World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk - WBGU

the Amu Darya, flow through the territory of several
countries of Central Asia. The mountainous republics
of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the upstream
states which control the headwaters. Further downstream,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are the heaviest
consumers of these resources (Giese et al., 2004;
Karaev, 2005).
Up to 90 per cent of the water resources in
these countries is used for irrigated farming, which
accounts for 75–100 per cent of the area under cultivation
in the four republics (Bucknall et al., 2003;
Ahmad and Wasiq, 2004). Recent figures show that
agriculture accounts for 20–40 per cent of the GDP
here (World Bank, 2006b) and therefore plays a
major economic role. Cotton – the leading export
crop – is a very water-intensive crop and, when coupled
with inappropriate irrigation technology, its production
leads to soil salination and decreasing productivity.
In Uzbekistan 50 per cent of the irrigated
land areas are already affected, and in Turkmenistan
the figure soars to a huge 96 per cent (Bucknall et
al., 2003). The fate of the Aral Sea symbolises this
combination of dehydration, salination and pesticide
pollution, which has proved to be an ecological and
social disaster for the region (Létolle and Mainguet,
1996; Giese, 1997). The electricity in Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan is based almost exclusively on hydroelectric
power which, with the aid of foreign investors, is
being further developed for export.
The states of Central Asia, which have been independent
since 1991, are defined by largely closed markets,
weak state structures and corruption (Karaev,
2005; CIA, 2006). Their past was plagued by conflict,
in which struggles over land and water resources
played a major role. Extreme social disparities mark
a culture of exclusion from economic life which is
controlled by a small, rich class, mainly from the old
Soviet nomenklatura. In Tajikistan declining water
quality caused by pollution was an important contributing
factor to violent intrastate conflicts (Giese
and Sehring, 2006; Wolf, 2006). Ethnic disputes and
campaigns by separatist or religious-fundamentalist
groups are destabilizing the area even further. Interstate
conflict is rooted in the partly arbitrary demarcation
of borders, and stems mainly from the use
of the unevenly distributed water resources in the
region (Giese et al., 2004; Kreutzmann, 2004).
Plausible developments in Central Asia
The following assumptions have been made about
the future development of Central Asia:
Ongoing climate change and glacier melt: Temperatures
in Central Asia are expected to rise sharply
in future (IPCC, 2007a; Section 7.5). By 2050 about
20 per cent of the glaciers in some of the mountains
may have disappeared, along with approxi-
Conflict constellation: ‘Climate-induced degradation of freshwater resources’ 6.2
mately a third of the total glacier volume (Giese
and Sehring, 2006), with major implications for
water supply.
Hydroelectric power affected in the long run: The
glacier melt, accelerated by climate change, at first
results in increased water availability in the summer
months. To avoid putting the existing hydroelectric
power infrastructure at risk, major runoffs
and flooding are allowed in the agricultural areas
surrounding the lower reaches of the rivers. As the
inflows from the melting process slowly decline,
the energy sector is compromised. The economic
consequences are serious.
Agriculture in crisis: The dependence of agriculture
on constantly diminishing water resources
leads to rapid falls in the production of cotton
and essential foodstuffs. Soil degradation and
desertification increase as a consequence of inappropriate
agricultural production practices. Unemployment,
poverty and migration escalate in the
rural areas. Pressure grows to introduce a sustainable
resource management system for the agricultural
sector (Herrfahrdt, 2004; Opp 2004), but it
proves impossible to implement efficient land-use
and water management systems.
More frequent sand and dust storms: Settlements
are increasingly threatened by sand and dust
storms as a consequence of desertification and the
scarcity of water. In regions contaminated with salt
and pesticides, these storms cause major human
health problems (Giese and Sehring, 2006).
Social disparities and weak state institutions still
predominate: The poorer classes continue to suffer
from inadequate access to land and water
resources, and do not benefit from export earnings.
The power of the existing elites is unbroken,
state structures remain weak, the state’s monopoly
on the use of force is ineffective, and the provision
of public goods does not improve.
Potential for interstate conflict persists: Recurrent
drought and a high demand for water in the cotton
monocultures of the downstream states conflict
with the needs of the upstream states (hydroelectric
power) and provoke disputes over the allocation
of water resources.
Fictitious confrontation scenario: Resource
conflict and interstate tension
The following scenario is conceivable: In the coming
decades regional temperatures rise significantly,
leading to greater evapotranspiration in the lowlying,
cultivated areas. Glacier melt speeds up in the
mountains. Consequently dams at first experience
increased water inflows, but as the glaciers continue
to shrink, the flows reduce substantially. Interstate
resource conflicts increase as the poorer upstream
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