The Roman Army: A Social and Institutional History - Karatunov.net

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The Roman A rmy
Planning and Staff Work
The Romans appreciated the value of good planning, at least in theory, and the
l i tera ry referen ces ex tol the vi rtues of those gen erals who were ren own ed for
l aying careful plans before en ga ging in active opera ti on s . Tac i tus attri buted
Corbulo’s successes to thorough preparation and planning (Annals 13). Much
of the initial planning took the form of i n tell i gen ce ga t h ering and recon n a i ssance
work. For example, the Republican general Scipio Aemilianus thoroughly
surveyed the ground in the vicinity of Carthago Nova (New Carthage, modern
Cartagena) before he laid siege to the city. Geographical considerations were vitally
important to the planning process, but so was an understanding of the enemy’s
characteristics and their daily routines. Vegetius recommends that generals
should alw ays get to know their en emies well (Ep i toma Rei Mi l i t a ri s 3 . 6 ;
4.27), and Caesar gathered as much information as he could about the inhabitants
of southern Britain as well as the terrain before he invaded in 55 and 54 bc
(Gallic War 4.20.2–4; Suetonius, Divus Julius 58.1).
One of the Rom a n s’ de s i ra ble aims of good planning was to en a ble the gen erals
to ch oose their own battle site s , wh ere they could make maximum use of t h e
terrain to pro tect their flanks, or to keep re s erves hidden from the en emy, a n d
t h en direct the proceed i n gs with en o u gh flex i bi l i ty to deal with unex pected
c ri s e s . The su preme example of det a i l ed planning of this sort is Arri a n’s O rd er of
Ma rch Against the Al a n s , wh ere he not on ly laid down ex act ly wh i ch troop s
would march under wh i ch com m a n ders , but also out l i n ed how he propo s ed to
f i ght the battle on ce he had en ga ged the en emy. His work is de s i gn ed for a specific
set of c i rc u m s t a n ces in a specific place against a high ly mobile en emy. Th e
d a n ger is, as Goldswort hy points out (1996, 2 0 0 3 ) , that historians interpret Arri
a n’s arra n gem ents as the universal Roman figh ting met h od for the second centu
ry all over the Empire , no matter what kind of en emy the Romans were figh ti
n g. While certain broad theoretical con cepts may be gl e a n ed from the few cl o s e
de s c ri pti ons that we have of the Roman army in acti on , it is not advi s a ble to extra
po l a tefrom them to build up a crys t a ll i zed static pictu re of the Romans at war.
In planning how to fight a battle or lay a siege , it was important to form som e
i dea of h ow to ex tri c a te the troops if everything went wrong and it was nece s s a ry
to retre a t . According to Po lybius (10.6.11–10.9.1), Scipio planned how to retre a t
f rom Ca rt h a go Nova (modern Ca rt a gena) in Spain. In this re s pect , det a i l ed loc a l
k n owl ed gewould help com m a n ders if t h eywere taken by su rpri s e , so they migh t
h ave a ch a n ce to ex tri c a tetheir armies wi t h o uttoo mu ch bl ood s h ed . Si n ce nothing
is com p l etely pred i ct a ble in war, and it is not alw ays po s s i ble to preem pt a
c ri s i s , at times the Romans had no opportu n i ty to make lei su rely plans but had
to re act to unex pected events very qu i ck ly, in wh i ch case they had to rely on the
ex peri en ce and training of the soldiers . O n a s a n der (32 and 39) lays more emphasis
on planning how to fight a battle on ce the en emy is in sigh t , so that his
d i s po s i ti ons can be ob s erved and arra n gem ents made on the spot to deal wi t h