Serviceeftersyn af vilkårene for kulbrinteudvinding ... - Skatteministeriet

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Fiscal Comparison/Exploration Attractiveness The State also has a major, indirect participation through its majority ownership of Statoil, the Norwegian National Oil Company (NOC). Statoil has no mandatory right to participate in licences, so only Petoro’s interest has been included as State equity in the analysis in this report. Corporate Income Tax Corporate Tax is levied at 28% of revenue less operating costs and depreciation. Offshore production assets depreciated straight line over 6 years, measured from date of purchase. Leased assets may be capitalised according to a deemed purchase price. Exploration costs can either be expensed or capitalised without uplift. Tax value of exploration losses are reimbursable in the tax year that expenses are incurred, even if the explorer has no taxable income that year. Losses are carried forward with interest at an after-tax risk free rate. Additional Profits Tax ‘Special Tax’ is levied at 50% of taxable income for CIT purposes, with an additional 30% uplift on capital expenditure over 4 years (i.e. 7.5% p.a.). CIT is not deductible for Special Tax and vice versa. Other Taxes Minor CO2 and Nox emission levies are payable on gas flared, gas or oil/condensate used for power generation and nitrous oxide emissions. CO2 levies are part of government take from field developments, however, these have not been included in this analysis due to their minor impact. NOx levies are paid into a fund used to reduce NOx emissions. Applicable installations on the Norwegian shelf are also subject to the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS). CO2 Tax CO2 tax is based on both the amount of gas flared on platforms and gas or oil/condensate used for power generation on platforms, rather than the level of CO2 emissions itself. The 2011 tax rate was set at NKr 0.47/scm of gas burned and NKr 0.47 per litre of diesel burned. EUETS Costs Wood Mackenzie’s carbon price assumption for the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS) in nominal terms is €13.85/CO2 tonne in 2012, €16.62/CO2 tonne in 2013 and €20.58/CO2 tonne in 2014. NOx Tax As with CO2 tax, NOx tax is an allowable deduction in arriving at the profits chargeable to both special tax and corporation tax. The NOx tax rate is revised annually, and was NKr 16.14/kg in 2011. In 2008, companies in Norway were given the option of paying into a NOx fund for 3 years, in place of paying NOx tax. The fund is used to reduce NOx emissions. All upstream companies opted into the NOx fund, and paid into the fund at a rate of NKr 11.00/kg, which was increased to NKr 16.14/kg in 2012. Ring Fencing Companies can consolidate their upstream activities for income tax and special tax purposes. Onshore losses may not be set against offshore income. Bonuses, Rentals and Fees No signature or production bonuses are payable. In order to discourage acreage being left fallow, in 2007 the authorities increased the maximum area fee from NKr 70,000 to NKr 140,000 per km 2 (excluding 1st and 2nd round licences). The fee remains at zero during the exploration phase, then increases to the new maximum in only three years. Furthermore, the 40% reduction for relinquishing preemption rights will be removed under the new scheme. There is also a two year exemption from the area fee, when a wildcat well is drilled on the licence. Royalty No royalties are payable for fields approved after 1 January 1986. Royalty was previously payable on older fields but has now been abolished. Page 23
Fiscal Comparison/Exploration Attractiveness Product Pricing ‘Norm prices’ are used to calculate revenue for tax purposes, which are fixed by government taking account of market conditions and reference transactions. Stability Provisions No stability clauses are in place. Norway is a member of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 4.5.2 Norwegian tax amendments since 2002 There have been no fiscal changes announced since 2005 and no proposals are being considered at the moment. Summary of changes to Norwegian fiscal terms since 2002 Year Fiscal Change 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 Area rental fees regulation changed as part of Fallow Acreage initiative 2006 2005 Special Tax uplift accelerated to four years (from six years). Tax relief for exploration expenditure available as incurred, even for non-producers. 2004 2003 2002 Source: Wood Mackenzie Red = “increase” in Government Share Green = “decrease” in Government Share Bold = change which impacts existing production 4.5.3 Norwegian terms and conditions for licence extensions The Petroleum Act contains the legal basis for the licensing system in Norway. Content of application and procedure for applying for licences is covered in Chapter 3 of the Petroleum Act and Chapter 3 of the Petroleum Regulations. A licence applies for an initial period (the exploration period) that can last for up to ten years. A set work commitment must be carried out in the form of geological/geophysical preliminary work and/or exploration drilling. If licensees wish to continue work in the licence, the licence will enter the extension period (period for development and operation). If the licensees wish to extend the exploration period, they can submit new work commitments to the NPD and Ministry who will review these. 4.5.4 Norway – Economic indicators for model fields A comparative overview of economic indicators for a range of model field sizes, using the same model fields for each country, is provided in the appendix of this report. The following economic indicators are provided for each model field: Government share % (as a % of the pre-share NPV), Government take NPV (US$ million), and Investor IRR (%). Page 24
Page 2 and 3:
Serviceeftersynet af vilka rene for
Page 4 and 5:
3.1.4 Åben dør-området .........
Page 6 and 7:
1 Indledning og sammenfatning 1.1 I
Page 8 and 9:
Kontorchef Søren Gaard, Erhvervs-
Page 10 and 11:
som selskaberne har indrettet sig e
Page 12 and 13:
der skal deles mellem stat og retti
Page 14 and 15:
Investeringsprojekterne i Nordsøen
Page 16 and 17:
1.2.3 Nordsøproduktionen og staten
Page 18 and 19:
2 pct. og 6 pct. Samme udvikling i
Page 20 and 21:
Figur 1.5. Statens andel af det ska
Page 22 and 23:
Danmark er endvidere, set i forhold
Page 24 and 25:
felter eller i marginen af eksister
Page 26 and 27:
Forskellen mellem statens andel fø
Page 28 and 29:
form af, at indkomsten vil blive s
Page 30 and 31:
Inddragelse under kulbrintebeskatni
Page 32 and 33:
2 Udvikling i vilkårene for kulbri
Page 34 and 35:
Statsdeltagelse. Fra 1. januar 2004
Page 36 and 37:
Med indførelsen af det nye regels
Page 38 and 39:
2.3 Ændringer i kulbrinteskattelov
Page 40 and 41:
Fremadrettet forventes der endnu en
Page 42 and 43:
Tabel 2.1. Provenu fra olie- og gas
Page 44 and 45:
Figur 2.5. Statens andel af det ska
Page 46 and 47:
3 Beskrivelse af gældende rammevil
Page 48 and 49:
Tilladelser til efterforskning og i
Page 50 and 51:
dergrunden i det ansøgte område.
Page 52 and 53:
edre seismiske undersøgelsesmetode
Page 54 and 55:
Figur 3.4. Udviklingen i antal till
Page 56 and 57:
3.1.7 Vilkår for kommende udbudsru
Page 58 and 59:
De enkelte elementer beskrives i de
Page 60 and 61:
3.2.1.4 Afskrivning Udgifter til an
Page 62 and 63:
Hvis udledningsvirksomheder ikke fo
Page 64 and 65:
Nedsættelsen gælder både i relat
Page 66 and 67:
3.2.1.9.2 Nye regler Satsen, som se
Page 68 and 69:
Erfaringerne fra udviklingen i den
Page 70 and 71:
3.3.3 Behov for teknologiforbedring
Page 72 and 73:
I Norge og Storbritannien er der fo
Page 74 and 75:
4.3.2 Norge Der betales 28 pct. i s
Page 76 and 77:
Wood Mackenzie har foretaget en sam
Page 78 and 79:
For bedre at kunne sammenligne hvor
Page 80 and 81:
Selskabernes betaling til staten i
Page 82 and 83:
Figur 5.1. Afkastgrad før skat ved
Page 84 and 85:
Det højere afkast i Danmark kan fo
Page 86 and 87:
ske muligheder, der er til rådighe
Page 88 and 89:
udsætninger er feltet imidlertid r
Page 90 and 91:
I beregningerne i denne rapport fas
Page 92 and 93:
Figur 5.3. Privatøkonomisk optimal
Page 94 and 95:
Figur 5.5. Optimalt investeringsomf
Page 96 and 97:
Effekten af en rentestigning er min
Page 98 and 99:
5.2.5 Reduktion af forvridningstabe
Page 100 and 101:
5.3.1 Statsdeltagelse som alternati
Page 102 and 103:
Samfundsøkonomisk kan det derfor g
Page 104 and 105:
Figur 5.6. Omkostningssammenligning
Page 106 and 107:
6 Optioner for ændring af rammevil
Page 108 and 109:
Ved valg af overgangsregler er det
Page 110 and 111:
For ikke både at give selskaberne
Page 112 and 113:
6.1.1.4 Provenumæssige konsekvense
Page 114 and 115:
udnytte fremførte underskud, hvorv
Page 116 and 117:
Kompensationen kan således - uanse
Page 118 and 119:
Boks 6.1. Beregning af kontantværd
Page 120 and 121:
Tabel 6.4. Afvigelse fra de sande o
Page 122 and 123:
Fik selskabet derimod udbetalt skat
Page 124 and 125:
Det har med det eksisterende omkost
Page 126 and 127:
indvinding af kulbrinter - som udga
Page 128 and 129:
6.3.4 Indkomst fra behandling og tr
Page 130 and 131:
Merprovenuet opstår i det omfang,
Page 132 and 133:
Udvalget vedrørende Eftersyn af Vi
Page 134 and 135:
Beskatning af ressourcerne i Nords
Page 136 and 137:
Ressourcerente og beskatning princi
Page 138 and 139:
• Impl.: Selskabsskat på hele SI
Page 140 and 141:
• Formue (RR): Ca. 50 % af BNP
Page 142 and 143:
• Er nuværende system “tæt p
Page 144 and 145:
Effektiv skat af ressourcerenten Pc
Page 146 and 147:
• Norsk vs. dansk beskatning. Nor
Page 148 and 149:
Konklusioner (2) • Beskatningsgru
Page 150 and 151:
Noen hovedpunkter med relevans for
Page 152 and 153:
Lisenstildeling og konkurranse, for
Page 154 and 155:
Statsdeltakelse og skatt • Rimeli
Page 156 and 157:
Tilnærmet nøytralt skattesystem;
Page 158 and 159:
Figuren viser en liten vekst i anta
Page 160 and 161:
Oljeprisen har økt 2003-2008, noe
Page 162 and 163:
Gjenværende utfordringer • Norsk
Page 164 and 165:
noen kompensasjon hvis det skjer ne
Page 166 and 167:
Hvis skattesystemet er nøytralt me
Page 168 and 169:
7. Skatt: Fortsatt problemer og van
Page 170 and 171:
Referanser Aarsnes, Frian, og Pette
Page 172 and 173:
DANISH OPERATORS Grundvilkår for o
Page 174 and 175:
DANISH OPERATORS Produktionen er fo
Page 176 and 177:
DANISH OPERATORS Om rammevilkår...
Page 178 and 179:
Disposition… Værdikæden Beskæf
Page 180 and 181:
En fuldtidsansat i et olie og gasse
Page 184 and 185:
Danish Offshore Industry
Page 186 and 187:
Aftaleretlige muligheder for at for
Page 188 and 189:
Opdraget • Som i overskriften •
Page 190 and 191:
Modifikationer • ”lov og ærbar
Page 192 and 193:
Aftalens indhold i øvrigt • Til
Page 194 and 195:
Forudsætningslæren Hvis en foruds
Page 196 and 197:
Forudsætningssvigt? • Indebærer
Page 198 and 199:
Bestemmelsens baggrund • Forbruge
Page 200 and 201:
Eksempel: Ula-sagen Nordiske Domme
Page 202 and 203:
Om hardship og genforhandling Kende
Page 204 and 205:
Konklusion • Svært at få øje p
Page 206 and 207:
egeringen ikke ville have indgået
Page 208 and 209:
Konsekvensen af at antage, at betal
Page 210 and 211:
I forudsætningslærens tre betinge
Page 212 and 213:
. Principielle betænkeligheder Sku
Page 214 and 215:
enhed. Feltet viste sig at producer
Page 216 and 217:
vinding - beskæftiger sig med muli
Page 218 and 219:
næppe i overensstemmelse med gæld
Page 249: Kammeradvokaten 28. FEBR AR 2013 En
Page 260 and 261: Udvalget for Serviceeftersyn af vil
Page 262 and 263: Fiscal Comparison/Exploration Attra
Page 332 and 333:
Fiscal Comparison/Exploration Attra
Page 334 and 335:
Ressourceopgørelsen anvendes som g
Page 336 and 337:
vanskeligt at forudse, hvilke nye t
Page 338 and 339:
1.2 Ressourcer opdelt på de 3 omr
Page 340 and 341:
For perioden 2004-2011 udgør gaspr
Page 342 and 343:
Figur 1.9. Faktisk olieproduktion 2
Page 344 and 345:
Figur 1.11. Faktisk gasproduktion 2
Page 346 and 347:
Bilag 5: Oversigt over de ved udgan
Page 348 and 349:
Tilladelse 4/98 Selskab Andel (%) O
Page 350 and 351:
Tilladelse 12/06 Selskab Andel (%)
show all

Serviceeftersyn af vilkårene for kulbrinteudvinding ... - Skatteministeriet

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?