Safety in the vicinity of non-towered aerodromes - Australian ...

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See-and-avoid conflicts See-and-avoid conflicts where situational awareness errors were involved (also contributed to by inadequate or no communications in some cases) made up about one-seventh of all occurrences. These types of conflicts led to almost all of the six accidents recorded in the vicinity of non-towered aerodromes between 2003 and 2008, four of which were mid-air collisions, and two of which were runway incursions leading to a collision on the ground. Furthermore, there were 60 serious incidents in which an accident almost occurred. Once again, these were mostly due to a lack of communication between pilots or an insufficient awareness of nearby traffic, leading to an airprox. In 87 occurrences, a Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) alert occurred due to a potential separation issue. In over half of these cases however, the TCAS alert was the only indication that pilots of an aircraft had of the other traffic. In approximately 20 per cent of all conflicts, one or more aircraft took avoiding action to prevent a collision or an airprox. In a further 17 per cent, one aircraft made a precautionary diversion from its intended flight path in order to maintain safe separation with another aircraft that was not communicating or aware of other nearby aircraft. Inadequate communication between aircraft Insufficient communication and broadcasts between aircraft, radio failures or misunderstandings were the biggest contributors to occurrences in the vicinity of nontowered aerodromes between 2003 and 2008 (388 of 709 occurrences). Communication issues accounted for 38 per cent of all information errors and 31 per cent of all action errors for these occurrences. Good communication between pilots on the Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF) is critical to creating a safe operating environment in uncontrolled airspace, especially in higher traffic density locations such as at non-towered aerodromes. Despite this, in almost a third of all occurrences, it was known (or likely) that the pilot was operating within the vicinity (10 NM) of a non-towered aerodrome and not monitoring the CTAF effectively. In 146 occurrences, the pilot did not have their radio tuned to the correct CTAF at all. Procedural errors and circuit operations Procedural errors were the second most common occurrence group at non-towered aerodromes (after communication issues). While not all of these occurrences happened in circuit areas, the proximity of aircraft and workload of pilots in this phase of flight reduces the margin of safety if procedural errors occur, or pilots do not make the positional and intentional broadcasts on the CTAF as required by CAR 166. In one-seventh of occurrences, an aircraft did not make a broadcast prior to taxi or entering a runway, and in 28 occurrences, a pilot did not broadcast before entering the circuit. Not making these broadcasts reduces the situational awareness of all other pilots in the circuit, as they are not aware of what aircraft are in the air, where they might be in the circuit, or if they are using or taxiing on an active runway. Within the circuit, most incidences of reduced separation between aircraft were due to at least one aircraft conducting circuits in a contrary direction to other circuiting aircraft (i.e. aircraft coming head-on in the circuit), or aircraft on base leg conflicting with those on final. This finding was supported by previous ATSB research into mid- - 78 -
air collisions, which found that 80 per cent of collisions occur in the circuit area, and two-thirds of these happen on the base-final turn. Radio frequency (CTAF) congestion and interference/shielding problems There were not very many occurrences in which broadcast congestion on the CTAF (and formerly, on Mandatory Broadcast Zone (MBZ) frequencies) was cited. Some issues involving an overlapping of broadcasts from two nearby aerodromes using the same CTAF were raised in confidential reports to the ATSB (through the Confidential Reporting (REPCON) and Confidential Aviation Incident Reporting (CAIR) schemes), and from Minutes of Regional Airspace and Procedures Advisory Committee (RAPAC) meetings in different states. Terrain shielding problems were generally not apparent from the occurrence data, with some evidence from REPCON and CAIR reports that there may have been some terrain shielding at Newcastle (RAAF Williamtown) Aerodrome (NSW) and in the vicinity of Cooma (NSW). In all instances, pilots experiencing radio frequency problems should gather as much information on the location, source, and nature of the interference, and refer these issues to Airservices Australia for further investigation and resolution. 10.1.2 Findings from movements data As readers might expect, most occurrences related to airspace use and operations in the vicinity of non-towered aerodromes occurred at the busiest aerodromes where radio carriage was required. However, the actual number of occurrences between 2003 and 2008 at each aerodrome was relatively small (the highest number of occurrences recorded at any aerodrome was 26), and occurrences were distributed across many aerodromes and aircraft landing areas (ALAs) (n = 231), all of varying sizes, locations, and activity level. A review of movement data and traffic mix at 20 of the busiest aerodromes found that Ballina/Byron Gateway, Mount Gambier, and Kununurra are experiencing a shift in their passenger transport services from smaller to larger aircraft. Port Macquarie Aerodrome had more passenger transport movements over the period, and also a greater proportion of large jet transport aircraft operating these services. A review of the occurrences at these 20 aerodromes showed that Ballina/Byron Gateway, Dubbo, Geraldton, Hervey Bay, Horn Island, Karratha, Orange, and Wagga Wagga had a disproportionate number of occurrences involving passenger transport aircraft, relative to the proportion of all movements at those aerodromes that are passenger transport aircraft. However, it was not possible to tell how much of an influence the better reporting culture of passenger transport operators had on this finding. - 79 -
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ATSB TRANSPORT SAFETY REPORT Aviati
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Published by: Australian Transport
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4.4 Making your presence and intent
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THE AUSTRALIAN TRANSPORT SAFETY BUR
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Airproxes and other separation issu
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across many aerodromes and aircraft
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procedures from 3 June 2010) GPS Gl
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What challenges do pilots face at n
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A factor in the frequency of occurr
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suggested that they ignored the lim
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airmanship principles, and to allow
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1.3 Scope This report focused only
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• Violations - any individual act
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Table 1: Movements for 20 selected
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that the level of detail and the ty
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Figure 1: Airspace-use and operatio
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Figure 2: Most common types of occu
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3.4 Where were the most occurrences
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Occurrences relative to flight rule
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Page 52 and 53: Runway incursions can have serious
Page 54 and 55: ATS errors in passing traffic infor
Page 56 and 57: In particular, pilots’ broadcasti
Page 58 and 59: Information errors were the most co
Page 60 and 61: A number of reports (n=40) indicate
Page 62 and 63: 5.3 Decision errors Decision errors
Page 64 and 65: A 2004 ATSB review of all 37 mid-ai
Page 66 and 67: In both cases, the pilots of most o
Page 68 and 69: Figure 10: Typical circuit entry me
Page 70 and 71: At non-towered aerodromes, circuits
Page 72 and 73: 6.2 Why weren’t pilots monitoring
Page 74 and 75: 6.3 Other alerted ‘see-and-avoid
Page 76 and 77: Not a substitute for maintaining an
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Page 80 and 81: Figure 13: Damage to Piper PA-28 Wa
Page 82 and 83: 7.3 Avoiding action taken and colli
Page 84 and 85: One airprox occurred between two pa
Page 86 and 87: The movement data elements 32 colle
Page 88 and 89: Notable changes in traffic mix betw
Page 90 and 91: expected number of occurrences; how
Page 92 and 93: Investigation number AO-2007-006 Wi
Page 94 and 95: 8.4.4 Other recent investigations i
Page 96 and 97: 9.1.1 Parachuting operations A numb
Page 98 and 99: 9.1.4 Avoiding landing charges Ther
Page 102 and 103: 10.2 Previous ATSB studies into non
Page 104 and 105: 10.4 What you need to do if you fly
Page 106 and 107: writing, data does not exist to eva
Page 108 and 109: Australian Transport Safety Bureau.
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