Freedom by the Sword - US Army Center Of Military History

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Freedom by the Sword: The U.S. Colored Troops, 1862–1867
where Union generals thought he would threaten the Nashville and Chattanooga
Railroad. On 25 November, with the northward direction of Hood’s army more
clear, Thompson received orders to send Battery A, 2d USCA, to reinforce the garrison
of Nashville. Mounted men of the 12th and 13th USCIs patrolled the north
bank of the Duck River. They saw no organized groups of Confederates, although
Thompson reported guerrillas “very thick” south of the river. Incessant rains earlier
in the month had increased the flow of the river and prevented the guerrillas from
crossing. 71
As Hood drew closer to Nashville, General Thomas received word that four
Confederate cavalry regiments had somehow crossed the Duck River. On 29 November,
he ordered the evacuation of Johnsonville. The first telegrams arrived soon
after sunrise and were indefinite, with phrases like “as the case may be” and “unless
it should become actually necessary to move hastily, of which there is no prospect
now.” By noon, with Hood’s army approaching Franklin, twenty miles south
of Nashville, the language became more definite: Thomas ordered forty freight
cars to Johnsonville to carry off government property; Colonel Thompson was
to dismantle any cannon that could not move, throw the gun carriages into the
river, and “move promptly” to Clarksville, some sixty miles to the northeast. In
midafternoon, the telegraph line went dead between Johnsonville and 12th USCI
headquarters at Kingston Springs, twenty miles west of Nashville. 72
Mounted companies of the 12th USCI had been on a scout for three days. While
waiting for their return, Lt. Col. William R. Sellon received orders to withdraw the
12th and 100th to Nashville along the line of the railroad as soon as the last train
from Johnsonville passed. As Sellon prepared to evacuate Kingston Springs on
30 November, the mounted patrol returned with the news that no Confederates
had crossed Duck River since the four cavalry regiments had moved north earlier
that week. After dark, a telegram from Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield reached General
Thomas, announcing that Hood’s army had attacked the Union earthworks at
Franklin that day “with very heavy loss, probably 5,000 or 6,000 men. Our loss is
probably not more than one-tenth that number.” Schofield’s estimate was close to
the total number of Confederate casualties (more than six thousand two hundred
fifty), but the defenders had suffered more than twenty-three hundred and Hood’s
force still outnumbered his own by three to one. The victorious Union troops abandoned
their hastily dug position and withdrew north toward Nashville ahead of the
battered Confederates. 73
Sellon’s command was not the only one moving to reinforce Nashville. At
Chattanooga, General Steedman readied five thousand men—convalescents and
conscripts belonging to Sherman’s army but who had arrived too late to join it
on the March to the Sea, and six infantry regiments, including the 14th, 16th, and
44th USCIs—on 25 November. Five days later, word came from General Thomas:
71 OR, ser. 1, vol. 45, pt. 1, pp. 669, 995, 1049–50, 1100, 1128; Lt Col W. R. Sellon to 1st Lt T. L.
Sexton, 23 Oct 1864; Col J. A. Hottenstein to Col C. R. Thompson, 26 Nov 1864; Lt Col W. R. Sellon
to Col C. R. Thompson, 28 Nov 1864; all in 13th USCI, Entry 57C, RG 94, NA.
72 OR, ser. 1, vol. 45, pt. 1, pp. 1138, 1161 (“as the case”), 1162 (“move promptly”), 1163.
73 OR, ser. 1, vol. 45, pt. 1, pp. 1171 (“with very”), 1194–95; Thomas L. Livermore, Numbers
and Losses in the Civil War in America, 1861–65 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), pp. 131–32.