The Roman Army: A Social and Institutional History - Karatunov.net

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The Roman A rmy
vian ex p l oi ted An tony ’s unfortu n a te if not unwise assoc i a ti on with Queen
Cleopatra VII of Egypt. Antony’s name was besmirched, it is true, but that was
normal in the Roman political arena—a number of Romans who were cast as
vi llains managed to cleanse them s elves and em er ge as heroe s — but caref u l
propaganda ensured that Cleopatra and Egypt were seen as the enemy. It was
ru m ored that Cl eop a tra wi s h ed to take over the Roman state , and it was said
that she often began her musings with “When I dispense justice from the Capitol.”
Whipped up by Octavian, the people were clamoring for him to mobilize
against Cleopatra, and he revived an ancient ritual whereby he designated a little
plot of land as enemy territory, threw a spear into this symbolic Egypt, and
so declared war.
On occ a s i on , Rome fo u ght wars on beh a l f of a n o t h er state , k i n gdom , or
tribe, after appeals for assistance from a threatened monarch or chieftain. The
re sult was not alw ays annex a ti on of the ch i ef t a i n’s terri tory, a l t h o u gh cert a i n
stipulations may be made, such as raising troops for the Roman army, and an
understanding that the chief who enjoyed Roman support should keep his own
warriors under control and watch his borders to guard against the people who
m i ght one day thre a ten Roman intere s t s . Si gn i f i c a n t ly, wh en the Romans decided
upon annexation, it tended to occur where there was a profit to be made,
a con cept that em braced both po l i tical adva n t a ges and/or econ omic ga i n s .
Pom pey the Great showed how immen s ely prof i t a ble forei gn wars could be ,
though the eastern territories offered more economic potential than the west,
wh ere certain gen erals like Ju l ius Caesar and Germanicus won great po l i ti c a l
kudos but not quite as much wealth.
During the Republic, the Senate made corporate decisions about whether or
not to go war, whom to place in command, how many troops to raise, and the
resources that should be voted to the generals. This applied especially when the
Romans were operating in Italy, but as the number of provinces increased, governors
acted more independently, a situation imposed by the distances involved
and the speed of com mu n i c a ti on s . G overn ors were not given an en ti rely free
hand, but their remit seems to have been broad enough to allow them to make
dec i s i ons to wage war on a tri be or peop l e , a lw ays provi ded that the rel eva n t
reasons could be produced to label the action a “just war.” In the early years of
the Pri n c i p a te , s en a tors con ti nu ed to act as their predece s s ors had don e , but
Au g u s tus ra p i dly made it clear that the degree of i n depen dent acti on for
provincial governors was severely curtailed. Marcus Licinius Crassus, grandson
of the more famous Crassus who met his end in Parthia, successfully conducted
a war in Moesia in 29–28 bc, and claimed a triumph, which he was granted. His
demands did not end there, however, since he also claimed the title Imperator,
wh i ch was norm a lly vo ted to a su ccessful gen eral by his troop s , and the ra re
honor of spolia opima. This was awarded to a Roman general who had personally
killed an enemy leader in battle, and it bestowed the right to dedicate the
spoils of war in the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol. These last two honors were