The Roman Army: A Social and Institutional History - Karatunov.net

The Roman A rmy at Wa r 173
ref u s ed . Hen ceforth the title Im pera to r bel on ged exclu s ively to the em perors ,
and generals who claimed signal honors were dissuaded from making too much
s pect acl e . The em perors made dec i s i ons abo ut going to war, wh ere to wage it
and thro u gh wh om , and the ch o s en gen erals were de s i gn a ted appoi n tees or
legates of the emperor, subordinate to him in all matters. The award of the triumph,
the pinnacle of the Republican military career, ceased for anyone except
the immediate family of the emperor, and to demonstrate the point, Augustus’s
right-hand man, the faithful Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, was awarded the honor
twice but refused it, along with other honors voted to him by the Senate. During
the Empire, successful generals had to be content with the lesser award of ornamenta
triumphalia, the insignia of a triumphant commander, but they did not
h ave the hon or of p a rading in the triu m phal ch a riot thro u gh the streets of
Rome, displaying the booty and captives that they had won, ending the procession
on the Capitol Hill where the trophies were dedicated to the gods.
E m perors som etimes curt a i l ed the ex p l oits of a su ccessful com m a n der in
case they ven tu red too far and em broi l ed Rome in wars that she did not want, or
in case the gen erals got above them s elves and started to think in terms of ru nning
the whole Empire . Cl a u d ius preven ted Dom i tius Corbu l o, l ega te of Lower
G erm a ny, f rom fo ll owing up his vi ctory against the Ch a u c i . Corbulo was opera ting
ac ross the Rh i n e , but the army was bro u ght back to the Roman side of t h e
river. The lessons learn ed from the disaster of Va rus were perhaps sti ll too vivi d ,
but it is also po s s i ble that Cl a u d ius did not want his gen erals to eclipse him.
Augustus quickly made it clear that supreme power and all honors were in
his gift and his alone, and his successors saw no reason to relax this unwritten
rule. Significantly, lesser powers and honors were granted to the military commanders,
whose achievements had to be acknowledged in some way, without allowing
them more power and influence than the emperors, all of which highl
i ghts the con ti nual dilemma of the Im perial regi m e . The Empire had to be
defended, so armies had to be stationed at convenient points with commanders
in charge of them. The commanders had to have enough ability and power to be
able to organize this defense if circumstances demanded it, but at the same time
they must not be encouraged to imagine that they could run the Empire rather
better than the reigning emperor. Given the long time span of Imperial rule, it is
perhaps su rprising that there were not more attem pts at usu rp a ti on and a
change of ruler in the first two centuries. If defense was to be effective, a warlike
spirit had to be instilled into the provincial armies, but the troops in the frontier
forts were no longer all Romans or Italians from the core of the Empire, so their
ideology of Rome would be based on the concept of a central ruling power but
not of a homeland where they could find repose after their service. They had
other loyalties besides their duty to Rome. If the right leader emerged making
all the right promises, the provincial armies showed themselves ready to make
war on whoever was marked out as the enemy, whether they were Roman, non-
Roman, or otherwise. The Roman war ethic could just as easily be turned in-