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Safety in the vicinity of non-towered aerodromes - Australian ...

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8.4 Investigated occurrences at comparison group<br />

<strong>aerodromes</strong><br />

Several <strong>in</strong>vestigations have been conducted by <strong>the</strong> ATSB <strong>in</strong>to safety occurrences at<br />

<strong>non</strong>-<strong>towered</strong> <strong>aerodromes</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> current National Airspace System <strong>non</strong>-<strong>towered</strong><br />

aerodrome procedures came <strong>in</strong>to effect <strong>in</strong> November 2005. All <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se occurred at<br />

<strong>aerodromes</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sample group. Most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se occurrences <strong>in</strong>volved a conflict<br />

between an RPT and a GA aircraft.<br />

These <strong>in</strong>vestigations have raised a number <strong>of</strong> concerns relat<strong>in</strong>g to issues such as<br />

aircraft separation, poor communication, situational awareness and circuit procedures.<br />

8.4.1 Port Macquarie Aerodrome<br />

Investigation number 200700231<br />

A Piper Arrow aircraft was approach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> aerodrome to jo<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> circuit on left<br />

crossw<strong>in</strong>d for runway 03. At about <strong>the</strong> same time, a de Havilland Canada Dash 8<br />

aircraft and a Piper Mojave aircraft were prepar<strong>in</strong>g to depart <strong>the</strong> aerodrome. All<br />

aircraft operat<strong>in</strong>g at Port Macquarie were required to carry and use a very high<br />

frequency (VHF) radio, as <strong>non</strong>-<strong>towered</strong> procedures us<strong>in</strong>g CTAF(R) applied.<br />

On short f<strong>in</strong>al for runway 03, <strong>the</strong> pilot <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Arrow reported see<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Dash 8 enter<br />

<strong>the</strong> runway. The pilot immediately broadcast his position, and prepared to <strong>in</strong>itiate a<br />

missed approach. The crew <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dash 8 saw <strong>the</strong> approach<strong>in</strong>g aircraft at <strong>the</strong> same<br />

time as this broadcast. They advised that <strong>the</strong>y would vacate <strong>the</strong> runway without<br />

delay, and <strong>the</strong> pilot <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Mojave manoeuvred his aircraft to assist <strong>the</strong> Dash 8 to<br />

depart <strong>the</strong> runway. The Arrow cont<strong>in</strong>ued his approach and landed safely.<br />

The <strong>in</strong>vestigation determ<strong>in</strong>ed that <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g safety factors contributed to <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>cident.<br />

• The Dash 8 taxied onto <strong>the</strong> runway unaware <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r aircraft on f<strong>in</strong>al<br />

approach for <strong>the</strong> same runway.<br />

• The procedures used by <strong>the</strong> Dash 8 crew did not ensure an effective active<br />

listen<strong>in</strong>g watch on <strong>the</strong> CTAF to ensure that <strong>the</strong>y had received radio notification<br />

from all o<strong>the</strong>r circuit aircraft before enter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> runway.<br />

• The TCAS display <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dash 8 did not <strong>in</strong>dicate <strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Arrow when<br />

<strong>the</strong> Dash 8 entered <strong>the</strong> runway, despite <strong>the</strong> transponder <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Arrow operat<strong>in</strong>g<br />

normally and <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> correct mode.<br />

• The Dash 8 crew’s visual lookout prior to enter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> runway did not detect <strong>the</strong><br />

Arrow on f<strong>in</strong>al approach.<br />

• Frequency congestion on <strong>the</strong> CTAF occurred as <strong>the</strong> Dash 8 entered <strong>the</strong> runway,<br />

reduc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> opportunity for <strong>the</strong> Arrow pilot to broadcast his position and<br />

<strong>in</strong>tentions.<br />

Follow<strong>in</strong>g this occurrence, <strong>the</strong> Dash 8 operator issued a safety alert notice (SAN) to<br />

all <strong>of</strong> its flight crew to highlight <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> monitor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Aerodrome<br />

Frequency Response Unit (AFRU) for a ‘beep-back’ dur<strong>in</strong>g CTAF operations.<br />

Source: ATSB, 2008b<br />

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