World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk - WBGU

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6 Conflict constellations
ations can result in problems for political stability in
a number of respects.
On the one hand, at no other time is a population
more reliant on external support than during and
after a disaster. The call for public assistance with the
response to the direct consequences is part and parcel
of almost all major natural disasters. If the obstacles
to intervention mean that the needs of disaster
victims can only be met slowly and inadequately,
however, in most cases there will be mounting frustration
and dissatisfaction with the government in
office. On the other hand, in many disasters it is obvious
that damage and casualties are not attributable
purely to the physical forces of nature: poorly implemented
building codes, housing development on vulnerable
sites, inadequate mitigation measures and
unclear emergency instructions are often identified
in the aftermath of disasters as obvious failures of
government, and discussed as such in public (Drury
und Olson, 1998). These or similar issues contributed
to political crises in Haiti (1954), East Pakistan
(1970), Bangladesh (1974 and 1988), Bihar (1987),
Orissa and West Bengal (1999), West Bengal (2000)
and New Orleans (2005) (Section 3.2.2).
The collapse of state functions always poses a
huge challenge for a government. This is all the more
acute when natural disasters strike, because the political
decision-makers are expected not only to implement
relief measures but also to ensure security in
the disaster areas. Indeed the breakdown of state
functions may well be exploited by non-state actors
in the pursuit of their own interests. A relatively common
phenomenon in this context is looting. Most
often, this involves people acting out of necessity
to obtain essential goods for survival; in some cases,
however, thefts of valuables and acts of violence are
also reported. These or similar incidents have been
documented for disasters in Bihar (1987), Nicaragua
(1998), China (1998), Orissa and West Bengal (1999),
Venezuela (1999), West Bengal (2000), Haiti (2004)
and New Orleans (2005) (Section 3.2.2).
6.4.2.3
From crisis to destabilization and violence
Mechanism 1: Escalation of existing
intrastate conflicts
Drury and Olson (1998) establish a clear relationship
between disasters and political unrest. Although
disasters can occasionally consolidate the political
leadership in its position, as a rule disasters tend to
heighten dissatisfaction with the ruling government.
In disaster situations governments often lose their
capacity to act. Any mismanagement and incompetence
on the part of the government and the admin-
istration are likely to be ruthlessly exposed during
and after disasters (Drury and Olson, 1998). Poorly
implemented building codes and emergency planning,
delays in the arrival of relief, and misuse of aid
funds are typical examples of state failure in these
situations. Pain over the loss of family members
and property combined with the blatant failure of
the responsible authorities can have such an effect
on public opinion that political stability is seriously
jeopardized in the medium term. These kinds of incidents
marked the course of conflicts in Haiti (1954),
East Pakistan (1970) and Bangladesh (1974 and 1988)
(Section 3.2.2). It is striking that in none of these
cases did new conflicts arise. Rather, events acted as
yet more damning evidence to justify the criticism of
the ruling government by its political opponents.
As a generalized assumption, then, the risk of conflict
is especially high when a disaster coincides with
existing or growing intrastate political tensions. Particularly
where there is poor governance and a wellorganized
opposition, a disaster is likely to act as a
catalyst.
Mechanism 2: Conflicts generated by social
tensions in power vacuums
The temporary breakdown of state functions can
be abused by a wide variety of groups for their own
ends (e.g. looting by gangs). In past disasters, however,
reports of violence and looting have often been
blown up out of proportion by the media and have
not reflected the real situation in the disaster area
(Auf der Heide, 2004). In such situations, the risk of
armed uprisings by rebel groups also tends to be low,
because they are equally exposed to the organizational
and logistical constraints imposed by the natural
disaster. There is no known case in which foreign
armies or rebel groups have exploited a natural disaster
to mount an invasion.
The descriptions of lootings referred mostly to the
theft of essential goods for survival. Nevertheless, in
some disaster areas it went as far as systematic thefts
of consumer goods and the use of violence. These
lootings took place in conditions of temporary anarchy,
closely linked with the timing of the transitory
collapse of state functions. Looting generally begins
about 48 hours after the actual disaster (Ebert, 2006)
and ends when state functions are restored. It is striking,
however, that a disaster-related breakdown of
state functions need not necessarily bring looting
and higher crime in its wake. There tend to be more
reports of a wave of mutual goodwill within affected
societies and a fall in the crime rate (Fuentes, 2003;
O’Leary, 2004). Lootings of consumer goods are
mostly carried out by perpetrators from outside the
disaster zone (O’Leary, 2004).