The Roman Army: A Social and Institutional History - Karatunov.net

ing one cohort from the third line of each legion and placed it out of sight as a
reserve, in case the right wing should start to crumble or disaster struck elsewhere
in the whole line. One other factor was perhaps instrumental in Caesar’s
even tual vi ctory: he ordered his troops to stri ke at the faces of the Pom pei a n
soldiers, judging that the psychological impact would spread fear and panic.
The battle opened with a Caesarian charge, which the Pompeians received
without moving, since Pompey did not want his men to be winded before they
fo u gh t . Caesar thought this a mistake , in that the men who ch a r ged forw a rd
had the advantage and did not have time to work up their fear while watching
an army coming toward them. Once battle was joined, Pompey’s right and center
held out and fought hard, and so Labienus ordered the cavalry to attack and
envelop the Caesarian right. However, they failed to work their way round rapidly
and decisively, and were scattered by an attack on their own flanks by the
troops that Caesar had concealed. The removal of the horsemen opened up the
Pompeian left to further attack by Caesar’s reserve fourth line, and he also sent
in the third line to help the first and second. The battle was lost at that point.
Pompey rode off the field and back to the camp, which ought to have been defended
by the seven cohorts that he had left there, but he neglected to make any
a rra n gem ents for the defense and rode aw ay as Cae s a r ’s men approach ed . He
took a few attendants with him and went to the city of Larissa, where he told the
inhabitants of his defeat and advised them not to resist Caesar. Then he made
for the coast, and ultimately Egypt, where he was killed. One of the main protagonists
was removed, but the civil war was not yet over. Caesar did not learn
of Pompey’s fate until he arrived in Alexandria, but Pompey’s sons and many of
his legates were still at large and could not be allowed to build up their power.
Perhaps if Pompey had been spared in Egypt and Caesar could have negotiated
with him, the war may have been ended less bloodily, but in 48 bc the victor of
the battle of Pharsalus had merely completed the first stage. Four more years of
war and two major battles at Thapsus and Munda were to follow before Caesar
could shake off the Pompeian threat.
Philippi, 42 BC
G r e at S o l d i e r s a n d B at t l e s 309
The legacy of the civil war between the Caesarians and the Pompeians was another
series of wars between Caesar’s successors and his assassins. The men who
called themselves the Liberators accomplished their aim of bringing down Caesar
in March 44 bc, but seem to have imagined that their contemporaries would
applaud their deed and revert to the old system without so much as a hint of a
plan. They had underestimated the strength of feeling among Caesar’s circle of
clients and associates, but fortunately, for a short and tense interval just after the
murder, Mark Antony as consul managed to restore order, reconciling the Lib-