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Freedom by the Sword - US Army Center Of Military History

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50<br />

<strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Sword</strong>: The U.S. Colored Troops, 1862–1867<br />

Like most officers of black regiments, Capt. John W. M. Appleton had served as an<br />

enlisted man in a white regiment. These photographs show him as a private in <strong>the</strong><br />

Massachusetts militia and as an officer of <strong>the</strong> 54th Massachusetts.<br />

Fort Wagner. General Gillmore concentrated his artillery; <strong>by</strong> nightfall on 17 July,<br />

twenty-five rifled cannon and fifteen siege mortars were trained on <strong>the</strong> Confederate<br />

works. A heavy rain during <strong>the</strong> night delayed <strong>the</strong> opening bombardment until late<br />

<strong>the</strong> next morning. By <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong> 54th Massachusetts landed, late on <strong>the</strong> afternoon<br />

of 18 July, two Union brigades—a little more than four thousand men—had been<br />

under arms for anywhere from four to seven hours. 64<br />

Gillmore’s report, written weeks later, called Morris Island “an irregular mass<br />

of sand, which, <strong>by</strong> continued action of wind and sea (particularly <strong>the</strong> former),” had<br />

accumulated on top of <strong>the</strong> mud of a salt marsh. The buildup had been gradual: sixty<br />

years earlier, <strong>the</strong> island had not existed, but wind and sea could subtract as well as<br />

add. Only after <strong>the</strong> attack of 18 July did <strong>Army</strong> officers learn that beach erosion had<br />

64 OR, ser. 1, vol. 28, pt. 1, pp. 345–46; vol. 53, pp. 8, 10, 12; Appleton Jnl, pp. 53 (“over narrow”),<br />

54; Emilio, Brave Black Regiment, pp. 65–68. Strength calculated <strong>by</strong> averaging <strong>the</strong> strengths of<br />

<strong>the</strong> 6th Connecticut, 9th Maine, 7th New Hampshire, and 100th New York in OR, ser. 1, vol. 28,<br />

pt. 1, p. 357, and vol. 53, pp. 10–13, and multiplying <strong>by</strong> nine, <strong>the</strong> number of regiments in <strong>the</strong> two<br />

brigades (OR, ser. 1, vol. 28, pt. 1, pp. 346–47). A third brigade that included Montgomery’s 2d<br />

South Carolina was present but did not come into action. Stephen R. Wise, Gate of Hell: Campaign<br />

for Charleston Harbor 1863 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 232–33,<br />

reckons <strong>the</strong> “Estimated Effective Strength” of <strong>the</strong> regiments that took part in <strong>the</strong> attack as 5,020.<br />

But <strong>the</strong> commanders of <strong>the</strong> four regiments named above listed a total strength of 1,820, while Wise<br />

gives 2,140 (an overestimate of nearly 17.6 percent).

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