
The term triarii is easily translated as the men of the third rank, but schola
rs have racked their brains abo ut the po s s i ble meanings of the other two
word s . The a ccen s i tu rn up in later Roman armies as serva n t s , but the ro ra ri i
defy clarification. It is tempting to equate the five types of troops of Livy’s battle
line with the five classes of the Servian constitution, but it cannot be affirmed
that there is any direct descent from one system to the other. On a linguistic basis,
the accensi were more likely to be attendants and not soldiers, but they did
occasionally take part in battles, notably in the war against the Latins under the
General Decius Mus. Livy explains that each division of the third line was a vexillum
(later this was the name of the standard of a detachment or vexillation).
E ach vexi ll u m con t a i n ed sixty men and two cen tu ri on s , i m p lying that there
were two centuries of thirty men. It is likely that the maniples of the hastati and
principes were similarly organized.
This was probably the type of army that the Romans employed in the Samn
i te Wa rs (343–341 bc; c . 324–304 bc; 298–290 bc) , wh i ch po s s i bly en t a i l ed
s ome ad a ptive tech n i ques on the part of the Rom a n s . The Sa m n i tes were hill
fighters and were reluctant to come down to the plains, so the Romans had to
wage war in hill country, disastrously at first. If it had not already occurred, this
was po s s i bly the occ a s i on for the introdu cti on of the p i l u m , because the Romans
now needed some way of en ga ging the en emy wi t h o ut cl o s i n g. L iv y
(10.39) mentions the use of pila in his account of the third Samnite War, but
this may be a retrospective misuse of terminology most familiar to his readers.
Si n ce the Romans were figh ting at some distance from Rome against a
highly mobile enemy, the practice of building marching camps may have begun
during the Samnite Wars. There is no firm evidence, but at some point the Romans
learned, and the Samnite Wars provide a valid context for the lessons. Livy
refers to camps several ti m e s , in one instance rel a ting how the Sa m n i tes att
acked the camp of the con sul Ma rcus Va l erius and saw soldiers “behind the
ramparts.” The Samnite Wars also taught the Romans about organizing supply
lines, and about communications. One of the first projects that was undertaken
after the conclusion of the second war was the building of the Via Appia from
Rome to the city of Capua. Routes were of obvious importance in military ma-