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Safety in the vicinity of non-towered aerodromes - Australian ...

Safety in the vicinity of non-towered aerodromes - Australian ...

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may have been due to action errors by one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pilots (such as not tun<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> radio<br />

to <strong>the</strong> correct Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF) be<strong>in</strong>g used <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> vic<strong>in</strong>ity<br />

<strong>of</strong> that aerodrome). Situations where a pilot reported <strong>the</strong>ir location differently from<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir actual position were also coded as communication-related errors. This occurred<br />

<strong>in</strong> 13 cases.<br />

Source: photo courtesy <strong>of</strong> Alex Gagiero (Temora Aerodrome, NSW)<br />

Situational awareness-related <strong>in</strong>formation errors (almost one-third <strong>of</strong> cases) were<br />

related to situations where one or more pilots had a less than adequate awareness <strong>of</strong><br />

nearby traffic. For example, a situation where a pilot taxied across an active runway<br />

without broadcast<strong>in</strong>g and it was known that he did not look to see if any aircraft were<br />

on approach or take<strong>of</strong>f was coded as a situational awareness error. Situational<br />

awareness errors also <strong>in</strong>cluded pilots land<strong>in</strong>g on an <strong>in</strong>correct runway.<br />

Position/proximity assessment-related <strong>in</strong>formation errors (one-fifth <strong>of</strong> cases) occurred<br />

when a pilot <strong>in</strong>correctly assessed <strong>the</strong> position or <strong>in</strong>tentions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pilot <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />

aircraft that <strong>the</strong>y were aware <strong>of</strong> (lead<strong>in</strong>g to a reduced safety marg<strong>in</strong> between those<br />

two aircraft), or came too close to ano<strong>the</strong>r aircraft that <strong>the</strong>y were aware <strong>of</strong> on<br />

approach or operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a circuit. In 47 occurrences, <strong>the</strong> pilots were ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />

separation with <strong>the</strong> assistance <strong>of</strong> radio alert<strong>in</strong>g (or <strong>in</strong> some cases, <strong>the</strong> flight crew <strong>of</strong><br />

one aircraft were ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g visual separation with a <strong>non</strong>-broadcast<strong>in</strong>g aircraft);<br />

however, <strong>the</strong> assessment <strong>of</strong> separation was found to be <strong>in</strong>correct (due to a Traffic<br />

Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) traffic advisory (TA) 25 , or because <strong>of</strong> a<br />

manoeuvre by one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> aircraft).<br />

25 A traffic alert (TA) is <strong>the</strong> first level <strong>of</strong> warn<strong>in</strong>g provided by a TCAS/ACAS to pilots and flight crews<br />

that <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> separation between two aircraft is reduced, and that <strong>the</strong> aircraft are com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to<br />

conflict. TAs are <strong>in</strong>tended to assist <strong>the</strong> pilot to visually acquire <strong>the</strong> conflict<strong>in</strong>g aircraft, and prepare<br />

<strong>the</strong> pilot for a potential resolution advisory (RA) if <strong>the</strong> TCAS/ACAS determ<strong>in</strong>es that <strong>the</strong>re is a risk <strong>of</strong><br />

a collision. TCAS/ACAS operates on relatively short time scales. The maximum generation time for<br />

a TA is 48 seconds before <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> collision. For an RA, <strong>the</strong> time is 35 seconds. The time scales<br />

are shorter at lower altitudes (where aircraft typically fly slower). Unexpected or rapid aircraft<br />

manoeuvres may cause an RA to be generated with much less lead time. It is possible that an RA<br />

will not be preceded by a TA if a threat <strong>of</strong> collision is imm<strong>in</strong>ent (EUROCONTROL, 2010).<br />

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