The Roman Army: A Social and Institutional History - Karatunov.net

The Roman A rmy at Wa r 201
ti on can be gl e a n ed as to wh et h er the com m a n ders were ide a lly su i t a ble for
their posts. For the most part commanders of armies were senators, men of education
and social standing, and as Campbell (1984, 1994) points out, scarcely
any of them would ever question their military or political abilities. During the
Republic, generals were appointed by the assembly and were expected to defend
Rome or Roman interests and then retu rn to po l i tical life , wi t h o ut becom i n g
professional military specialists. Young men such as Scipio Africanus and Pompey
the Great rose to power wh en dangers thre a ten ed , and they ga i n ed commands
wi t h o ut too mu ch public disbel i ef in their apti tu de for war. Th e
Impe–rial system was no longer conducive to the emergence of youthful heroes.
While there was never a rigidly prescribed career pattern, aspiring generals followed
a broadly similar path. They would gain experience of the legions from
their appointments as tribuni laticlavii and later as legionary legates, and this,
com bi n ed with their po l i tical ex peri en ce , form ed their training for warf a re .
Th ere were no staff co ll eges or training sch oo l s , but there were the military
manuals and the accounts of the battles of the past, and there were men of experience
to talk to and question, all of which Polybius (11.8.1–2) recommends
as a means of becoming a general. Cicero says that this was how Lucullus acquired
his expertise while traveling to the east to take up the command that was
eventually wrested from him by Pompey the Great (Campbell, 1984). None of
the sources mentions an Imperial archive or an official corpus of military theory
and recorded practice.
It has been stated that Roman commanders were amateurs and that the victories
they gained came about almost by accident as a result of the expertise and
training of the soldiers and the officers. While the contribution of the centurions
and their abi l i ty to influ en ce the outcome of a battle should never be
doubted, the suggestion that generals were more or less superfluous ignores the
f act that re s pon s i bi l i ty for the con du ct of c a m p a i gns and indivi dual battles
rested with the general. The subordinate officers did not formulate the overall
plan for a campaign or a battle, and ulti m a tely they had to obey their commanders
even if they did not agree with the planning process.
The quality of these subordinate officers was of some concern to conscientious
em perors and Roman gen era l s . Vespasian paid of f a cen tu ri on who had
joined the army merely for the pay, so it could be assumed that aptitude for mili
t a ry servi ce played its part in the appoi n tm ent of of f i cers and com m a n ders .
Not all senators pursued their military careers with great vigor up to the rank of
provincial governor of an armed province. Indeed, there would not be enough
appointments to satisfy them all, so it was perhaps only those men who did have
some ability, either self-professed or observed, for command. Catching the eye
of men who could advance one’s career was an important route to military appointments,
and although the emperors did not take a personal interest in the
promotion of all the individual centurions, they certainly did take an interest in