5.2. Tensions ethniques – un deuxième génocide

- 45 -
« Jon [Jean] Pierre told us that he had no objection to make war
[with the] RPF people because RPF was the enemy ... but his
mission was now to prepare the killings of civilian and Tutsi
people... to make lists of Tutsi people, where they lived, to be
able, at a certain code name, to kill them. Kigali City was divided
in a certain number of areas, and ... each area was manned by,
let's say, 10 or maybe more people. Some were armed with
firearms, some with other kind of tools like machetes, and the
mission of those persons was just to kill the Tutsis. Another
aspect of his mission was to distribute weapons to the
[Interahamwe] militia, and so during this first meeting he told me
that in the area of Kigali there were a lot of arms caches and
some ... of the weapons, the firearms were in those caches. » 56
Après avoir transmis le télégramme contenant l’information ci-dessus à Kofi Annan
et Iqbal Riza, directeurs du DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping operations), rien
ne se passe.
Dallaire est instruit d’informer le président Habyarimana des informations reçues.
« Not only was I not allowed to conduct deterrent operations in
support of UNAMIR, but in the interests of transparency, I was to
provide the information that Jean-Pierre had given to us to
President Habyarimana immediately. I was absolutely beside
myself with frustration. » 57
De nouveau, rien ne se passe, Habyarimana ne prend pas de mesures, ni à
dissoudre les dépôts d’armes dont on est mis en connaissance, ni à nettoyer les
quartiers des personnes armées, prêtes à tuer. Un autre élément d’information
obtenu par « Jean Pierre » concernait une stratégie dont le but était de provoquer
le meurtre de soldats belges de la MINUAR et le retrait de leur bataillon.
« … et les troupes belges devaient elles aussi faire l’objet de
provocations. Si les Belges répondaient par la force, un certain
nombre d’entre eux seraient alors assassinés, ce qui garantissait
que la Belgique retirerait son contingent du Rwanda. » 58
56 Frontline Interview avec colonel Luc Marchal
57 Roméo Dallaire, Shake hands with the devil, Arrow Books, 2004, p. 146
58 United Nations Independent Inquiry,” December 1999, II. Les principaux événements,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/48/PDF/N9939548.pdf?OpenElement,
(05.12.2007)