The Roman Army: A Social and Institutional History - Karatunov.net

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The Roman A rmy
vers and battles are probably trustworthy, and the value of his works is not in
doubt, not least because there is nothing else by any other author that covers the
same peri od . Hi s tori c a lly, t h ere is very little detail con cerning topogra phy for
the accounts of the various civil wars, and the chronology is sometimes questionable,
but this should not detract from the overall worth of the military details.
For the Gallic War in particular, Caesar’s narrative shows his army in action.
It was a very personalized army by this time, loyal to Caesar first and Rome
s econ d . L i ke most of his con tem pora ri e s , Caesar had never had any form a l
training as a military commander, but he had perhaps studied the former battles
of the Scipios and of the generals of his own day. He was a hard taskmaster,
demanding severe discipline, unquestioning obedience, initiative where appropriate,
incredible speed of operations, willing self-sacrifice, and more—and he
got everything he asked for. He would have made an excellent psychologist, as
far as the command of men was concerned.
Cae s a r ’s books show the Roman army on the march and in battle. The troop s
were mu l ti s k i ll edin other military nece s s i ti e s ; t h eycon s tru cted bri d ges and bu i l t
tra n s port ships, war ga ll eys , c a m p s , and fort s ; t h ey con du cted sieges as well as
f i gh ting battles; t h ey guarded ro ute s , and they or ga n i zed and pro tected thei r
food su pp ly and com mu n i c a ti on s . In some instance s , Cae s a r ’s of f i cers were
p l aced tem pora ri ly in indepen dent commands and acted on their own initi a tive .
He could not keep the whole army toget h er at all times because he needed to
hold down several areas at on ce , and he could not easily feed the whole army if
he kept it in one place in the wi n ter. As a re su l t , he appoi n ted lega tes (l ega ti)to
command some of his legi ons or groups of l egi on s . Si n ce com mu n i c a ti ons were
de s pera tely slow by modern standard s , su bord i n a te com m a n ders could not afford
to wait for instru cti ons from the great man himsel f . Credit was given wh ere
it was due in Cae s a r ’s narra tive for the good sense and su ccesses of his lega te s ,
and espec i a lly for those of f i cers and men he had pers on a lly ob s erved perform i n g
great feats du ring battles or on campaign s . No do u bt he also derived some of h i s
i n form a ti on from the reports his of f i cers sent to his head qu a rters .
One of Caesar’s officers, Aulus Hirtius, wrote the eighth and last book of the
account of the Gallic War. Hirtius and Cicero both regarded the commentaries
on the Gallic War as materials for the historian rather than history proper. As
literary works, they are simple, clear, and easy to read, lacking only the merit of
polished style, but it is possibly a distinct advantage that they were not polished
and rewritten by a historian, who could have distorted the narrative for the sake
of a tu rn of ph ra s e . Prob a bly for po l i tical re a s on s , the books were wri t ten up
very quickly, which enhances the impression of immediacy and vigor. Most important,
Caesar presents a rounded picture of the Roman army as the Republic
was transformed into the Empire. The fighting methods did not undergo vast
ch a n ge s , and the met h ods of rec ru i tm en t , ad m i n i s tra ti on , p ay, su pp l i e s , a n d
discharge of time-served soldiers were already extant in embryo, to be gradually